Afghanistan Committee on May 14th, 2009

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here.

It's nice to hear from people who have actually been there and actually have the expertise and don't rely on retired corporals who run magazines.

With respect to securing a civilian population, I'd like just a generalized comment. I know you can't give a number on this, General Thompson, but you talked about zero casualties. That's a tremendously commendable thing. Can you give a generalized comment on how many civilian casualities we'd have if we weren't there?

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

I can't, Mr. Hawn. That would be entirely speculative. I have no idea.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

No, I know it's not a number, but suffice it to say that the civilian population is safer because we are there.

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

The civilian population that is not under the security umbrella of the Afghan national security forces are certainly subjected to acts of intimidation on a daily basis.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

We were talking about benchmarks, and I have a couple of things for General Howard. You have a broader international view. We have a number of benchmarks and we're measuring progress against them. Is there an international view of how Canada's doing with our benchmarks? Do you have a view on how we're doing with ours, compared to other folks who may have similar benchmarks of their own?

[BGen Alan Howard]

When I left Afghanistan, nine of the 15 brigades that compose the Afghan National Army--they're spread out in five different regions, five different cores--are combat-capable and are involved in counter-insurgency operations every day, including the brigade within the Canadian sector. I've had a chance to see all 15 brigades and the standard that has been achieved across the ANA. We should be proud of what we've accomplished within the Canadian Forces to help the ANA.

One of the questions was on the growing technical aspects of the Afghan army and their ability, for example, to counter IEDs. It's a very tough subject to get the ANA squared away on counter-IED. There are very high illiteracy rates, and it takes a long time to train the illiterate soldiers we get. I dispatched the very first counter-IED team to my good friend here, Dennis Thompson, in December. That was a 20-man team. The very first counter-IED team in the field trying to learn their trade to come up to our standards was in the Canadian sector.

I personally felt proud as a Canadian. I'm not just painting the walls red here. We are seen as a true partner over there, and certainly when we had challenges within the command, we weren't necessarily looking in the Canadian sector.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

General Thompson, I'll switch gears here a little to the air wing. I don't think you were there for that one, but Operation Sanga Fist was the first air operation in which we had Canadian soldiers inserted as part of a larger force by air rather than ground. How significant is that mission in going forward?

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

Obviously we made great use of aviation assets previous to the air wing. It just happened that they were British, American, and Dutch aviation assets.

Having that sort of flexibility for tactical commanders is a tremendous advantage, because it allows you to appear in places where the insurgents wouldn't otherwise expect you to be. It gives you the element of surprise and allows you to catch them on their back foot. It also allows you to get close to compounds of interest that would have been indicated to you by intelligence, so it's a significant multiplier. To have Canadian assets only makes the job that much easier for my colleague Jon Vance.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

I'd like to go back to securing the civilian population, as you put it. I know you personally had a lot of close contact with them in your time there.

People are concerned. People talk about how the Afghans are lukewarm to us or don't want us there. There is that sort of attitude. Is it that, or are they being prudently cautious because if we don't stay--when I say “we”, I mean the broader we, not just Canadians--and the Taliban return, they will want to have hedged their bets on where their support is? Does that go back to the basic premise of boots on the ground and having enough people there to stay long enough to secure the confidence of the population for a longer term?

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

I think what it goes back to is precisely that.

We do not conduct operations, whether they're ISAF operations, NATO operations, or Canadian operations, without being in direct partnership with the Afghan national security forces, whether that's the police or the army. We always conduct operations in that manner, and that's because we recognize that once we're in among the Afghan population, they're obviously the best ones to be the face of the security forces and to represent their government.

While I would agree there is a lukewarm acceptance that western forces are necessary--particularly in the south, where the insurgency is present and appears to be intimidating larger parts of the population, as they might have done in the past--we find we're much more successful when we operate in partnership with the Afghan national security forces.

The key is getting more boots on the ground, but not necessarily.... Where the population is, those boots should be Afghan boots vice western boots.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Benchmark four talks about the confidence that the ANA has in the population, and it has assessed that about 85% of people are happy with the ANA.

The ANP is a larger challenge, actually. Would you put a number on the ANP at the moment? And how would we get that number up?

