Agriculture Committee on May 16th, 2019

[The Chair, Liberal, Pat Finnigan]

Thank you, Mr. Drouin.

Unfortunately, that's all the time we have.

I would like to thank Ms. Cameron, Ms. Guigou, Mr. Ross and Mr. Roy for taking the time to come talk to us about a very important issue. This will help us decide which steps to take.

I'll suspend the meeting for a few minutes, and then we'll have another group of witnesses.

[The Chair, Liberal, Pat Finnigan]

For our second hour, from the Canada Border Services Agency, we have Mr. Fred Gaspar, director general, commercial program directorate. Thanks for joining us today on very short notice.

From the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, we have Colleen Barnes, Acting Vice-President of Policy and Programs, and Dr. Jaspinder Komal, Vice-President of the Science Branch and Chief Veterinary Officer and Canada's delegate to the World Organisation for Animal Health. Welcome back to our committee, Dr. Komal.

We'll start with Ms. Barnes for up to seven minutes. Thank you.

[Colleen Barnes, Acting Vice-President, Policy and Programs, Canadian Food Inspection Agency]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I appreciate this opportunity to speak to the efforts being taken to prevent African swine fever from coming into Canada.

Let me touch upon three important points when it comes to African swine fever, or ASF. First, ASF is not in Canada. Second, our approach to keeping ASF out of Canada focuses on prevention and preparedness. Third, we are working with domestic and international partners to finalize a framework and an associated action plan to address ASF.

To begin on my first point, Mr. Chair, the CFIA has recognized from the beginning the importance of keeping ASF out of Canada. In fact, it's a disease we've been watching for years, even before it appeared in China, because an important part of our mandate is safeguarding animal health in Canada.

ASF is a contagious viral swine disease that can cause high mortality rates in infected domestic and wild pigs. To date, there have been no reported cases of ASF in North America, but the disease is spreading rapidly in other parts of the world.

ASF was first discovered in Africa in the 1920s and spread outside of Africa beginning in 2007. Since the summer and fall of 2018, ASF has spread to a significant extent in areas of Europe and Asia.

I want to make it clear that there are no human health risks associated with ASF. Food is safe, and there is no risk of transmission of the disease to humans. However, its entry into Canada could have a devastating impact on the health of the swine population and therefore on Canada's pork industry, as you heard just before Jaspinder and I joined the table.

Canada is the third-largest pork exporting country in both value and volume, representing about 20% of the world pork trade. ln 2017, 1.2 million tonnes of Canadian pork, valued at $4 billion, were exported to over 100 different countries. The Canadian pork industry contributes to more than 100,000 jobs, which in turn generate close to $24 billion.

As you heard this morning, we've been working with representatives from other levels of government and industry both domestically and internationally to minimize the risk and protect Canada's swine population. Our efforts have very much been taken in a partnership approach with industry.

Given that Canada and the Americas are currently free of ASF, we've been taking a leadership role in acting decisively and collaboratively to increase awareness around ASF and fill in gaps that have been identified, in order to aid in our approach to the disease.

This brings me to my second point. Prevention and preparedness have been our major concern. We must be ready for any eventuality. That's why Canada continues to take steps in both of these areas.

Mr. Chair, a big problem with ASF is there's no treatment or vaccine, so this makes the focus on prevention and preparedness most important.

As I said, we've been engaging a broad range of representatives, especially industry, in this country—on both the producer and the processor side—to do all we can to prevent the introduction of ASF into North America, and also to be prepared in the event that the disease reaches this continent. That includes working with government and industry to develop and implement a national action plan, and working closely with both the United States and Mexico, recognizing the integrated nature of our industries. lt also includes working closely with our QUADS partners in Australia, New Zealand and the U.S., with international partners like the World Organisation for Animal Health, or OIE, with the European Union, and with a wide range of other participants from industry to academia.

Another valued partner, whom you'll hear from shortly, is the Canada Border Services Agency. Up to $30 million has been allocated to increase the number of detector dogs at Canadian airports, to help prevent undeclared pork products from entering Canada. This was recognized early on as one of the vectors we had to be worried about. These dogs are an extremely effective means of quickly searching large amounts of baggage, and they are very successful in finding undeclared imported meat products.

ln addition, a ministerial declaration by the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food has placed additional import controls on plant-based feed and feed ingredients arriving at certain Canadian marine ports from countries where we know ASF is already established.

