Mr. Rae, I'd say that some of this information on these developments came to light not in spite of our program, but because of our program, and there are a number of lessons from our experience.
As we geared up this new system of monitoring, which was a robust one and a complex one and required enormous resources from and risk to Canadian personnel to implement, we thought that risk was worth it, because it was important to deliver those obligations; they didn't cover a range of allegations over the course of us stepping up that program. As that monitoring program matured, was refined, and became more and more robust, the number of allegations actually declined. In 2008 we had none, and I think that was a demonstration of the positive outcome of what we were doing.
For the allegations that there were, we took every allegation seriously. Some people complained about the food, about the air conditioning, about the toilet paper, and then the range was much more serious. There was one very compelling allegation of all that we have had--the 10 or 12 over the entire time of our experience with 200 or so visits. There was one that we felt was materially much more significant than the rest, and we took the actions that we think are appropriate to that. That did involve a lengthy stop to the transfer of detainees while we implemented the program and the action plan that we had pre-established, which was to work with the AIHRC, the ICRC, and the Afghan government across the board to ensure that the measures that we expected were needed were actually implemented. And there were no transfers until we were fully satisfied.