Afghanistan Committee on Nov. 17th, 2010

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

I'd like to bring this meeting to order.

This is the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, meeting number 17.

We are continuing our study of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, and we have witnesses today from the Canadian Council of Churches. Mr. Mike Hogeterp is vice-chair of the Commission on Justice and Peace, and Mr. John Siebert is the executive director of Project Ploughshares.

Welcome, gentlemen. I hope I've pronounced your names correctly.

Have you decided who is going to go first and how you will split your time at this point?

[Mike Hogeterp, Vice-Chair, Commission on Justice and Peace, Canadian Council of Churches]

I'll begin, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Okay, you will begin.

We welcome you to our committee. We look forward to what you have. Usually opening comments are around ten minutes, and then we open it up for questions and comments.

Anytime you're ready, go ahead.

[Mike Hogeterp]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and committee members, for your invitation to be with you today. It's certainly a privilege.

The brief before you today is entitled “Canada's Role in Afghanistan,” and it's a consensus position of the Canadian Counsel of Churches, which is the broadest ecumenical body in Canada. We have 22 member churches representing the Anglican, Evangelical, Orthodox, Protestant, and Roman Catholic traditions. For that reason, the statement before you is a remarkable one. The recommendations before you were formed from a shared belief that a robust public dialogue on Canada's responsibility for advancing peace in Afghanistan is urgent.

The Manley panel noted that public and parliamentary dialogue would make an important contribution to sound and sustainable policy on Canada's role in Afghanistan. We indeed urge this committee to widely consult civil society and citizens in Canada and Afghanistan as you explore next steps for the mission.

The events and announcements of the last few days convinced us of the importance of such dialogue as I've just talked about. The churches will most certainly need more time to consider the evolving mission in order to sharpen a substantive and constructive contribution to this important dialogue. Nevertheless, today our comments will be framed by the brief in front of you.

As the Canadian Council of Churches president, Reverend Bruce Adema, wrote in his forwarding letter to the Prime Minister last December, Canada should focus on two priorities. First is to support Afghans in implementing participatory reconciliation programs and responsive governance at the district and local level. Second is to encourage the international community to give significant new attention to diplomatic efforts to end the war.

We will also briefly comment on the recent announcements concerning a training mission in Afghanistan, in light of the council's recommendations.

We recognize, of course, the sacrifice made by many in the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan and the profound suffering of the people of Afghanistan through decades of war. Canada's future efforts in Afghanistan should honour such sacrifice and suffering with integrity and commitment.

Through a process of research, analysis, and dialogue with many of you, we have concluded that peace in Afghanistan cannot be achieved solely through military means, and that peace is a generational project requiring international commitment and resources well beyond July 2011. It is a generational project. This is particularly true with respect to the challenges of reconciliation and peace-building at both the national and sub-national levels.

The question before us is where and how Canada can best make its contribution to sustainable peace in Afghanistan. Let me start by saying that reconciliation in Afghanistan is a complex, multi-level endeavour that will advance incrementally. Efforts towards reconciliation at the local and district level are distinct but are related to national negotiations for political reconciliation and reintegration of the insurgents.

My colleague John Siebert will address the national and international aspects of this in a moment, but right now I'll make some specific comments on sub-national governance and reconciliation.

The reasons for conflict in Afghanistan, as you well know, are diverse. Conflicts spring from disputes over land and water, family and tribal grievances, the presence of the Taliban and other insurgents, warlords and criminal elements, international forces, and corrupt Afghan security forces and government officials.

The reconciliation priority, or priority number six in the quarterly reports, has struggled to gain traction. The reports suggest that this is due to the inability of the government of Afghanistan to focus on a direction and to zero in on a lead agency. Canada, to this point, has properly been deferential to Afghan-led reconciliation, but it is clear that the working definition of Afghan-led is national-government-led. That's an unfortunate limitation.

We know Afghanistan is culturally and geographically complex. Indeed, central governments historically have rarely exercised national reach. Authority, governance, and basic service delivery are frequently focused at local and district levels.

