Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ladies and gentlemen, members of the committee, I will first of all introduce you to the person accompanying me, Mr. Jean-Guy Côté, who is the political attaché in my Quebec City office.
I will begin by thanking you for your invitation to take part in the work of your committee in its deliberations on Bill C-20. I will repeat what I said in 2007 when I stood before a senatorial committee—the Government of Quebec does not usually appear before a federal parliamentary forum unless exceptional circumstances warrant it, as is the case today. This is the third time Quebec has come before the Parliament of Canada to express its opinion on the measures put forward by the federal government to reform the Senate.
Quebec presented its viewpoint at a sitting of the Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform in the autumn of 2006, and in a brief submitted in May 2007 to the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. Quebec's positions are thus well known. We demanded the withdrawal of Bill C-43, today's Bill C-20, by which the federal government would introduce an electoral system applicable to the selection of senators. We also demanded the suspension of proceedings on Bill S-4, now Bill C-19, concerning the tenure of senators. These two measures are presented separately but are indeed components of a single initiative.
For the Government of Quebec, however, transformation of the fundamental features of the Senate is not a matter of ordinary statutes. It is a fully constitutional issue that therefore begs recourse to multilateral procedures of constitutional amendment.
It is perfectly clear to Quebec that the federal government's underlying intention in these bills is to do indirectly what it cannot do directly, namely, to transform the method of selecting senators and, by extension, transform the nature and role of the Senate which, since 1867, has been an appointing chamber of legislative sober second thought.
It seems equally clear to us that the system envisaged in Bill C-20 is electoral in purpose and effect. We have noted that, during the committee's works, it has been pointed out that Bill C-20 had been "carefully drafted" to comply with the Constitution. But the Constitution is more than form. It is more than drafting techniques. It goes to the very heart and nature of things and to the very purpose of rules that govern our society.
Constitutional jurisprudence was quick to emphasize the importance of going beyond form and appearance in assessing the constitutionality of power-sharing measures. The formalist approach was rejected. The courts had the wisdom to recognize that subtle wording can sometimes be tantamount to concealment. They made the pith and substance of the rules of law the centrepiece of constitutional logic.
As I see it, this legal tradition applies just as aptly to the limits of unilateral federal jurisdiction in institutional matters in relation to the multilateral procedures of constitutional amendments. What counts are the purpose, subject and effect of this bill, and not the care taken in drafting it or the ingenuity of the notions involved, such as consultative election as a means of appointment, a notion that appears to have no precedent.
The Government of Quebec maintains that the purpose of Bill C-20 is, beyond a doubt, to transform the method of selecting senators. This is the clear intent of the federal government. The system considered in the bill is not workable or viable unless it is electoral. Otherwise, how does one ask citizens to stand as candidates and campaign throughout the province, with the personal and financial commitments that candidacy entails? How does one justify the involvement of Elections Canada and the use of public resources for a complex voting process that must comply with all the requirements of an electoral system, and ask citizens to exercise their right to vote and to cast a ballot? What is there to prevent candidates from considering themselves and from being considered as elected directly by the population, taking into account the recourse to universal suffrage?
The notion of consultation, therefore, strikes us as artificial. If, after such a process, there is a pool of candidates, as certain federal representatives have put it, that would be a pool of elected persons and this does not change the fundamental impact of the bill on the nature of the Senate. Even if the seats for which these persons have been elected are not all available immediately, these persons would have been chosen by voters through universal suffrage. The idea of a pool does not mitigate the consequences of the institutional change that is sought through this bill.
In my previous interventions, I touched on the link between sections 42 and 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the Supreme Court's 1979 Reference on the Upper House. Further to this opinion that gave rise to the principle of the exclusion of the fundamental features, or essential characteristics, of the Senate from unilateral federal jurisdiction, the framers of the Constitution expressly specified certain exceptions to the federal jurisdiction under today's section 44, including the method of selecting senators, the powers of the Senate, and regional representation, incidentally, three closely interconnected elements in terms of institutional balance and architecture.
