Evidence of meeting #5 for Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan in the 40th Parliament, 3rd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was know.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Ahmadshah Malgarai  Advisor to the Former Commander of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan, As an Individual
Amir Attaran  Counsel to Ahmadshah Malgarai, As an Individual
Eileen Olexiuk  Former Senior Policy Advisor, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, As an Individual

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Good afternoon, colleagues.

This is meeting number 5 of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, on Wednesday, April 14, 2010.

I remind everyone that today, as you can tell, we are televised, so I would ask everyone to adjust their cellphones or their BlackBerrys.

We're continuing our study of the transfer of Afghan detainees. Appearing as our first witness today as an individual is Ahmadshah Malgarai, the advisor to the former commander of the Joint Task Force in Afghanistan.

I know, Mr. Malgarai, that you have a friend with you today. You'll be making the presentation, basically. As you understand, you will have some opening remarks, and we'll go into a couple of rounds of questioning, if that is all right with you.

Mr. Hawn.

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

Laurie Hawn Conservative Edmonton Centre, AB

Mr. Chair, I have a point of order.

We gave notice that we would like to seek unanimous consent—because we didn't get the motion in by the 48-hour limit—for the following motion, the reasons of which will be obvious.

This will only take a couple of minutes.

The motion is:

That the Committee begin without delay to investigate and study Canada's preparations and plans for the withdrawal of Canadian Forces from Afghanistan in 2011, and Canada's Whole of Government efforts and plans in Afghanistan post 2011, in light of the fact of the Leader of her Majesty's Official Opposition's inquiries in the House of Commons on March 30th, 2010, concerning the “plans the government has for the Canadian mission in Afghanistan after 2011”; and the Prime Minister's invitation to the opposition to “share its ideas on the future of the mission”; that the policy relevance and importance of these plans are clearly of immediate concern and primary importance; and that given that the Military Police Complaints Commission is continuing its own investigation, that the Committee's continuing Taliban prisoner investigation constitutes a political exercise damaging to the morale of our troops and Canada's mission.

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Hawn, my question is, are you asking for—

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

Laurie Hawn Conservative Edmonton Centre, AB

I'm asking for unanimous consent to consider that motion today. I think I know the answer.

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

You don't have unanimous consent.

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

Laurie Hawn Conservative Edmonton Centre, AB

I think I knew that answer, Mr. Chair, but—

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you.

Is this on this point of order?

3:30 p.m.

Bloc

Claude Bachand Bloc Saint-Jean, QC

No, it's on another one.

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

On another one?

3:30 p.m.

Bloc

Claude Bachand Bloc Saint-Jean, QC

Yes.

Mr. Chairman, I would simply like to draw your attention to the following matter.

The motion introduced at the time put considerable emphasis on the fact that we had to inform as many Canadians and Quebeckers as possible about the issues related to the mission in Afghanistan. However, I'm not sure we'll have the necessary infrastructure to accommodate all the media every time we meet in this room.

I want to know whether we can be guaranteed that, for every meeting held in this room, an invitation will be sent to the media and that we will no longer be served up the argument that it is impossible to accommodate them here in view of the caucus or other meetings that have been held during the morning. That's important for me. I also think that, if we held our meetings in one of the rooms equipped with broadcasting equipment in the Centre Block, that would help us enormously.

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you, Mr. Bachand. I'm not certain that's a point of order, but I think what we could do is certainly take a look at it the next time we have committee business. I'm surely open to doing that.

Mr. Harris.

3:30 p.m.

NDP

Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL

Just briefly, Chair, I would support the comments of Mr. Bachand. Perhaps when we discuss this, we could also consider writing a letter to the Speaker, or whoever is in charge of this, suggesting that some of these committee rooms be upgraded so that they all have access to television broadcasting.

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you, Mr. Harris.

We'll now proceed to our guest today. We look forward to your comments.

3:30 p.m.

Ahmadshah Malgarai Advisor to the Former Commander of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan, As an Individual

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting me.

I am Ahmadshah Malgarai, although some people know me as Pacha, my Canadian Forces code name. I'm joined today here by my legal counsel, Professor Amir Attaran.

I was employed by the Canadian Forces as a civilian in Afghanistan from June 2007 to June 2008. During that time, I served as a cultural and language advisor. You can tell from my accent that I was born in Afghanistan, but I am a Canadian. I came to Canada as a refugee and studied at Carleton University. Ottawa has been my home since.

