Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for this opportunity to present this afternoon.
My name is Ian McCreary, and I farm at Bladworth, which is just an hour's drive from here in Saskatoon. I'm here today on behalf of the board of directors of the Canadian Wheat Board. I have been a farmer-elected director of the Canadian Wheat Board since the board was turned over to farmers approximately eight years ago. I currently chair the board's farmer relations committee.
In appearing here today I'm mindful of the directive of the government, which does prevent us from speaking directly of the so-called monopoly powers of the Canadian Wheat Board. However, I'm mindful of the minister's view that directors can put their own points of view on the table, and accordingly I will be doing that this afternoon.
At the CWB we take a very broad view of business risk management. Farm income support is certainly a very important component of the business risk management file. As a member of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, we mainly echo CFA's positions on this front. Grain producers need risk management programs that enable them to deal with the extraordinary production risks they face, as well as market risks related to price volatility and the international trade component that feeds non-economic signals back to our grain industry. These programs must provide a foundation for growth and stability in the grain sector. They need to be clear, sustainable, and predictable.
At the Canadian Wheat Board there's a view that there's a structural side to this issue that needs to be highlighted. Grain producers play a fundamental role in the stability and the prosperity of the agricultural sector as a whole, whether it is in the traditional sectors like grain exports, domestic milling, or production of livestock, or in the emerging sector such as the biofuel industry. Plentiful, consistent supplies of grains and oilseeds from western Canada are keys to the present health and future growth of agriculture in Canada.
Unfortunately, grain producers are also in an environment where they exercise relatively little control over the factors that affect the profitability and therefore the sustainability of our enterprises. On the variable input side, for example, a limited number of suppliers provide us with seed, chemical, fertilizer, and fuel that make up the bulk of our costs. Those suppliers have the power to set prices at whatever the market can bear. Grain marketing costs are no better. Where prairie grain producers once had access to two or three elevator companies in each small community, they now face huge distances to get to one terminal that serves their entire area. Grade, stockage, trucking premiums, and access to the grain handling system are correspondingly more difficult to negotiate.
Grain producers are more often than not captive to one provider of rail transportation. When that provider is unwilling or unable to supply them with the cars they require, they have little recourse as individuals. The existence of only three or four major grain merchants on the international stage means grain producers here can be played off against those in other nations and that commodities can be sourced wherever they are the cheapest.
In crops where only a handful of countries buy our export commodities, we can be suddenly left out in the cold by tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed on the whim of government authorities with political agendas. The economic or commercial environment in which grain producers find themselves is one that can be best characterized as a power struggle--a power struggle where you have a limited number of very large powerful entities on one hand and farmers on the other. This uneven power struggle has a direct bearing on farmers' ability to manage their business risk. When grain producers must bid down the value of their crops to get access to grain handling and transportation systems, it lowers returns. When they cannot deliver their crops because of the lack of grain movement, it shuts the tap on cashflow. When the cost of inputs follows the commodity prices in a never-ending upward file of narrower margins, we face increased risk. When a key customer decides to shut its borders, we face backlogs on the farm. Anything that can be done to return some measure of balance to this power struggle is a positive step and one that deserves to be supported in a renewed policy framework for agriculture in this country.
As a farmer-elected director of the Canadian Wheat Board, I would submit to the members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food that the CWB, with its current powers as a single-desk seller of wheat and barley, is just such a positive force. It gives prairie farmers a lever with which to exercise influence over our environment and manage business risk.
Let me point to a few examples of where this has been the case. Through the CWB, farmers stand united in their struggle to obtain good service at reasonable rates from the two mainline rail carriers. Whether it is through a level of service complaints, in direct negotiation, or in the work that has been done on the rail revenue cap, farmers have the CWB to fight on their behalf for lower costs and better access to the system.
The CWB has supported farmers' efforts in their bid to establish and maintain producer car loading facilities as an alternative to the existing grain handling system. Producer cars have enabled participating farmers to lower their costs and bring an element of competition to the environment, where otherwise that would not be the case. Also, producer-owned facilities have a major presence on the Saskatchewan market, and the Canadian Wheat Board as an international market creates a level playing field for rail services for those terminals.