We are also working on tools such as zoning, because that's effective in facilitating safe trade from unaffected areas in the face of an outbreak. We are working with our key trading partners to have zoning recognized in the event of an outbreak in Canada.

This brings me to my final point. ASF knows no boundaries. It cannot be solved by any one country or any one stakeholder. What I know for sure is that we need to work together—industry and all levels of government—to make sure we keep ASF out of this country.

Also, we need to work globally. That is why, earlier this month, an international forum was held in Ottawa, organized by Dr. Komal and co-hosted by Canada and the U.S. Over the course of two days, we worked with colleagues from around the globe to address the risks of ASF. There were 150 leaders and decision-makers from government and industry, from 15 countries, who shared their experience and expertise, engaged in productive discussions and contributed to developing strategies to address ASF.

Jointly, we are finalizing a framework and associated action plan that will support ongoing international collaboration and action in the areas of preparedness planning, enhanced biosecurity, business continuity and coordinated risk communications. This framework and associated action plan will build on existing foundations for a high state of readiness to swiftly control ASF should it enter the Americas region, strengthening biosecurity measures to prevent the entry of ASF and mitigate its spread, establishing arrangements in the swine sector to mitigate trade impacts, and having effective communications.

Through our domestic and international dialogues, we have also identified several key opportunities to collaborate and advance the implementation of the joint framework, once finalized.

The framework was not the end of our work together. Our discussions are set to take this important work further. We have found areas where more exploration is needed, and there will be more discussions on next steps based on the finalized framework, which will take place later this month at the World Organisation for Animal Health.

We are looking forward to our continued collaboration with both domestic and international representatives in industry and all levels of government as we continue to explore how best to address the potential impacts of ASF in Canada. What I do know is that we all need to work together to be successful here.

Thank you again for having me speak about this important issue.

[The Chair, Liberal, Pat Finnigan]

Thank you, Ms. Barnes.

Mr. Gaspar.

[Fred Gaspar, Director General, Commercial Program Directorate, Canada Border Services Agency]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

As my colleague from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency mentioned, the threat to the Canadian pork industry posed by the outbreak of African swine fever in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is serious and one that we are working very hard with CFIA to prevent.

The CBSA is responsible for enforcing CFIA's policies as they apply at the Canadian border point of entry. The agency fulfills this role by screening travellers for inadmissible food, plant and animal products, and ensuring that commercial shipments are released, refused or referred to CFIA for further inspection in accordance with CFIA release recommendations. It should be noted that goods from affected countries, such as uncooked pork products, continue to be inadmissible to Canada.

In managing the border, the Canada Border Services Agency works closely with CFIA to ensure that goods that may pose a threat of spreading African swine fever into Canada are interdicted at the earliest opportunity. To this end, the CBSA has taken several steps, both operationally and in terms of outreach to the public, to help prevent ASF from being introduced into Canada.

Some steps include strategic redeployment of our resources, including food, plant and animal detector dog teams, to focus on flights of primary interest from ASF-affected countries; increasing vigilance in the monitoring of travellers and goods arriving from ASF-infected countries; ensuring that our officers have the training and awareness they need to be vigilant when screening travellers; and ensuring readiness by collaborating with CFIA to develop operational response plans, should they be required.

With respect to our outreach to the travelling public, the CBSA has also taken a number of important steps. We have placed ASF warning posters in 13 languages at 18 Canadian airports and even locations outside of Canada. We have distributed leaflets to inform travellers of their responsibility to declare food, plant and animal items, and we have posted advisories about African swine fever on CBSA web pages and social media. We have conducted outreach to airlines and airports in international locations via CBSA liaison officers who are posted overseas, and we have identified additional means for the CFIA to request ASF messaging, such as on the Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada website for electronic travel authorizations and visas to Canada.

To increase compliance, the CBSA enforces the CFIA's agriculture and agri-food administrative monetary penalties system for contraventions of the governing legislation. Under this system, border officials may issue agriculture and agri-food monetary penalties of up to $1,300 to travellers who fail to declare pork products.

