Evidence of meeting #2 for Agriculture and Agri-Food in the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was agreement.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Steve Verheul  Chief Negotiator and Assistant Deputy Minister, Trade Policy and Negotiations, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
Aaron Fowler  Chief Agriculture Negotiator and Director General, Trade Agreements and Negotiations, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food
Claire Citeau  Executive Director, Canadian Agri-Food Trade Alliance
Brian Innes  Vice-President, Canadian Agri-Food Trade Alliance
Jane Proctor  Vice-President, Policy and Issue Management, Canadian Produce Marketing Association
Shane Stokke  Vice-Chair, Grain Growers of Canada
Erin Gowriluk  Executive Director, Grain Growers of Canada
Michael Barrett  Chair, Dairy Processors Association of Canada
Gilles Froment  Secretary, Dairy Processors Association of Canada
Mary Robinson  President, Canadian Federation of Agriculture
Dave Taylor  Member of the Board, Dairy Farmers of Canada
Jacques Lefebvre  Chief Executive Officer, Dairy Farmers of Canada

3:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Pat Finnigan

Welcome, everyone, to our meeting on the study of Bill C-4, an act to implement the agreement between Canada, the United States of America and the United Mexican States.

We have a three-hour meeting today. It's going to be very tight, so I'm going to be tight on the time also.

Here with us, for the first 40 minutes, we have Steve Verheul, chief negotiator and assistant deputy minister of trade policy and negotiations at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.

From the Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food, we have Nicole Howe, executive director of the supply management and livestock policy division at the policy development and analysis directorate, and Aaron Fowler, chief agriculture negotiator and director general of trade agreements and negotiations.

Mr. Verheul, if you want to start, you have up to 10 minutes for an opening statement.

February 20th, 2020 / 3:30 p.m.

Steve Verheul Chief Negotiator and Assistant Deputy Minister, Trade Policy and Negotiations, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Good afternoon, Chair and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you.

First of all, I'd like to talk about the status of the Canada-U.S.-Mexico agreement. I'll provide some opening comments that should take under 10 minutes, and then we'd be open to any questions that you may have and we can pursue issues in greater depth.

The signing of CUSMA or, as many are calling it, the new NAFTA, on November 30, 2018, followed 13 months of intensive negotiations that brought together a broad range of officials and stakeholders, with a very strong partnership between federal and provincial officials. That agreement achieved several key outcomes. It served to reinforce the integrity of the North American market, preserve Canada's market access into the U.S. and Mexico, and modernize the agreement's provisions to reflect our modern economy and the evolution of the North American partnership.

On December 10, 2019, following several months of intensive engagement with our U.S. and Mexican counterparts, the three NAFTA parties signed a protocol of amendment to modify certain outcomes in the original agreement related to state-to-state dispute settlement, labour, environment, intellectual property and automotive rules of origin. These modifications were largely the result of domestic discussions in the U.S. However, Canada was closely involved and engaged in substantive negotiations to ensure that any modifications aligned with Canadian interests.

Throughout the negotiations, Canadian farmers, producers, processors, business associations, labour unions, civil society and indigenous groups were closely engaged and contributed heavily to the final result.

For the agriculture sector, the government engaged with more than 275 agriculture and agri-food stakeholders through nearly 300 in-person interactions on NAFTA modernization from February 2017 to December 2019. This included more than 55 stakeholders involved in the supply-managed sectors—dairy, poultry, egg and related processors—and 230 others covering a wide range of agriculture sectors, including grains and oilseeds, meat, sugar, fruit and vegetables, and related processors.

To help better inform Canadians of the outcomes, documents have been made available on the Global Affairs website, including the text of the agreement and the amending protocol, a summary of the overall outcomes and summaries of all chapters in the agreement.

As we talk about this negotiation, I'd like to recall that the NAFTA modernization discussions were unique in terms of our experience in negotiations. Normally, free trade agreement partners are looking to liberalize trade. In this process, the goal of the U.S. from the start of the negotiations was to rebalance the agreement in its favour. The President had also repeatedly threatened to withdraw from NAFTA if a satisfactory outcome could not be reached.

The opening U.S. negotiating positions were rather unconventional. These included, first of all, the complete dismantlement of Canada's supply management system; the elimination of the binational panel dispute settlement mechanism for anti-dumping and countervailing duties, which is the existing chapter 19 under NAFTA; a state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism that would have rendered the agreement completely unenforceable; 50% U.S. domestic content requirement on autos, which would have devastated our domestic auto sector; removal of the cultural exception; a government procurement chapter that would have taken away NAFTA market access, leaving Canada in a worse position than all of the U.S.'s other free trade agreement partners; and a five-year automatic termination of the agreement, known as the sunset clause.

