Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon.
My name is Arif Lalani. I am currently the director general for policy planning at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
I served as the Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan from April 2007 to August 2008. Immediately prior to that, I was ambassador to Jordan and to Iraq.
You have heard from my colleague David Sproule and from others about the complexities of the mission—civilian and military—in Afghanistan, over the entire period of Canada's approximately 10-year engagement there.
I would like to speak to you today briefly about the objectives during my time in Afghanistan, and specifically about the detainee transfer file. My predecessor, and officers from the embassy and headquarters, had been developing a number of aspects of the file. David has outlined those to you.
I arrived in Kabul on April 27, 2007. The detainee file was a priority from day one. On my first day in the embassy, on April 28, instructions were sent by headquarters to negotiate a supplemental arrangement to the 2005 detainee transfer agreement using guidelines that had been drafted between the post and headquarters over a period of months. The embassy completed negotiations within six days--by May 3. The conclusion of the supplemental arrangement and other actions Canada took allowed us to address some key aspects of the file.
The detainee transfer arrangements up to that point had three main challenges: notification to the ICRC and other authorities, despite improvements, remained convoluted; we did not have in place a monitoring regime by Canadian personnel for detainees transferred by Canadian Forces; and, record-keeping, by all concerned, needed to improve.
In the month following the arrangement, Canada had begun to implement an increasingly robust monitoring regime, with Canadian civilian personnel, to augment the work of others, such as the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the ICRC. We had changed our notification process to the ICRC so that officials in Kandahar notified the Kandahar ICRC office immediately, in addition to the notifications to Kabul and Geneva. We had developed and began to implement standard operating procedures for the transfer of detainees and for their monitoring. And we had dispatched a technical assistance mission of Canadian experts to examine further options for training, and the provision of equipment to assist Afghans with the management of detainees in Afghan facilities.
Over the course of the year, Canada focused on implementing the transfer regime, including identifying key people accountable for the file, and the creation of a database of detainees transferred by the Canadian Forces.
We had other urgent work at the embassy and in the country, of course.
There were two strategic objectives.
First of all, we were trying to help develop and implement a whole-of-government engagement in Afghanistan, one that saw our military and civilian effort managed in a coherent fashion, and in the midst of a counter-insurgency campaign.
We needed to ensure that a civilian engagement could occupy the space secured by the military so that we could concentrate on the governance, development, and stabilization efforts that were required.
That's why we doubled the civilian presence in Kandahar and Kabul, including officers to monitor detainees.
Second, we needed to have influence commensurate with our investment. Canada was one of the top donors to Afghanistan. On any given file--education, police reform, micro-finance loans for women--Canada was among the top three donors. It was my job, on a daily basis, to ensure that we had voice on these issues, that we were developing policy with headquarters and in Kandahar that would have an impact in a way that would help Afghans build governance institutions, strengthen economic development, and provide for their own security.
Ron Hoffmann joined the embassy in August 2007 as deputy head of mission. His position was created so that we could operate at a fundamentally different level--as a major actor across a number of priority files--with the deputy helping to run the embassy and its operations, including the Kandahar civilian component, and the head of mission focused on influencing the outcome of the files in which we were so heavily invested.
To summarize my time there, Mr. Chairman, Canada was in the process of strengthening its civilian presence in Kabul and Kandahar in order to achieve our national objectives. The detainee transfer file was an important component of a highly charged and important set of issues that the embassy team and I managed.
With regard to detainees, by the time I arrived at the embassy, the reporting had done its job. The issues had been acknowledged. Decisions had been made. Within a week, there was a formalized agreement in place.
Then came the work of ensuring that everyone involved--both the Afghan authorities and all Canadian personnel--fully understood the new system and were working together towards the goal of the agreement. That work was carried out in an outstanding manner by my successor, Ron Hoffmann, and all of the dedicated Canadians who risked their lives to serve in Afghanistan.
Thank you very much.