Thank you, Larry.
I have been here several times testifying on behalf of the Canadian Pork Council, on behalf of Ontario Pork, and on behalf of my own individual case, which is the case today. It seems that since we have been here so often we are like family, and obviously when family gets together, the first thing we talk about is the dirty laundry.
We operate a 600-sow farrow-to-finish unit in southern Ontario, and we support—well, we actually don't support our families on that; we have off-farm income because we can't generate the revenue. Technically, we're broke. If anyone were to want to give us a push, we would be in bankruptcy tomorrow. It is only because our suppliers continue to support us that we are able to continue. There is a strange business case here, because we are looking at next June in the U.S., which is what our commodity-priced product is based on. We are looking at potentially historic record highs of one dollar per pound. Five years ago, that would have translated into a $300 market hog here in Canada. Those are being eroded by high grain prices. If the world continues on the path it is on, we could see record high grain prices; we could see record high hog prices, and then we could still see producers struggling to make ends meet.
In our case, we financed a $2 million expansion starting in 2005. We had a builder that put the screws to us. We ended up in litigation, and today we have a structure that has no occupancy permit and does not meet the Nutrient Management Act, and we have a banker who is pushing us to liquidate as we move forward.
It is interesting as you look at that, and we go back to the penny auctions of the 1980s and how things have evolved. We have all sorts of producers. You may have heard of some of them in Ontario—Wayne Bartels and others—who are looking at using social networking and media such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to bring forward the plight of farmers and to reach people instantly. I'm not sure if we're there.
We have farms under the gun in Ontario, and I see it across the country. I was talking with a gentleman this morning from the east coast. His accountant has 30 farms that are in farm debt review. I was talking with another gentleman yesterday from Saskatchewan. There are 30,000 sow spaces out there that are empty and that could be purchased for somewhere between 10¢ and 15¢ on the dollar, but nobody can find the money to buy them.
We see as we move across the country—and as a producer, I am fortunate to have the ability to contact these people—the definition of insanity being repeated. Some of you...I was fortunate enough to meet with Larry at a reception last week. My definition of insanity is that we continue to do the same thing we did last week, last month, last year, and expect a different result. We have some major lenders in this country that are doing that today. They are going out and forcing farmers off their farms. They are stopping the ability of people to produce and to feed this country, and then they are turning around and putting them on the market and getting bare land value. So why is it that when the farmer offers bare land value, these producers are not allowed to purchase their farms back?
In Ontario, we have an interesting situation: 50% of all farms that are in the hog farm transition program are coming out of Ontario; 30% of the production changes in the country will come out of Ontario; 60% of all the processing and slaughterhouses in this country are in Ontario. What that tells me is that as we allow the basic infrastructure in this country to erode in the swine industry, we're not only putting farm families at risk, we're also putting processing jobs at risk. We're putting trucking jobs at risk. We're putting electricians' jobs at risk, jobs of the people who repair these plants and keep them running. It's a very large issue that goes beyond the farm.
I just found out yesterday when I was at the OFA convention in Ontario that we now have foreign investments stepping into Ontario. Four thousand sow spaces apparently closed in one week, and those 4,000 sow spaces produce approximately 2,000 hogs a week, or they did. The purchaser is in the U.S. Those pigs will now go to the U.S., and as we walk down the line and we follow that back, that's basically a day's kill at one of our plants. It's 30 farm families that all of a sudden, in four months, will have no source of income because their contracts have been cancelled.
How do you sell to the world from an empty shelf? As we continue to lose producers, we will continue to lose processing, and this industry will continue to shrink. Four short years ago, the Ontario industry was reaching for $1 billion in sales, and we were supplying 45% of all the product exported out of this country. And let's remember—I'm sure you're all aware—that the agrifood industry is the fifth-largest exporter in Canada. We are one of the huge contributors to the GDP and to keeping people employed.
We look at all that, and I ask why the minister is going out looking for free trade deals, for bilaterals. If this trend continues, in two years we won't have enough to supply our own markets, let alone supply the world as we have.
But we are here today to talk about the business risk management, and we will move on to that.
Three things I think all of my newly made friends here from the agricultural industry across the country will agree on is that all of these programs need to be bankable, need to be predictable, and need to pay out in a timely fashion. We have none of that within the existing suite of programs we have today.
In AgriInvest, we have a declining fund that's been paid out. Being Canadians, three or four years ago we did the Canadian thing. We took what money the government chose to invest in those programs and we spread it across all commodities. For some commodities, that was a very timely insertion of cash, because since that time they have had record prices for their crops. Typically, across the country, on average, they had better than average crops. Those AgriInvest dollars they're matching up are going into their bank accounts, and they're building for the future.
It's sad to say that in the hog industry and the beef industry the opposite has been true. We not only lost $75 million in AgriInvest money, we've had five years of complete devastation. I'll give you an example of that when we get to AgriStability.
The kickstart program in our industry.... They say that when you're playing the commodity markets, it's better to be lucky than to be smart. Well, I guess we weren't very lucky. We thought we did the smart thing, but we ended up getting hurt. Kickstart also really impacted our industry because of circovirus. In the western provinces, the issue wasn't so bad, but in eastern Canada and central Canada, circovirus contributed to a 40% decline in some farms' income in a single year. Imagine having to go to the barn and draw straws to see who's going to drag all the dead pigs out that day. You had people breaking down and having to be hospitalized.
We have to change that. We have to get those AgriInvest dollars back to the farmers who really need them.
We have AgriStability, which is the core platform in our suite. To use our own example, because I know you like to have numbers you can use, in our 2004-05 reference year, our margin was over $500,000. In 2004-05, our actual margin was $480,000, so the program looked like it was working fairly well. Due to circovirus, appreciation of the dollar, and the decline in markets, in 2005-06 our reference margin was down to $240,000. Our actual margin was minus $300,000--a $600,000 swing in twelve months. That was on top of all the building issues and other issues we went through. At this point, our 2011 reference margin looks as if it's going to be minus $100,000.
In four of the last five years we've had negative margins. And we're producers who in 2008 marketed almost 24 pigs per sow. We're in the top 5% of producers in this country.
We need to reset the clock. There's no chance for any margins in our industry until well into 2015. We need some interim intervention to look after H1N1 and circo.
AgriInsurance I'm only going to touch on very briefly, because we've been talking about it since 2003. We still don't have production insurance, and I see no indication that the government is getting off its ass and doing it in the meantime. I'm sorry, but that's a real issue, guys, and you folks here need to get it out there for the beef guys and the hog guys.
We have AgriRecovery, which is where I believe we can see payments come out to deal with circovirus and H1N1. H1N1 took $35 million out of our industry in one week. Unfortunately, AgriRecovery is very political in the way it's set up. The hog industry was told three years ago, and continuing to last year, to wait until AgriStability comes out and we'd see where it is, to wait until provincial programs come out and we'd see where it is. We still haven't seen anything come out of AgriRecovery to deal with those non-economic issues we had in terms of H1N1 and circo.
Yet when the grain farmers in western Canada had a need, the payments were out within 30 days. They didn't have to wait for AgriStability. They didn't have to wait for crop insurance. The money flowed.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm open for questions.