Barely any grain gets interswitched. In terms of operational impact, it's minimal. When the pilot ran from 2014 to 2017, less than 1% of all traffic was interswitched, and less than 0.6% of that was grain.
It really has a negligible to non-existent operational impact. The railways will play that up. They don't want it because it creates some measure of competition, which is distasteful to them. That is just a non-thing.
It's very useful to us, because if the railway is not providing you with a train or with competitive rates, today, you as an elevator and as a shipper would wait for a train. You don't really have any leverage. I shouldn't say “today”, because under extended interswitching, you do have some leverage to say that if they're not going to provide you with that service, you're going to avail yourself of your right to connect to the competing carrier. What happens after is that the primary carrier comes back and says that everybody should just back away from the ledge and that they think they can get you a train next week.
The effectiveness of extended interswitching isn't in the actual interswitch. It's in the leverage you get in presenting the competitive alternative and introducing that into the discussion. That's really a non-issue.
In terms of employment and trains to the U.S., we have to remember that both major primary carriers in Canada exist on both sides of the border. They have employees on both sides of the border, and they have vast networks on both sides of the border. They move product across the border all the time.
We export a lot of grain to the U.S., but the vast majority of our grain moves east-west. It moves to one of Canada's ports for a destination overseas. We don't move grain to or through the U.S. unless it's destined for the U.S. In that case, it crosses the border, and it can go a certain distance before the railway needs to change from a Canadian crew to a U.S. crew. Then it moves on. It really doesn't have an impact on Canadian jobs either, other than that the railways—