In Afghanistan I worked both inside the wire at Kandahar airfield, known as KAF, and outside the camp in the dangerous Panjwai district and on dozens of patrols. I was on patrols hit by rifle fire and IED explosions. I risked my life for Canada's soldiers and the Afghan people. I earned many recommendations from the Canadian military and the Afghan government for my service.

From personal experience, I know what is possible or impossible to say because of operational security. Nothing I will say today is a threat to the security of Canada, Afghanistan, or the soldiers with whom I proudly served. I'm here today because of my solidarity with Canadian soldiers and Afghan people.

I had a secret clearance and worked with several military units that handled or interrogated detainees. I translated many meetings and documents about detainees for DFAIT, for the military police, and for the All Source Intelligence Centre, known as ASIC. I also translated and gave cultural advice to high-level Canadians, such as the commander of JTF Afghanistan during Task Force Afghanistan, Brigadier-General Guy Laroche, a man whom I respect very much, and also visiting ministers and members of Parliament.

What I learned in Afghanistan is that Canada often transferred innocent men to the NDS, and sometimes did so when the NDS threatened their safety and their lives. Let me tell some stories about the detainees. Please excuse me for the fact that some of the dates and details are approximate, but the Canadian Forces took my notes when I left Afghanistan.

Around June or July 2007, the CF forces raided a compound in Hazraji Baba, north of Kandahar City. During that week, a Canadian soldier shot a 17-year-old unarmed Afghan man in the back of the head. Shooting an Afghan unarmed man from the back violates the rules of engagement. The Canadian Forces thought he had a pistol, but it was tested at Bagram airfield and it was not his. Anyway, after the Canadian Forces wrongly killed the man, they panicked. They swept through the neighbourhood arresting people for no reason. They arrested more than 10 men, from about 10 to 90 years old. All the men were taken to Kandahar airfield, where I personally interviewed them with the military tactical questioners unit.

None of the detainees were Taliban. None did anything wrong except to be at home when the Canadian Forces murdered their neighbour. Yet Canada transferred all these innocent men to the NDS. I don't know what happened to them.

Here is another story. Around July 2007, a detainee with battle injuries was in KAF awaiting transfer to NDS. Because he had medical needs, a meeting took place between two DFAIT policy advisers—John Davison and Ed Jager—the military police, and an NDS colonel named Yassin. I attended the meeting to translate.

During the meeting, disagreement broke out. Colonel Yassin said that NDS would not accept a sick detainee. When the Canadians insisted, Colonel Yassin removed his pistol, put it on the table, and said, “Here is my gun. Go shoot him. Give me the body, and I will justify it for you.” I translated the NDS colonel's proposal to murder the detainee.

Canada's government says detainees are never transferred to NDS if there is a risk of abuse, but this is a lie. The detainee was transferred to an NDS colonel who proposed murdering him while military police and DFAIT people watched.

When Colonel Yassin made the death threat, Ed Jager immediately said, “I will pretend you did not say that and I did not hear it.” Of course, pretending did not protect the man, but it is what DFAIT and the military police did. I never found out what NDS did to that man.

In the fall of 2007, the CF detained two brothers-in-law named Abdul Ghafar and Atta Mohamad Azckzai. One of those men was a car dealer and the other a mechanic. They were not fighters.

After Mr. Ghafar and Mr. Azckzai were brought to KAF, I received a call from a guard at the Canadian gate, controlled by the Canadian airfield in KAF, called ECP3. Mr. Ghafar's mother, a brave elderly woman, was asking to see me. I went to the gate to see her. She had brought a bag of medicine for her son, who she said had been recently treated for kidney diseases in Pakistan. She asked the guard to take the medicine to her son. She went on her knees, begging and grabbing the guard's feet, but the guard refused. I told my chain of command that to refuse this elderly woman was very insensitive in Afghan culture. Anyway, without his medicine Mr. Ghafar became sick. The doctors at KAF operated and removed his kidney. Then Canada was ready to transfer him.

But as I already told you, the NDS in Kandahar did not want sick detainees. They would not accept Mr. Ghafar. So Canada transferred him to the NDS in Kabul instead. I don't know what happened to him.