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

I wouldn't put a number on it. You might be able to ask through the researcher. It may have formed part of a survey at one time.

The reason, again going back to the differences between the ANA and the ANP, essentially is that we got to the ANP late in the game compared to when we got to the ANA. One of the interesting facets—I'm sure General Howard can shed some light on this—is that when a member of the ANA graduates from his recruit training, he has a bank card, so he knows he's getting his pay.

When security forces actually get their pay, and they don't have anybody between them and their money and their money and their family, then they're no longer in a position where they have to prey on the local population. This happens in many conflicts around the world.

That is essentially what the problem was with the police. As they graduate now from the focused district development program, they're all given a bank card. During our time, anyway, about 1,000 police officers went through the focused district development program in Kandahar province, and those are 1,000 police officers who don't have someone's hand in their pockets, so they're able to look after their family.

It's an important distinction to make.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much. You're right on schedule here.

Mr. Dewar, please.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our guests.

One of the areas that I think is going to be important is the American footprint on the work that we're doing. I understand the description you just gave, and I appreciate that. I think it's important to lay out the recent changes at the top.

Secretary Gates is quoted as saying, “It's time for new leadership and fresh eyes”, so he's brought in someone new. General McCrystal, who is going to be the top general, obviously will be providing a different direction, and, if you believe Secretary Gates, new leadership and fresh eyes.

In what I've read of the new leadership for the American military, they seem to be trying to do two things. One is to provide more military—not necessarily in numbers, though, and I want your take on this—and a different approach. If we are now inheriting a new variable, if you will, the new leadership, is it too early to state how we're going to change what we're doing?

I appreciate your saying that you're going to continue doing the work you're doing, but it seems to me that there will be some effect on what we're doing on the ground. I'd just like to know your take on it to date with the new leadership change.

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

I think it's an excellent question, but unfortunately you're asking me to speculate in some regard.

What I will say is this. While I was there in October or November—I can't remember the precise month—an assessment team came from the United States Central Command. This was part of General Petraeus taking over his new role. They went to all parts of the United States Central Command area of operations, and we met the team that came to Kandahar. We get lots of visitors. Some of them are learned, like this group, and other ones are a little bit more taxing. I can tell you that the officials who showed up from the U.S. Central Command, they had their stuff in order, so to speak. It was quite refreshing. They asked the right questions, and I think that the subsequent strategy that has been developed by the Obama administration is actually probably on the mark. That includes some of the changes, I suppose, that they're making now.

What's important is that the team left with an appreciation, in a positive sense, for how our provincial reconstruction team operates. It is a different model than that used by the United States. You would have noted, recently, that the United States is trying to increase the number of civilians they're going to deploy in all of their various provincial reconstruction teams and across the mission writ large, and they've appointed a senior envoy in Mr. Richard Holbrooke to look at the regional problem.

All of these things are encouraging. So while it may be described as fresh set of eyes or a different approach, that different approach is going to look, in my opinion, and I'm talking opinion now, remarkably like the Canadian approach.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you for that.

On another issue of import, we were discussing the training of police here recently. I know that's separate from the issue today, but it's related. One of the issues that was of deep concern, certainly for me, and I'm sure others, is the fact that when we look at the Afghan human rights commission's reports on the conduct of police, we see there is some really horrific behaviour amongst the police. I know the problems with the police and I don't want to open that up, I simply want to talk about the army.

I couldn't agree with you more that there need to be professional standards and some basic things, like making sure you're going to get paid, to deal with things like corruption. But how is the whole issue of human rights done in the training of the army? Is there monitoring of the army, like there is of the police, in terms of their conduct, and if so, what kind of reporting has been done on that in terms of human rights conduct and standards?

[BGen Alan Howard]

During my year with CSTC-A, if I can comment on the first question quickly and then move on to the second one, the big thing that was missing for us was enough resources. General Thompson talked about that. I think the influx of U.S. troops will allow CSTC-A, for sure, to better deliver its mandate. It has been an operation that was second in priority for the U.S. when it comes to Iraq. We were very deficient on police mentors and were not able to get enough of the police mentors squared away. I think an influx of U.S. troops will really help with that particular issue.

