As Mr. Bouchard told you, I have been responsible for the DPP project at the Government of Quebec since July 24, a project that resulted in passage of Bill 109 on December 1 last, creating the position of what, in Quebec, is called the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions, but who is in fact a DPP, a Director of Public Prosecutions.
I'll make some very general comments on the act and two or three more specific comments.
First, by way of a general comment on this act, I would say that, in reading the part of Bill C-2 concerning the Director of Public Prosecutions, one can't avoid seeing a DPP model that is very similar to the one adopted in Quebec. So you won't be surprised if I tell you that, in our opinion, this is an ideal model for achieving the two objectives that essentially must be achieved when you establish a DPP: first, to provide institutional, functional and operational guarantees of independence for the director—that's the purpose of the exercise—and, second, to maintain a reasonable and necessary measure of accountability to government.
In our view, the introduction of a DPP based on this model will necessarily have beneficial effects on the office of the prosecutor itself, as well as on the credibility of the prosecution system in the public's eyes. We know to what extent public confidence is essential to the proper operation of the judicial system.
There is no legal or constitutional obligation to establish a director of public prosecutions, but we think—and, in view of the tabling of Bill C-2, it appears the government thought the same thing — that this was an important and necessary measure in the context of the process of improving and modernizing our judicial institutions. That's the general comment that we wanted to make on Bill C-2.
As to specific comments, there are two that concern very specific provisions. These are about differences that can be seen between the bill that was passed by the National Assembly and the government's proposal in Bill C-2. That doesn't mean, and I don't want to be understood as meaning that these differences are disadvantageous or advantageous. I am pointing them out because, in our view, these issues were very important and were the subject of debate, because they go to the very heart of the matter of the functional independence of the DPP and because they concern the question of the image of independence and apolitical operation that emerges from this bill.
The first of these comments concerns the DPP appointment process. The process favoured here is obviously very similar to the one that we adopted, subject to certain differences that are not important here. The only comment that forms the subject of major discussions in Quebec and which made our act slightly different—here my sole purpose is to point this out to you—is the absence from the bill of any legal obligation to trigger the process of appointing a DPP.
The bill provides that the DPP is appointed for seven years, that his term is not renewable and that the DPP remains in office until he is replaced, which is perfectly normal and necessary. However, the bill provides that the Attorney General may hold a competition, but it does not provide for an obligation to do so within a certain period of time after the position becomes vacant.
Following this debate, we chose to provide that the Attorney General or the Minister of Justice shall start the competition process in the year preceding the year when the position becomes vacant. That was my first comment.
The second concerns a question that goes to the heart of all these acts, and that is the obligation for the Attorney General to make public any intervention that he must make in respect of the DPP. The primary purpose of this act is to create the functional independence of the DPP in the performance of his duties. However, as a result of constitutional necessities, the Attorney General remains in his traditional institutional form and thus holds ultimate powers of prosecution. Those fall to him. He may therefore intervene with the DPP, both to establish general standards and to intervene specifically in prosecutions that are the DPP's responsibility.
The situation is identical under our act. As a result, the desired objective, which is to establish functional independence, is one that can never be completely achieved, since there will always be an Attorney General who can intervene.
In general, in all acts, whether it be this one, ours, or those of Australia, Nova Scotia, British Columbia or England—in fact, I know nothing about England; I was talking through my hat—we're replacing this absence of functional independence with a transparency measure. It states that, if there is an intervention, it must be made public. In fact, we're ensuring that the Attorney General's interventions will be effective. They must always be made in the public interest, not for a public purpose. The object of this act is to prevent political intervention in the prosecutor's decisions, while preserving the Attorney General's power.
Now this power of publication...