Well, I think that's very much, if I may suggest, the benefit of hindsight. It was not at that time evident to us that there was such a substantial risk.
In the first place, at that point we had not, to my knowledge, taken any prisoners, so we didn't have experience with prisoners. It is quite correct to say that the literature shows there were problems in the Afghan prisons, but as you know from being the member from Toronto Centre, there are problems with the prisons in Toronto. There were three young people killed in the Don Jail within the last year. Every prison system has its problems, including our own.
So you have to balance that to recognize that we were dealing with a country where we were trying to help them build a prison system, that this was a part of what we were building, that we were providing aid for that at the same time, and that this was a part of a process of moving along.
I think it's fair to say that the military leadership at the time did not foresee the number of prisoners who were going to be taken. I think in fact General Hillier gave that evidence before the committee, that in fact this was a surprise, the number of prisoners one took.
So we were operating, if you like, in a somewhat theoretical rather than completely knowledge-based world at that time.