Yes, sir.
There's a significant problem in what we call the food import bill, which is the cost of what you imported before the problem—before the war—and what you import today. There are several dimensions that have substantially increased the food import bill of all these vulnerable countries. One is, of course, the prices, which have increased substantially. The second is the evaluation of the exchange rate, which also increases the cost of the import bill.
We are proposing to the IMF to develop what we call the food import financing facility. Essentially, we calculate the gap in the food import bill, we rank the countries by vulnerabilities and we identify the countries that are a priority because we want to minimize the potential risk of social unrest. For example, for Africa we are talking about $9 billion, which will be the total coverage of 100% of the gap in terms of the food import bill. If you cover 10%, it will be $0.9 billion. If this is a loan, the cost is minimal and basically can be covered with SDRs within the mechanisms that IMF has.
Yes, the food import bill has increased substantially. Just to give you an idea, in the case of Lebanon, the prices have multiplied substantially. The amount of food they import is around 40% less than what they used to import. That shows clearly how something that was supposed to be inelastic became elastic because of the crisis we are facing.