The CWB has diversified markets where farmers can sell their wheat and barley. When a major customer closes its borders to our products, for example, when the U.S. slapped its duties on Canadian exports of red spring wheat in 2003, the prairie wheat industry does not collapse. In the case of the U.S. trade action, new markets were found while we fought the tariffs and eventually won their removal. Contrast this with the fallout from the BSE crisis and its enduring effect on the Canadian beef industry. Our farm operations are still suffering from that collapse.
The CWB's ongoing efforts to brand western Canadian wheat and barley as a consistent high-quality product, backed by a customer service package that is second to none, enables prairie farmers to tie into value chains and get a bigger share of the consumer dollar. When you have a branded product and customers associate value with that product, you can extract more for the product, even when the prevailing market prices drop and supplies of lower-valued commodities are ample.
Branding is ultimately a business risk management strategy. It seeks to develop customer loyalty, so that price is no longer the only determining factor when customers decide to make their purchases. At the end of the day, it really turns suppliers who are price takers into price makers. As a producer, that is our objective.
In addition to providing grain producers with the opportunity to exert greater control over their commercial environment, the CWB also provides western Canadian farmers with some unique pricing tools that also help them to manage their business risk.
The pooling option is the historical one, and it is reasonably well known and understood. The advantage of pooling, from a business risk management perspective, is that it ensures that farmers do not end up selling the entirety of their grain crop in low-price markets. By calculating average returns for the year, all farmers benefit equally from sales of high value as well as more price competitive markets.
It used to be that pooling was the only way to price grain through the CWB. That has changed dramatically since the farmer-elected directors have come to the board. We have added a series of producer payment options that provide farmers with a wide range of pricing alternatives. They can still pool, but they can also price their grain in advance through the fixed-price contract; follow the futures and price their grain at a later date through the basis payment contract; price it off American elevator prices through the daily price contract; or get their money up front through early payment options and still have the opportunity to benefit from future price rallies.
These options are significant from a business risk management perspective because they give farmers the ability to customize their wheat and barley pricing according to their individual needs as farmers. If they need to lock in a price for cashflow purposes or to obtain credit, they can. If they need the opportunity to follow the market and pick off market highs, the PPOs enable them to do just that.
That said, pooling remains the most popular pricing option. It is a simple, cost-effective solution for farmers who do not want to see their wheat and barley sold at the bottom of the market only to have prices rebound as the year wears on while they are left with no crops to sell.
So if the CWB is delivering these business risk management tools, what is the board of directors asking the standing committee today? I want to leave you with a number of messages.
First, we're asking the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food to provide the legislative support necessary for farmer-run marketing agents to continue to work effectively on farmers' behalf in the area of business risk management. I'm not talking about more money here. I'm not asking for government programs. What is needed is a commitment from the committee that marketing agents like the CWB, agents that re-establish some balance in the marketplace and provide grain producers with solid price risk management options, must be enabled to continue exercising the powers that really make them effective.
Secondly, we are calling on the committee to clearly establish how, in the absence of the single-desk powers, the CWB could effectively provide farmers of western Canada with the same kinds of business risk management tools that exist today.
Thirdly, we'd like to know what the committee will do to ensure that the government provides risk management tools to farmers of western Canada if it does proceed with its current policy of making the CWB a voluntary marketing organization.
Lastly, we ask the committee to pause and take a look at what the CWB is proposing in its plan for the future and what we've called the “harvesting opportunity”. The board and senior management at the CWB have spent a lot of time developing this plan. It lays out in some detail how the CWB could do more for prairie grain producers than it does today.
So far there has been no willingness on the federal government's part to engage in meaningful discussions on this plan. It is my hope that in the context of trying to do something real to help the farmers of western Canada better manage risk, the government may revisit this position.
Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to having some discussion and questions.