Good afternoon. My name is Jeremy de Beer. I'm an associate professor in the faculty of law at the University of Ottawa.
My research focuses on law, policy, and business issues related to intellectual property, technology innovation, and international trade. I teach, among other things, courses on global intellectual property policy and the digital music business. I'm also a practising lawyer who has worked with copyright stakeholders of all kinds, from creators and producers to intermediaries to end users and consumer groups. Before becoming a professor, I was the legal counsel for the Copyright Board of Canada. That's the economic regulatory agency responsible for the administration of copyright in Canada.
That said, all the views I'm going to express today are my own and are based on my scholarly research and my professional experience.
The Government of Canada should be congratulated for its commitment to copyright reform, and I, like many other Canadians, look forward to the eventual passage of Bill C-11, the Copyright Modernization Act, into law. This committee's work in that context is extremely important, and I'm grateful for the opportunity to participate in the process of making Canada's copyright laws among the most appropriate and effective in the world.
Because I'm not here today representing any particular organization or any particular perspective, I'm not asking this committee for any specific amendments to the bill. However, in an effort to facilitate evidence-based policy-making, I hope this committee will draw its own conclusions about the appropriate course of action suggested by my research and experience.
If I may, I would like to discuss two aspects of the Copyright Modernization Act that have attracted attention from various stakeholders throughout the copyright reform process. The first relates to the provisions regarding technological protection measures in the proposed sections 41 to 41.21, and the second is the addition of the words “education, parody or satire” in the proposed new section 29. I would be pleased to address other issues during the question period, if you would permit me to.
There's no doubt and little controversy about the fact that international treaties to which Canada is a signatory require reforms to provide adequate protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of technological protection measures. The only real question is whether Canada ought to adopt the approach taken by some countries, such as the United States, or the approach taken by other countries, such as Switzerland and New Zealand. This is a difficult policy decision.
While there are differences between the anti-circumvention provisions in Bill C-11 and the anti-circumvention provisions in the American Digital Millennium Copyright Act, these approaches are similar for failing to link liability for circumventing technological protection measures with an act of copyright infringement, so Bill C-11, as it's currently proposed, could prohibit the circumvention of technological protection measures even if those measures are applied to materials in the public domain or even if the purpose of the circumvention is a lawful purpose, including the exercise of rights that are provided elsewhere in Bill C-11.
In contrast, recent reforms in Switzerland and New Zealand link circumvention provisions with copyright protection and with copyright-protected works.
My research suggests that there are four reasons to be concerned about the approach currently proposed in Bill C-11. I have provided the committee clerk with copies of some of my relevant publications and I understand these will be translated and distributed to you. Those documents explain the conclusions that can be drawn from this body of research in more detail.
First, this model of anti-circumvention provision is conceptually and pragmatically inconsistent with other parts of Canada's existing and proposed legislation, specifically with rights to engage in private copying under part VIII of the Copyright Act as well as other provisions in the bill. My research contrasting Canadian and American law related to private copying and technological protection measures suggests that if private copying is otherwise allowed by virtue of a levy or other provisions, it ought to be lawful to exercise private copying rights irrespective of the presence of a technological protection measure.
Second, my research shows that there are serious unresolved legal questions about the constitutionality of anti-circumvention provisions if those provisions do not reflect the fundamental contours of copyright as that term is defined in the Constitution Act of 1867 in dividing jurisdiction over matters between the federal and provincial governments. Regulation that is in pith and substance about private contractual matters or technological protection measures trumping the balance of rights established by copyright law risks being invalidated as an intrusion into areas of provincial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's recent ruling in the securities reference reinforces a risk that under the approach proposed in Bill C-11, these reforms could be ruled unconstitutional. As a worst-case scenario, the baby could be thrown out with the bathwater.
My research suggests that narrowing the provisions to permit circumvention for lawful purposes substantially reduces that risk. It virtually guarantees that the legislation will be upheld as constitutional.
Third, my research suggests that strict anti-circumvention provisions would do little to help Canadians exploit the potential of new markets based on open innovation, collaboration, and peer production, which are identified by many experts in business and management schools as the most promising avenues for economic growth, innovation, and productivity over the coming decades.
Evidence suggesting the contrary—that is, that anti-circumvention provisions are needed to enable new business models—does exist, but it's so far theoretical rather than empirical. Moreover, the research that does exist, the empirical research, suggests that strict anti-circumvention provisions risk the unintended consequence of counterproductively stifling competition by tying digital content to particular platforms, devices, and distribution models. That's a risk that, if possible, I think Canadians want to avoid.
Fourth, my most recent data shows that the majority of experts who have published research about anti-circumvention provisions are not supportive of a model that fails to link circumvention liability with copyright infringement. In a thorough, systematic, and objective overview, I and a team of researchers reviewed almost 1,500 articles published in various databases on this topic.
Our review of approximately 1,500 articles revealed that only a tiny fraction—10%—concluded that they were supportive of anti-circumvention provisions. Thirty-four per cent of authors of these studies were neutral, while 56% of authors in publications such as these were unsupportive of this particular model of anti-circumvention law.
So while this empirical data can't be interpreted to conclusively represent public opinion, or even the views of all stakeholders, it does indicate a substantial consensus among experts who have published research on this topic. The data provided to support that is in the documents that I've circulated to the clerk.
In light of this evidence, the committee may wish to consider whether the approach taken toward anti-circumvention in New Zealand or Switzerland is a more appropriate model for Canada to follow. I would be pleased to provide you with more specific details about how precisely that can be done if the committee wishes to do so.
Before that, the other topic I would like to mention very briefly concerns the implications of adding the words “education, parody or satire” to section 29 of the act, and especially the word “education”. I understand that some stakeholders have expressed worries that these words are too vague and will lead to significant litigation and reductions in revenues collected by authors and publishers of educational materials.
First, if indeed there were extensive litigation required to interpret the scope of the new provision, then it's arguably impossible to conclude yet whether there will be any effect—negative or positive—on royalty payments and revenues in Canada. I can testify as former legal counsel to the Copyright Board of Canada, which is tasked with regulating economic aspects of copyright such as this, that any royalty structures that emerge will be fair and equitable.
I can also testify that the possibility of litigation over the meaning of these new provisions is not a sound basis on which to reject their inclusion in Canadian copyright law. In fact, if there's anything we can predict with certainty, it's that many of the provisions in Bill C-11 will be tested in courts. That's to be expected.
I'm not suggesting that it would not be helpful for Parliament to provide courts with guidance: for example, on factors that it considers relevant to the fairness of any particular dealing with a copyright-protected work. But in my professional experience, I can suggest that it would be dangerous and inappropriate to entrench too much specificity into the definition of categories that must, by their nature, be flexible and fair.
Again, thank you very much for the opportunity to participate in this process. I look forward to elaborating on these issues or responding to any questions.