The challenge that faces the ANA is no longer the production of combat units. They're quite good at that. What I spent a lot of my time doing was building systems--logistics systems, medical systems, and legal systems. We spend a lot of time and we have Canadian and U.S. officers working with their legal branch. None of those officers have legal training; we are almost starting from scratch. The law of armed conflict, human rights, and the like are things the Afghan seniors take very seriously. I worked with their equivalent of the JAG and the deputy minister to start a training plan. We're in very early days with that.

My experience with Afghan generals was that if there was a problem that was reported from the field, we would go to investigate immediately, and they would take it seriously. But to inculcate it amongst all of the Afghan troops will be a work-in-progress over the next several years.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Does the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission monitor the conduct of soldiers at this point, or is that a work-in-progress?

[BGen Alan Howard]

I do not know whether they monitor what the soldiers do. I know that within the Afghan chain of command, if any abuses are noted, they do come up the chain. We are beginning to put training packages together to explain to the Afghan army the importance of following the rules of armed conflict.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

We're right on schedule again.

That closes the opening round. Now we're on the second round, five-minute spots.

We'll start with Mr. Obhrai.

[Deepak Obhrai, Conservative, Calgary East, AB]

Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, General, for coming. From our testimony I think it has become obvious that Pakistan is a key cog in the wheel to bring stability to Kandahar province. It was made very clear to us that without stability on the Pakistani side, there will not be stability on the Afghanistan side. This is a challenge that is out there.

We would be interested in knowing if the Afghan National Army and the Pakistani army are cooperating. Is there animosity? There seems to be animosity between the presidents, but is there really animosity between those two forces out there? If so, what are we doing about it?

I know we are helping them on the border situation for customs and everything, but I'm talking about both sides of the armed forces. That will become the key element. Perhaps you would like to shed some light on that, if you can.

[BGen Alan Howard]

Let me start at the higher level, and then Dennis can talk at the Kandahar level.

Quarterly, it was a bit of a confidence-building regime that I observed under way. There's no doubt about it, there is friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan. If I was to say any different, you would call me a fool. The issue, though, is confidence-building.

Once a quarter, I observed General McKiernan leave Kabul with the Chief of the General Staff, General Bismullah Khan, and normally his G3, General Kayani, would go with him. They would meet with their Pakistani colleagues at a border point and they would discuss border security issues, confidence-building, and the like.

I hope that does bring fruition. The big thing was to have the discussion, to at least begin a bit of sharing of information, but there's much more work to do in that area. At least the two sides are talking at that level, and that's really what we tried to do. They're very initial steps that have some way to go. The Afghan army appreciates and knows that the situation in Pakistan needs to be stable for them to be able to flourish in the security environment that they have in Afghanistan.

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

Right. And just to put a more provincial note on it, if I could, if you think of the problems in Pakistan right now, they're predominantly in the northwest frontier provinces and in the federal administered tribal areas, vice Balúchistán, which is the portion of Pakistan immediately adjacent to where Quetta is and where the Canadian Forces are deployed in Kandahar.

In this region, the Afghan and Pak counterparts are the Afghan border police and the frontier border corps from the Pakistan military. Those two organizations speak through a mechanism called the “border flag” meeting, which is a meeting that I would co-chair with whoever decided to host it at that time.

We had three of those while I was there. They would discuss, because now we're talking where the rubber meets the road, such basic issues as radio frequencies, and exchanging cellphone numbers, and talking about incidents that might have occurred over the last couple of months. But these were discussions about real-life friction points.

So that process has to continue and that dialogue between the security forces has to continue down at that level, as well as at the capital level. There's certainly lots of animosity between them, but there isn't some sort of trigger that's going to go off that's going to start a war between Pakistan and Afghanistan at this point in time. Tensions aren't at that level, if you see what I mean.

[Deepak Obhrai, Conservative, Calgary East, AB]

But there is still a lot of work of do.

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

Oh, without question. It's a completely unregulated border. Highway 4 runs from Quetta to Kandahar City. I think you had a session on this, so you're probably better informed than I am on where Canadian Border Services and others are going with the control of the legitimate crossing. What I'm talking about is all those other illegitimate crossings where not only insurgents move back and forth from Pakistan to Afghanistan, but also, clearly, narcotics and other nefarious products. And that piece is going to be tightened up over time.