This is fairly technical.
I think that this present bill creates a selection process for senators that when implemented will not be able to sustain the constitutional commitment in section 22 of the 1867 act that the senators either hold property or reside in the appropriate one of the 24 electoral regions of Quebec. If it cannot sustain that provision, then Bill C-20 is effecting an amendment of a term of a Constitution that applies to one or more provinces but not all provinces and therefore triggers the requirement of bilateral consent. It seems to me highly arguable that Bill C-20 is not valid unless the Province of Quebec consents.
Now, it could be argued that the exercise of appointing senators under Bill C-20 in the case of Quebec will be constrained less by the election and more by the section 22 requirement that the senator hold property or reside in the appropriate district. But as I said in my initial submission, that's going to be a fairly unattractive position for Canada to be in: where elections determine who is a senator for most provinces except Quebec, where the elections count for little.
I think that Quebec in this particular amendment is in a very strong legal position if it wishes to. It may not. In a more general Senate reform process, almost any reform we can think of will abandon that really obsolete provision relating to the 24 electoral divisions and again would trigger section 43 giving requirement to a Quebec veto independent of the seven-and fifty formula.
I think that if we're going to deal with the Senate, we're going to deal with Quebec. And if we're going to deal with Quebec, we're going to deal with 1982. That challenge is what the country is facing.