There are documented indications of continuing support--dramatic support in fact--for local, informal, and traditional authorities in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is then essentially a hybrid system of interdependent formal and informal power holders.

As such, local Afghan leadership for governance and sub-national reconciliation is a significant resource for peace-building, one that needs further exploration and then support for its incremental development. Our brief details some of the complexities of sub-national governance and reconciliation activities, and we can certainly explore those in the question period.

Suffice it to say now that beyond 2011 it is our hope that Canada will put new energy and commitment into a sub-national reconciliation priority, specifically in collaboration with civil society organizations with a track record of support for local governance and peace-building activity in Afghanistan.

I'll pass it over to my colleague. John.

[John Siebert, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares, Canadian Council of Churches]

Progress in sub-national reconciliation will require a stable national context if these gains are to be sustainable. To end this civil war in Afghanistan, Canada should commit itself to advancing a diplomacy surge that has the political energy and financial resources of the military surge.

What is true of local and regional reconciliation is also true of creating a national cessation of hostilities in a new political environment and social framework in Afghanistan. It's complex, multi-level, and will take a lot of time. As some have put it, the peace process in Kabul runs through Islamabad and New Delhi. There are other neighbours who must play a role in finding peace, along with the United States and other ISAF members, including Canada.

In our view, the national peace process must be led once again by Afghans, but not necessarily the current Afghan government. It has been drawn into an entrenched civil war along with supporting international forces. The government of Afghanistan must be part of reconciliation efforts, but not necessarily the manager or custodian of this process. Part of the responsibility of the international community, of which Canada is an integral part, is to work with Afghans in and beyond the government to develop a trusted process through which reconciliation and negotiation efforts can take flight.

Current attempts to induce individual insurgents to switch sides have largely failed. The reasons speak to misjudging their primary motivation for fighting under the Taliban or other insurgent groups, and the resulting lack of attraction for what is on offer. The goal of national negotiations ought to be the creation of an inclusive political order in Afghanistan. It must include the Taliban and other insurgents and address the legitimate fears that a new political order will compromise the hard-won expansion of civil and other human rights in Afghanistan, particularly the rights of women.

We recognize that Canada cannot be the sole or primary international actor in this diplomatic surge, but it could play a decisive role in persuading the international community, particularly its close allies, to work for a political settlement. To this end, we would recommend that Canada appoint a special envoy on Afghanistan, with adequate staffing and financial support as well as the trust of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of National Defence.

Finally, we have a comment on Prime Minister Harper's recent announcement, reinforced by other ministers, that Canada will continue to field up to 1,000 Canadian forces in Afghanistan after July 2011 to carry out a training mission through 2014. The member churches have not had a chance to consult internally, and Mike and I do not want to speculate on what the churches might want to say collectively. What we would like to do is take the principles articulated in the December 2009 brief from the Canadian Council of Churches and apply them to this emerging situation.

Let's ask some questions. Will continued training and equipping of the Afghan National Army and police bring us closer to the goal of a negotiated, sustainable, inclusive peace in Afghanistan? The answer isn't immediately apparent. Better trained Afghan military and police personnel could extend the services and legitimacy of the national government to local areas where insurgent fighting is light or non-existent. Elsewhere, to simply substitute Afghan troops for ISAF troops presents no gains for a political resolution of this civil war. With this continuing and expensive military commitment in Afghanistan, will Canada also increase its diplomatic activity to support a negotiation surge, as well as increase development and other forms of assistance to address local governance and development needs? If we do not, then we continue to play a role in sustaining the current military stalemate, while missing the opportunity to support the war's conclusion.

Thank you once again on behalf of the council and on behalf of Mike and me for this opportunity to be here. We look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you.

The usual practice at this committee is to have the official opposition begin with a seven-minute round of questions and comments.

Mr. Wilfert.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for coming.

I have a series of questions. First, do you have, or have you had, any presence on the ground in Afghanistan?

[John Siebert]

Historically, Canadian churches have not had widespread presence in Afghanistan. That's probably something that could be said to be true of most Canadians and most Canadian organizations prior to 2001.