Finally, budget 2019 earmarked $32 million over the next five years, starting in 2019-20, with up to $5.8 million per year ongoing, to increase the number of detector dogs at the CBSA. Over the next few years, the CBSA will acquire and train 24 new food, plant and animal detector dog teams for deployment at high-risk ports of entry, with our first deployment of six teams at major airports by the end of the calendar year 2019.

We've received the mandate, and we've begun to act.

This concludes my opening statement. I would be happy to take any questions you may have.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Pat Finnigan]

Thank you, Mr. Gaspar.

We'll go to questions now.

Mr. Shipley, for six minutes.

[Bev Shipley, Conservative, Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, ON]

Thank you very much for your presentation.

Mr. Gaspar, you answered the question on penalties. When you have a major, intentional breach with an import coming in, what are the consequences?

[Fred Gaspar]

The Agriculture and Agri-Food administrative monetary penalties system provides those consequences. The primary one we're dealing with in the traveller stream relates to declarations. If you declare that you don't have food, plant and animal products and you are found to have food, plant and animal products, that is a false declaration, and you are subject to up to a $1,300 penalty. That's the maximum penalty allowed by law. We have provided guidance to our officers that they should be vigilant, aware and prepared to apply the maximum penalty.

[Bev Shipley, Conservative, Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, ON]

For a major breach, $1,300 is part of doing business. I'm more concerned about—

[Fred Gaspar]

Commercial?

[Bev Shipley, Conservative, Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, ON]

—an intentional breach coming in and what the consequences would be. You've given me the answer.

I'm hoping there would be something a lot more significant. Our pork producers rely on exports, so having this in our country would be detrimental to one of the greatest commodity organizations we have with pork.

If they're exporting that, I'm concerned. Earlier witnesses talked a little bit about it. There is concern about animal activists coming in, because we don't know where they're coming from. They're breaking into our facilities. They're in contact with our animals. In fact, they start to carry them out. If I were being asked what we can do, I would suggest that all of us, as an industry, and those supporting our industry, get on board. We need to become active to our attorneys general in our provinces and our government to make sure that we get some action taken, because this could very well come into a barn with one of the activists.

On the contamination of feed, we've talked about processed feed. Grains have come in. Are there feeds that come from countries that have ASF?

[Colleen Barnes]

Mr. Chair, yes, there are.

For those countries we're importing from, the importers have to be sure that ASF is not there. They can do it as described earlier. Either they are heat-treated ingredients before they come to Canada, or they're stored, or they come from a facility that has really high biosecurity. We've tried to be outcome-based in our approach and let the importers manage that risk as best they can using the science we have. There are several acceptable ways we will let an importer bring in a feed ingredient or a feed from an ASF-infected country. They have to prove to us, essentially, that there is no ASF there.

[Dr. Jaspinder Komal, Vice-President, Science Branch, Chief Veterinary Officer and World Organisation for Animal Health Delegate for Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency]

We talked about biosecurity, Mr. Chair, but that part of biosecurity also includes producers making sure that the procurement is actually from sources that are known to them and that are actually part of a program, such as the FeedAssure program,. They then are very sure of the origin and who is providing those ingredients. Those are all elements of biosecurity at the farm.

[Bev Shipley, Conservative, Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, ON]

Ms. Barnes, you talked in your presentation about zoning. This was a challenge that we had with BSE. You also mentioned that prior to this outbreak, you had been working on it. Can you tell us about your achievements from where you started to where you now are?

[Colleen Barnes]

I think this is a good contrast with BSE, because with BSE, we really started moving once we had the problem. By contrast, we're moving before we have the problem. We're trying to think through all the scenarios and think through all the programming in advance.

[Bev Shipley, Conservative, Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, ON]

For the countries that we have to deal with, is there some sort of an acceptance of the zoning within Canada, given our huge geography and small population?

[Colleen Barnes]

I'll let Jaspinder respond, but I'll start. These are conversations we have with our trading partners.

[Bev Shipley, Conservative, Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, ON]

Yes.

[Colleen Barnes]

They must have confidence that all of the risk is managed in the zones we are creating and can be confident taking product from Canada. We're thinking through the scenarios. What if it's in Manitoba where there is high-density? What if it's in a place that's remote? What will be our offering to the trading partners? Again, to try to get ahead of it before we have a problem, we're negotiating with our trading partners now on what basis they would allow us to zone and accept our conditions.