The U.S. administration took the unprecedented step of imposing tariffs on imports of Canadian steel and aluminum on the basis of purported threats to national security, with no legitimate justification for that. The U.S. administration had also launched an investigation that could lead to the same result for Canadian autos and auto parts, also a national security investigation.

In the face of this situation, Canada undertook broad and extensive engagement with Canadians on objectives for the NAFTA modernization process.

Based on the views we heard and our internal trade policy expertise, Canada set out a number of key objectives, which can broadly be categorized under the following overarching areas. First of all, we wanted to preserve important NAFTA provisions and market access into the U.S. and Mexico. We wanted to modernize and improve the agreement, where possible. We wanted to reinforce the security and stability of market access into the U.S. and Mexico for Canadian business.

For the first objective, preserving NAFTA, the outcome preserves a number of important elements, including the NAFTA tariff outcomes, ensuring continued duty-free access into the U.S. and Mexican markets for originating goods. For our farmers and food processors, this means securing Canada's over $30 billion in agricultural exports to North American markets.

Second, it preserves the binational panel dispute settlement mechanism for anti-dumping and countervailing duty matters, which is a key component of the overall goods market access package of NAFTA and of the original Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement.

We wanted to preserve, as well, Canada's preferential access to the U.S. under the temporary entry for business persons chapter, and the predictability and security of access for service suppliers and investors. We also wanted to preserve the cultural exception.

As well, we wanted to preserve state-to-state dispute settlement, which we achieved, including through the protocol of amendment, actually improving on that considerably so that it's a much more efficient and effective mechanism to resolve disputes with the U.S. and Mexico.

The U.S. was opposed to almost every single one of those objectives.

With respect to modernizing NAFTA, we have modernized disciplines for trade in goods and agriculture, including with respect to customs administration and procedures; technical barriers to trade; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; new provisions on the trade of products of agriculture biotechnology; as well as the new chapter on good regulatory practices, which encourages co-operation and protects the government's right to regulate in the public interest, including for health and safety.

The agreement also establishes a mechanism for parties to strengthen co-operation and international advocacy on a wide range of agricultural biotechnology issues of mutual interest. The new agricultural biotechnology obligations will establish practical trade-facilitative approaches to getting safe products to market, reinforcing an environment that enables trade and innovation in North America.

Under the new agreement, market access for Canadian refined sugar into the U.S. market will almost double. The new agreement will provide Canadian exporters with new market access into the U.S. in the form of tariff rate quotas for certain dairy products, including cheese, cream, milk beverages and butter. It also eliminates U.S. tariffs for whey products and margarine and provides a more liberal rule of origin for margarine.

The agreement contains a modernized committee on agricultural trade, which provides a forum in which to discuss and address issues and trade barriers related to agriculture.

For our wines and spirits industry, the new NAFTA provides for protection of Canadian whisky as a distinctive product of Canada. It also protects the definition and traditional production method of authentic icewine. As well, Canadian wineries and distilleries retain the authority to sell only their own products on site.

Commitments on trade facilitation and customs procedures have been modernized for the 21st century to better facilitate cross-border trade, including through the use of electronic processes that will reduce red tape for exporters and save them money.

New and modernized disciplines on technical barriers to trade in key sectors are designed to minimize obstacles for Canadians doing business in the U.S. and Mexico, while preserving Canada's ability to regulate in the public interest. We also have modernized obligations for cross-border trade in services and investment.

On labour and environment, we have made important steps forward by concluding ambitious chapters that are fully incorporated into the agreement and subject to dispute settlement.

Finally, the outcomes advance Canada's interests toward inclusive trade, including through greater integration of the gender perspective and better reflecting the interests of indigenous people.

With respect to other outcomes, in the context of the overall outcome, Canada did make some incremental moves in relation to the U.S. objectives, specifically in the area of supply management.

With regard to Canada's dairy, poultry and egg sectors, we should recall that the U.S. made an explicit and public demand for the complete dismantlement of Canada's supply management system. In the end, we preserved the three key pillars of the supply management system, including production controls, import controls and price controls, ensuring that its integrity is maintained long into the future, and granted only limited access to the U.S. The new NAFTA ensures that Canadian dairy farmers and processors will continue to supply the vast majority of the Canadian market.

The government has been clear on its commitment to provide full and fair compensation to farmers for losses in market access. In the fall of 2018, the government announced the formation of working groups on the dairy, poultry and egg sectors. These groups were tasked with developing mitigation strategies to fully and fairly compensate supply-managed farmers and processors to help them adjust to the impacts of recent trade agreements, including the new NAFTA.

3:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Pat Finnigan

Thank you, Mr. Verheul. I'm going to have to cut this off.

3:40 p.m.