We do bring a record of participation in development, peace-building, and disarmament work around the world. Churches are among the largest civil society organizations. We don't function as a command organization such that we can deliver each and every member of any one of our churches on a particular issue, especially as complicated as this one. But our statement does represent the collective wisdom of our involvement in the world, including in multi-faith dialogues.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Do you partner with other non-governmental organizations on the ground?

[John Siebert]

Certainly we do. And I should say that there are Canadian church-related development organizations that do have a presence in Afghanistan, and there are--

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Could you name a couple of them?

[John Siebert]

Sure. There are the Mennonite Economic Development Associates. There are others. I know there is an ecumenically supported organization that's worked with eye hospitals and that sort of thing for decades. CARE and others that are not religious or faith-based are also partners with us.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

They would have a connection.

Thank you.

[Mike Hogeterp]

Just as a quick follow-up on that, the Canadian Foodgrains Bank did have an active program in Panjshir in 2003.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, sir.

Something you mentioned in your brief, which we certainly have been supportive of, is the appointment of a special envoy for Afghanistan with a mandate to pursue new diplomatic efforts. And we certainly agree with that and applaud that.

You had sent a brief to the Prime Minister on December 10, 2009. Did you get a response? And if so, what was it?

[Mike Hogeterp]

We did get a response--a letter several months later--thanking us for the intervention.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Were there any specific comments on your brief?

[Mike Hogeterp]

Not that I can recall.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you very much.

You mentioned human security often in your brief, and we certainly all agree with the issue of human security. You prefaced your remarks earlier by indicating that you haven't had time to consult your membership with regard to the training aspect. But do you see training as an integral part of, or certainly a major component of, this human security factor in Afghanistan in order to do the kind of aid work and assistance that you were looking to do?

[John Siebert]

The human security framework certainly takes account of formal security mechanisms like police, army, border controls, and that sort of thing, but definitely tries to broaden the scope of the meaning of security so that people in their communities and in their families are secure and have access. “Freedom from fear and freedom from want” is a tag phrase that sums up the human security, so it's more all-encompassing.

The training mission could assist, given the proper circumstances. But ultimately, if we don't have a stable national context, if we don't have a peace agreement and a peace-building process that implements it, the training of Afghan national forces won't assist to that end.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

I notice that in your comments, sir, on a few occasions you referred to the “civil war”. Are you not accounting for the fact that al Qaeda plays a significant role in the operations, and that in fact these are often non-Afghanis, so in any kind of reconciliation you have an unknown component as part of any kind of reconciliation?

[Mike Hogeterp]

Indeed, that's a fair comment. In terms of a broader reconciliation agenda, we're saying that the al Qaeda factor addresses sort of the broad national and more regional context. Communities are vulnerable to the influence of insurgency. And to drive down to successes in local governance and service delivery and so forth can reduce that vulnerability and therefore create a momentum for change in human rights and justice at those levels, which hopefully undercuts the vulnerability of those communities and feeds up the chain towards a more sustainable civil-society-based peace process.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Something you noted was the support for outreach research pilot projects to try to create a new local reconciliation. There are two parts to my question. The first is what your view is generally of the current operation of CIDA and CIDA projects in Afghanistan. Second, how would your comments differ, if at all, from what CIDA is currently doing, particularly at the local level?

[Mike Hogeterp]

We've followed the local reconciliation agenda through the reconciliation priority, which, from our perspective, has been led by the Afghan task force at the Department of Foreign Affairs. To be honest, I don't have a lot of information or analysis on CIDA programming.

Nevertheless, local governance and reconciliation is certainly something that can be supported by CIDA, and indeed there has been some intervention, I think, on the Independent Directorate of Local Governance. That agency itself has been identified as somewhat problematic, and you see that also in the brief. Further analysis is necessary.

Our interest in local-level reconciliation tries to reflect the reality that Afghanistan is a decentralized place, with a great diversity across geography and culture and where authority is actually isolated in those pockets. Therefore, support for those localized structures, which are often informal, is critical for the process of developing peace, as I mentioned.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

You have half a minute.