Mr. Atta Mohamad Azckzai was also transferred, but not easily. When Ed Jager read him the detainee agreement and he understood that he was being transferred to the NDS, Mr. Azckzai became angry. He asked why he was being transferred. Mr. Jager did not answer. However, Colonel Yassin objected that Mr. Jager was telling the detainee his rights. Mr. Azckzai protested that he had children and no money to bribe his way out of prison. Finally, he put his head on the ground and said to the soldiers, “Please put one bullet in my head. Do that instead of transferring me to the NDS.” He was that scared of the NDS. Colonel Yassin answered. He told all of us, “When Azckzai gets to my room, he will speak.” It was a clear threat to abuse this embarrassing detainee.

Here is the last story. In the summer of 2007 I was with the Canadian Forces assisting in Kalantar village in Kandahar Dand district. I was approached by a very desperate woman. Her husband had been detained a few days before and transferred to the NDS, and now the NDS wanted money to release him. Ransoming detainees is normal for the NDS. If the NDS is not paid, they threaten the family. Afghans know this sort of thing happens. Unfortunately, this woman was too poor. She could not pay the NDS for her husband's freedom. Even worse, with her husband in prison and not working, there was no money to buy food for her four children.

When I saw the children, they looked sick because their mother had to feed them grass and leaves for four days. After our patrol left the village, I do not know what happened to this family.

I am out of time, but there is one question I must discuss: that is the question of why. Why did Canadian officials ignore the abuse of the NDS, or, like Mr. Jager, why did they pretend not to see?

When he testified, Brigadier-General Thompson said that the NDS was “a very valuable partner” and that Canada “acted on the intelligence we received from the NDS”. This is true, but not in a pleasant way. I saw Canadian military intelligence sending detainees to the NDS when the detainees did not tell them what they expected to hear. If the interrogator thought a detainee was lying, the military sent him to the NDS for more questions, Afghan style. Translation: abuse and torture.

3:40 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Malgarai, I wonder how much extra time you need, because we're two minutes over already.

3:40 p.m.

Advisor to the Former Commander of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan, As an Individual

Ahmadshah Malgarai

In just a few minutes I will finish, Mr. Chairman.

3:40 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Just try to summarize it, and then some of it you can bring out in the questions.

3:40 p.m.

Advisor to the Former Commander of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan, As an Individual

Ahmadshah Malgarai

When Brigadier-General Thompson called the NDS our partner for intelligence, he was correct. But that means the military used the NDS as a subcontractor for abuse and torture.

I complained about this to the commander of ASIC, and I was punished for it while I was negotiating for the surrender of two Taliban commanders. Someone in the Canadian Forces, I believe, leaked my real name and real identity to the Taliban. Soon the Taliban were threatening, sending night letters to my family because I was a traitor helping the Canadian Forces. My family had to escape Afghanistan as refugees, afraid for their lives.

I am ending now. The stories I told show how transferring detainees to the NDS does not win hearts and minds but increases support for the Taliban. ASIC thought the NDS was a good partner for intelligence reasons, and Canada's government must agree. Certainly when I complained to the official representative of the Government of Canada in Kandahar, Elissa Golberg, nothing changed.

But today the Taliban are stronger, and Canadian soldiers are more in danger than ever before. That shows how foolish the Canadian government's detainee transfer agreements are. They hurt innocent Afghan people and Canadian soldiers at the same time.

Thank you for listening, Mr. Chairman.

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you, sir.

We'll move into the first round.

Mr. Rae.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Malgarai, I wonder if you could tell us, when you saw the situations that you're describing, did you have any training or did you know what was legal or lawful under the Geneva Convention or under international humanitarian law? Did you have a sense of what should and should not be done?

3:45 p.m.

Advisor to the Former Commander of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan, As an Individual

Ahmadshah Malgarai

As human beings we know what's right and what's wrong. But working for the military...they have a saying in the military, “Don't play with ranks because they can destroy you.” You cannot question the military if a man in uniform is doing something. If you question, you will be in trouble.

We just had basic training for three weeks, but none of it covered humanitarian...what's right or what's wrong or what we could do or what you were not allowed to do.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

Was there a chain of command or a chain of responsibility, where you would have been able to go to someone else who you reported to and say, “I've seen something that should not have happened”? Were you able to do that?

3:45 p.m.

Advisor to the Former Commander of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan, As an Individual

Ahmadshah Malgarai

I went through all my chains of command, from ASIC, from the field security counter-intelligence questioners who were responsible--they knew it. All along the chain of command, they knew what was going on. Everybody knew.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

But you specifically told them.

3:45 p.m.

Advisor to the Former Commander of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan, As an Individual

Ahmadshah Malgarai

I have informed everyone what's going on.