With the framework of current debates on the federal bills, some have questioned the contemporary relevance of the Reference on the Upper House. We reiterate that this Supreme Court opinion is just as relevant now as it was then. Constitutional protection of the fundamental features of the Senate is enshrined in the Constitution through the exceptions laid out in section 42 and, in addition to these exceptions, through the required use of the 7/50 general procedure under section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
The federal compromise at the basis of Canada's political system is expressed in the fundamental features of the federal institutions created in 1867. In its original mandate, by virtue of the regional distribution of senatorial seats, the Senate was designed to be a forum for representing the interests of the components of the federation within federal institutions.
For Quebec, those interests take on special meaning in relation to its national identity. Bill C-20 also raises concerns about the francophone presence in the Senate and the role of this chamber regarding the Canadian duality, a point emphasized in the brief presented to this committee by the Fédération des communautés francophones et acadienne du Canada. The Government of Quebec agrees with this position.
The Senate also fulfils the role of providing sober second thought with regard to the legislation submitted by the House of Commons. This role is reflected in the powers of the Senate, which has to approve every piece of federal legislation. As we know, the manner in which the Senate exercises these prerogatives is largely inflected by the fact that it is an appointment chamber.
Bill C-20 would very likely encourage the Senate to make concrete use of the many powers still available to it, even though there are no mechanisms for resolving a potential deadlock between the two chambers. We were taken aback by the argument that Bill C-20's drawbacks are seen by some as a means, in some ways positive, of destabilizing the status quo, of triggering change. We do not think it is possible to embark upon such fundamental constitutional change in this way, without taking into account the complex connections between the various fundamental features of the institutions concerned.
The Senate exists in a complex and coherent constitutional environment that is tied to considerations underlying the federal compact and the balance of intergovernmental relations. The federal government's current bills are not mere experiments or pilot projects. Were they to be implemented, they could lead to sweeping political changes which we cannot safely assume would be easily adjusted or rectified should the need to do so arise, especially if there were to be unexpected consequences.
What we can foresee, however, are possible impacts of an elected Senate on the balance of intergovernmental relations, without improvement in the defence of provincial interests by the Upper Chamber. The new senators would in all likelihood be less effective in representing provincial interests, for they would tend to integrate with the political dynamic proper to the federal scene, in particular, the dynamic of the federal political parties, even if certain variations on the Australian model, the template for the federal government, have been written into to Bill C-20. Here the comparison is with the Australian Senate, an institution in which partisan polarization is particularly prevalent.
What we should be examining is the impact of the electoral system advocated by the federal government on the basic constitutional mission of the Canadian Senate. When the issue is viewed from this angle, it seems obvious that partisanship within the Upper Chamber would intensify.
The provinces have a direct interest in the unilateral changes the federal government proposes to make to the Senate. The argument to the effect that the process of constitutional amendment is too demanding has no place in a federal system in which constitutionalism and the rule of law are recognized as basic principles. It is an untenable argument in a federal system in which the purpose of more complex procedures for constitutional amendment is to ensure that minority interests are taken into account when fundamental constitutional elements are at issue. Consideration of minority interests is of particular importance for the Quebec nation, given its situation within Canada.
The future of the Senate, and changes to its fundamental features, cannot be envisaged outside of the constitutional context to which it belongs, one of constitutional changes in which the provinces are called upon to share the exercise of constituent authority.
It is odd indeed that we have to engage in a procedural debate on a subject as patently constitutional as the nature and role of the Senate and that we are here to demand that the provinces be part of the process.
The provinces must be participants in reforms pertaining to the fundamental features of federal institutions. Quebec is not averse to the idea of modernizing the Senate. It is aware that its federative partners have certain aspirations in this regard. Naturally, it is interested in the question of the role of the Senate within the federal system, and, notably, that of closer relations between the provinces and the Upper House. But a single Parliament cannot monopolize this undertaking of institutional modernization.
In concluding, allow us to reiterate before this committee the message expressed unanimously by the National Assembly of Quebec in its May 16, 2007 resolution. Bill C-20, which the federal government is attempting to present as a minor amendment over which the federal Parliament would have exclusive jurisdiction, in fact masks an in-depth change in the nature and role of the Senate. Under no pretext whatsoever does such a reform lend itself to unilateral action by the federal government. The provinces, and Quebec in particular, cannot be excluded from fundamental debates concerning the evolution of the Canadian federation.
Thank you.