This is a conversation that happens at the CVO level, so I'll let Jaspinder colour it in a little bit.

[Dr. Jaspinder Komal]

Thanks, Colleen.

One of the things we need to keep in mind is that these agreements on zoning are bilateral, so they have to be both ways. If the country that we have an agreement with has a case of ASF, we need to accept that they will be zoning and we'll be accepting their product. That is a very important point.

With that in mind, as we try to negotiate based on the OIE rules, the country must have good veterinary oversight and be able to manage their problem with zoning for disease management purposes, and also give us the confidence that products are coming from the safe areas. Those are two good arguments for a zoning agreement.

[The Chair, Liberal, Pat Finnigan]

Thank you, Mr. Komal.

Unfortunately, I have to move to the next one. I'm sure you'll have a chance to respond later.

Mr. Drouin, you have six minutes.

[Francis Drouin, Liberal, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

Before I go on, I too want to echo the comments that you made at the beginning of the meeting about Kelsey Johnson. We hope she will work hard to find a replacement so that agriculture will be as well-reported as it has been by her over the past six or seven years.

I'm assuming, Mr. Komal, that you'll have a big role to play in this, because I am asking what the policies are that we have in place to monitor issues around animal disease. What triggers determine whether we have to implement policy X? As you've said, Ms. Barnes, it only affects animal health so there's no risk to human health. Obviously, science tells us that, but once the trigger happens and oops, there may be an impact on human health, or it's just going to impact animal health.... How does Canada play a role on the international stage to manage those particular diseases and to ensure there is no major outbreak? At the end of the day, we do not want to have any producers in Canada being impacted.

[Dr. Jaspinder Komal]

That is a very good and quite a big question. Implementing animal health policies is my colleague Colleen's responsibility, but I'll speak to it and she can add.

In deciding policies, we look at whether the disease is present in Canada. If it is present, we look at whose role it is, because there's a shared responsibility between provinces and the federal government. We'll take care of all responsibilities for diseases that are not present in Canada. In other words, we'll look at the border and any diseases that come in, we'll manage or eradicate them.

Second, we also look to work with the Public Health Agency of Canada to understand the implications of the zone audit perspective for human public health issues and how we manage them. We can manage that with the Public Health Agency and also with the provinces.

We always look at those areas when we develop our programs. For diseases that are not present, our first action is to keep them out, or if they come in, to eradicate them. With ASF, because it's not here, our actions have been based on prevention. We took a novel approach to keep it out. Given the global concentration of this virus that is circulating in the world, our industry thinks we need to take action on prevention.

As for the international role, we have actually worked with OIE and other partners such as the FAO and the European Commission. They are now living with this disease, so we wanted to learn from them. We held a forum here in Ottawa to learn from their best practices in case we got this disease here and had to take action. We learned a lot and we have come up with a pretty good approach moving forward, which is synthesized in this.

At the same time, Canada took a leadership role in this by bringing the world together, because it's a global problem and we want to tackle this collectively to minimize the concentration of this virus. Our objective is also to keep it out of the Americas region.

[Francis Drouin, Liberal, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

Are conversations happening with regard to regional boundaries? I know we're working on developing regional boundaries, but would those be accepted, for instance, in the U.S., where we do a lot of trading? If we say we'll manage that disease because it's only happening in some part of Ontario, would those practices be accepted in the U.S., for instance? Are those conversations happening to manage those who are unaffected by those diseases? Do you think it's possible on the world stage for this to happen?

[Dr. Jaspinder Komal]

Thank you. I'll actually continue from the answer I was trying to provide.

When we know that like-minded countries are following those rules on zoning and have good veterinary oversight and we have confidence, we will draw up those agreements with them. We are doing one with the U.S. and one with Europe, and are working with Japan to get one in place. Then we'll look at other countries as we continue to get that confidence in place.

With the U.S., we're very close to actually having that. Under our regulatory co-operation with the U.S., we have a zoning agreement in place that we have been practising for avian influenza management. We just wanted to make sure that we had the right sort of case and conditions in place as we were finalizing this with the U.S. We have done that, and both the U.S. and Canada will practise it if the disease happens in either country.