Chief Negotiator and Assistant Deputy Minister, Trade Policy and Negotiations, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Steve Verheul

I just had a closing thought.

3:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Pat Finnigan

We are very limited on time and I want to make sure everybody has a chance.

Again, don't think I'm rude when I cut you off. I just want to make sure that we all have—

3:40 p.m.

Liberal

Francis Drouin Liberal Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON

“Don't think I'm rude; I'm just rude.”

3:40 p.m.

Voices

Oh, oh!

3:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Pat Finnigan

I'm just rude? Could be.

With that, we'll start with the Conservatives for six minutes.

Mr. Barlow, you're going to lead us off.

3:40 p.m.

Conservative

John Barlow Conservative Foothills, AB

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I'm likely going to split my time with my colleague, just to make sure we all have an opportunity. If you don't mind, please let me know when I'm about halfway through, at three minutes or so.

Thank you very much, Mr. Verheul. I know you're probably sick of talking about this agreement by now, but we certainly appreciate your taking the time with the officials to give us a bit of a breakdown on these three areas, specifically when it comes to agriculture.

I know you've probably heard a lot about this, but the one area of the new NAFTA, or CUSMA, that gives me pause for thought is on the supply-managed side. I can't think of another trade agreement we've signed with another country whereby we have, in my opinion, surrendered our sovereignty on the growth of a specific commodity, and that would certainly be true on the milk powder, milk protein concentrates and infant formula.

If I'm seeing this correctly, we have a cap on the amount of product we can export and on the growth in opportunities for that product, whereas the United States does not have such a cap. They are free to expand that market.

Here's my concern. Is this an unusual concession in a trade agreement? I'm not aware of another one that has that give and not a lot of take.

3:45 p.m.

Aaron Fowler Chief Agriculture Negotiator and Director General, Trade Agreements and Negotiations, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food

This is an unusual provision. I am not aware of any other similar provision in any of Canada's FTAs that would impose a restriction on the global exports of a commodity.

It was concluded in the context of this agreement because it was the best option we were able to identify to address a specific concern, which the United States had been expressing throughout the negotiations and, indeed, prior to the negotiations, that was linked to the introduction of dairy price class 7 and the national dairy ingredient strategy, which came into force in Canada in February 2017.

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

John Barlow Conservative Foothills, AB

This is a hypothetical and I know you can't answer, but my concern with it, I guess, is that five years from now, when CUSMA is open for renegotiation, we will have allowed a foot in the door for these types of concessions in a trade agreement. It's milk powder, protein and infant formula now, but what's next that we would surrender? That's why I'm concerned that this aspect is in the trade agreement.

There's another question. Mr. Verheul, I had an opportunity to ask you this before, but I want it on the record. One of the aspects of this agreement is that it does address COOL, country-of-origin labelling, to ensure that we don't have to deal with that again, but does it deal with front-of-pack labelling, which the health minister has in her mandate letter to move ahead with? I would see that as a trade irritant.

3:45 p.m.

Chief Negotiator and Assistant Deputy Minister, Trade Policy and Negotiations, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Steve Verheul

The U.S. certainly did make significant efforts in trying to get us to commit to front-of-package labelling requirements. At the end of the day, those are not disciplines that were agreed to in the end, so we do not have those kinds of restrictions.

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

John Barlow Conservative Foothills, AB

I'd like to turn the rest of my time over to Mr. Lehoux.

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

Richard Lehoux Conservative Beauce, QC

My question will also touch on what Mr. Barlow just mentioned.

Is there any other way to limit the impact of this concession than waiting five years? On the ground, we know that there have been major concessions. We cannot develop other markets for certain categories of milk without asking our neighbours to the south for permission.

Could something be included in the signing of the agreement to minimize these impacts? This concession has harsh consequences. As you mentioned, it's a pretty unique concession.

3:45 p.m.

Chief Agriculture Negotiator and Director General, Trade Agreements and Negotiations, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food

Aaron Fowler

Thank you for the question.

It's difficult to say what the impact of this particular provision will be five years from now. I think it's important to recall that the export monitoring commitments that Canada agreed to apply exclusively to three particular categories of dairy products: skim milk powder, milk protein concentrates and infant formula. They apply to no other dairy product produced in Canada or exported from Canada. The volumes that are permitted to be exported without any export charge are 55,000 tonnes in the first year, falling to 35,000 tonnes in the second year and then growing indefinitely thereafter.

The question whether the actual export charge that would be applied to exports above that threshold would be commercially prohibitive is difficult to answer now, and it's very difficult to say whether it will continue to be prohibitive as far out as five years from now. If you look at our exports of the covered products in recent years, from a high of 75,000 tonnes of skim milk powder and milk protein concentrate that Canada exported in 2017, we saw only 54,000 tonnes exported in 2019. That is below the threshold provided for in the agreement, and so, had CUSMA been operating last year, there would not have been any commercial impact of that provision on the sector, given the actual level of exports.

