Evidence of meeting #7 for Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan in the 40th Parliament, 3rd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was detainees.
A recording is available from Parliament.
4:40 p.m.
Bloc
4:40 p.m.
MGen Timothy Grant
Right.
The bottom line is that we did take action. We took very swift action when those series of articles were printed, were made public. So from that standpoint, absolutely, we acted on the ground in a responsible and swift manner.
As to the issue of whether I was able to make a decision to transfer or not transfer, absolutely, that was my decision. During that period of time, we didn't make transfers. We wanted to make sure of what had transpired on the ground.
4:40 p.m.
Bloc
Claude Bachand Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
This was written in May 2007:
The new transfer agreement is signed allowing Canada to visit Afghan prisons. Colvin says little monitoring occurs due to lack of resources, which means “detainees continued to be tortured after they were transferred.” He also says “the paper trail on detainees was reduced” and “reports on detainees began sometimes to be censored with crucial information removed.”
Do you believe that what Mr. Colvin said is accurate?
4:40 p.m.
MGen Timothy Grant
Not at all. In fact, I would say the paper trail from that point in time became larger.
We put in place at that time a formal piece of paper, a process that would clearly capture the commander's decision-making process. I think that's the paperwork that was discussed yesterday at the MPCC that can't be found, or can't be located quickly.
The fact is we were diligent to make sure we documented exactly what transpired. That information was put into a database that was accessible to both military and Department of Foreign Affairs officers. And that's what I talked about earlier. The implementation of that supplemental agreement caused us to do certain things differently. It took about a week for us to figure out all of the details we had to do to make sure that we had got it absolutely right. And everyone was involved in that. So to say that our paperwork was reduced after that time, it's just the opposite.
4:40 p.m.
Bloc
Claude Bachand Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Okay.
This was reported in June 2007:
A PRT team in Kandahar reports that a Canadian-transferred detainee in Sarpoza prison has been “beaten with electrical cables while blindfolded” by NDS officials.
Are you aware of this report of the PRT team?
4:40 p.m.
MGen Timothy Grant
I believe so, but I would have to see it to be sure.
4:40 p.m.
Former Political Director, Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Department of National Defence
May I ask you to repeat the date?
4:40 p.m.
Bloc
4:40 p.m.
Former Political Director, Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Department of National Defence
Yes, I understand.
If I remember well--and I think I do--this alluded to something that happened before April 2007. It is someone who was transferred to the Sarposa jail and who made allegations about abuse that may have happened at the NDS. These allegations are related to the period preceding April 2007.
4:45 p.m.
Conservative
4:45 p.m.
Conservative
Laurie Hawn Conservative Edmonton Centre, AB
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Grant, we've heard testimony that the captured Afghan insurgents are not IED bomb-makers, but innocent Afghans with no connection to the insurgency whatsoever. Would you agree with that assessment, that most or many of the detainees were taken arbitrarily or simply for the purpose of information gathering? How did we process those folks?
4:45 p.m.
MGen Timothy Grant
I would say no one was taken arbitrarily and no one was taken for the purpose of information gathering. Soldiers were trained. They needed to ensure that their environment was safe, and where there was doubt, through the tool of tactical questioning, they were able to determine if an individual posed a threat to them and to the Afghan civilians in the area.
So were innocent individuals from time to time picked up? Did soldiers on the ground make a mistake? Absolutely. But the fact is they took them in a controlled process, moved them back to Kandahar, where we had the luxury to make the decision, a cold, calculated decision, of whether this person was truly a threat. I would say, in general terms, about 25% of the people were immediately released because they didn't cross that threshold of being a threat.
From my standpoint, the soldiers on the ground who were trying to distinguish insurgents from local farmers made the right decisions. At KAF, we made the right decisions.
4:45 p.m.
Conservative
Laurie Hawn Conservative Edmonton Centre, AB
You probably can't get into too much detail, but how much would a simple gunshot residue test have played in that decision and how much would other factors have played?
4:45 p.m.
MGen Timothy Grant
If you go back to the three scenarios that I described, the first one is the conditions of the incident. So is it after a firefight? Is it after an IED or a suicide bomber? The soldiers would look at the conditions of that incident and then they would look through a series of indicators, and gunshot residue was but one of them. But for security reasons, I would not give you the list of what all the indicators are.
4:45 p.m.
Conservative
Laurie Hawn Conservative Edmonton Centre, AB
I understand.
Mr. Buchan, we've heard a lot of diverging testimony, and a lot of it from Mr. Colvin, and it has been referred to again. Last week Mr. Colvin clarified that he really wasn't saying that Canadian-transferred detainees had been mistreated, but he was concerned that they might be vulnerable to mistreatment. Isn't that precisely the concern that everybody has expressed right from day one? And we might be simply exaggerating his concerns, because he didn't pass those concerns on to you or to General Grant, from what I've been hearing.
4:45 p.m.
Former Political Director, Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Department of National Defence
It's an accurate statement that Richard expressed concerns about the overall treatment of detainees in the Afghan system during the period 2006-07, yes.
I think you're quite right, we all had concerns about risk. We had put measures in place to mitigate that risk and we didn't realize that those measures were not working the way they were intended. Once we did realize the measures were not working as intended, we put in place new ones, much reinforced, in an effort to ensure that the situation was fixed, comprehensively.
4:45 p.m.
Conservative
Laurie Hawn Conservative Edmonton Centre, AB
General Grant, you've worked with translators, obviously, before, and Mr. Buchan, I suspect you have too. We have been told that Mr. Ahmadshah Malgarai obviously was a translator. I assume he would like to keep a low profile for self-preservation. Would that be a normal modus operandi for a translator?
4:45 p.m.
MGen Timothy Grant
It would be.
4:45 p.m.
Conservative
Laurie Hawn Conservative Edmonton Centre, AB
Now, if Mr. Malgarai was preaching in the local mosque, which he was, and was under consideration, in some quarters, as a potential Governor of Kandahar, does that sound like somebody who was really trying to keep a low profile?
4:45 p.m.
MGen Timothy Grant
He started working in Afghanistan while I was still the commander, and I believe he translated for me once. I wasn't comfortable with him, so I went back to another individual. If I had known he was preaching in the mosque, I would have put an end to it, because I don't believe that would be appropriate to do.
My recollection of 99% of the interpreters, translators, is that they are very dedicated to the job they do in Afghanistan, but they do keep a low profile.