It's difficult to know how exports would evolve absent this provision or with the provision. I think we have reason to believe that there will be increased demand for skim milk in the future and perhaps lower growth in demand for butterfat in Canada, which would lead to lower production of certain products. Assessing the long-term implications is thus difficult, but I don't deny that there could be some.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Pat Finnigan

Thank you, Mr. Fowler.

Thank you, Mr. Lehoux.

Mr. Blois, you have six minutes.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Kody Blois Liberal Kings—Hants, NS

Thank you very much.

Thank you to all the witnesses for your hard work on this particular file.

I come from the riding of Kings—Hants in Nova Scotia, where supply management is very important to industry.

Mr. Verheul, you mentioned in your comments some of the challenges. My first question for you—yes or no, in terms of your opinion—is whether this deal could have been struck without some of the concessions that were given in the dairy industry.

3:50 p.m.

Chief Negotiator and Assistant Deputy Minister, Trade Policy and Negotiations, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Steve Verheul

No. It was quite clear from the beginning that there would be no deal without concessions on our side on dairy, to some extent.

When the U.S. first started, as was mentioned, their position was the complete elimination of supply management. They stuck to that position till very close to the end of the negotiations. They had made many promises to their domestic stakeholders, and they insisted that they needed to have a substantial outcome on dairy at the end of the day.

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

Kody Blois Liberal Kings—Hants, NS

Thank you very much.

We mentioned the export caps. Are those hard caps, or are they caps where a tariff would be levied beyond that? Can you explain a little bit? Is it the Government of Canada collecting that tariff, or where exactly does it go?

That's for you, perhaps, Mr. Fowler.

3:50 p.m.

Chief Agriculture Negotiator and Director General, Trade Agreements and Negotiations, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food

Aaron Fowler

Thank you for the question. It is a good question.

They are often referred to as caps. We do not refer to them as caps. They are not a cap: Canadian exporters are free to continue exporting beyond the threshold amount that is set out in the agreement, but for volumes that exceed the specified amount, they will face a specific export charge.

In the case of skim milk powder and milk protein concentrates, that charge is 54¢ Canadian per kilogram. In the case of infant formula, it is $4.25 per kilogram. Any export charge revenues that are generated as a result of this mechanism would be directed to the general revenue fund of the Government of Canada.

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

Kody Blois Liberal Kings—Hants, NS

Obviously, this isn't the first time there have been concessions on supply management. In the trade agreements under CPTPP and CETA, there was access given up under the former Conservative government.

Were you at the table during those negotiations at all? Can you speak to the dynamic in the room as it compared with CUSMA and this particular circumstance?

3:50 p.m.

Chief Agriculture Negotiator and Director General, Trade Agreements and Negotiations, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food

Aaron Fowler

I was not part of Canada's agricultural negotiating team for those FTAs.

3:50 p.m.

Chief Negotiator and Assistant Deputy Minister, Trade Policy and Negotiations, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Steve Verheul

I was certainly at the table for those negotiations, and the atmosphere was completely different.

The U.S. was adamant that they were going to be looking, if not for complete elimination of supply management—which, as I mentioned, is the official position they held until close to the end—then for a very large result.

With other negotiations such as CETA, for example, the European Union insisted that they had to have some access on the dairy side. They restricted it to cheese only. We refused any other access. In the other negotiations, it was a matter of concessions having to be made across the board, to some degree.

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

Kody Blois Liberal Kings—Hants, NS

Thank you.

Mr. Verheul, you spoke about sanitary and phytosanitary provisions within the agreement. Can you expand on that and how it's going to benefit our Canadian agriculture?

3:50 p.m.

Chief Agriculture Negotiator and Director General, Trade Agreements and Negotiations, Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food

Aaron Fowler

The sanitary and phytosanitary measures chapter of CUSMA reinforces and builds upon provisions that are contained in the original NAFTA, as well as in the WTO SPS Agreement. The outcome maintains the parties' sovereign right to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and requires that any SPS measure be science-based and not applied in a manner that would constitute an unnecessary barrier to trade.

The modernized SPS chapter in CUSMA will support trade in agriculture, fisheries and forestry products through a number of measures, including enhanced rules on import checks, audits, equivalents, regionalization, transparency, science and risk analysis. In particular, I would note that in the SPS chapter, the parties established a new technical consultation mechanism to address issues related to SPS measures with a view to resolving those issues through technical consultations between the parties' competent authorities. This mechanism would ensure that technical discussions take place in lieu of an issue being brought to a formal dispute settlement.

There's more I could say, but I'll leave it at that.