Canada-China Relations Committee on Feb. 24th, 2020

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Colleagues, this meeting of the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations is called to order. Good morning.

This morning we'll have two panels.

The first part of the meeting will take place from 10:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m., and the second between 11:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m.

We're starting off this morning with Charles Burton, senior fellow of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, who is with us here. We have Phil Calvert, senior fellow of the China institute of the University of Alberta, by video conference from Toronto. We also have Paul Evans, professor in the school of public policy and global affairs at the University of British Columbia, by video conference from Singapore, where it's 11 p.m.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Mr. Chair, I have a point of order. I was looking at the witness list and the number of witnesses in each of the one and a half hour periods. I've done some calculations based on our standing orders. It appears that if we are going to have three rounds of questioning, we need 64 minutes for this, leaving 26 minutes out of the 90 minutes.

I'm going to suggest that we confine the witnesses to a maximum of eight minutes each. I consulted with colleagues on this side. Those on the other side weren't here yet.

Otherwise, we're going to have a truncation at the end, and Mr. Bergeron and I would not get to participate in the third round.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

I should tell you that the clerk advises me she has advised the witnesses that they have seven to 10 minutes.

Mr. Oliphant.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I was just going to say that I don't disagree with Mr. Harris; however, I don't think it's fair to our witnesses, who have been given time to prepare their statements of 10 minutes. I would be happy to give up two minutes of Liberal time to the third and fourth party if they should need it.

I just don't think it's fair. I don't think it's good parliamentary procedure, and I think it's somewhat rude to our witnesses.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Mr. Albas.

[Dan Albas, Conservative, Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First of all, it's my understanding that all of the witnesses, whom I look forward to hearing from, have been told it's between seven and 10 minutes. Also, by supplying their briefs in advance....

The real value of the experts we have is that we can ask them the questions that may not be illustrated in their briefings. I would hope that we show some flexibility and ask them to either speed up a little or slightly edit their statements, knowing that the committee will be looking at these briefs in full.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

The witnesses undoubtedly heard this conversation. I hope they'll do their utmost to keep it short.

We should get going so that we have a chance for as many committee questions and answers as possible.

Mr. Burton, we'll start with you.

[Dr. Charles Burton, Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual]

Good morning.

Thank you, Chair. It's a great honour for me to be invited to give evidence to this committee.

I have read all the evidence of the committee's meetings—numbers three, four and five—that were sent to me by the clerk, and all this evidence was given by senior Canadian government public servants explaining to the committee how they implement the Canadian government policy towards China.

This morning, I'd like to highlight some factors in the Canada-China relationship that I was disappointed to see omitted in the earlier evidence, some assertions that I interpret differently and finally some recommendations that I have for the Government of Canada on how to more effectively further Canada's interests in our relations with China.

First of all, as is the case in many Canadian families, Chinese, not English or French, is the language of my home. I bring this up because in my youth I read a lot of classical Chinese texts in the original. More than 40 years ago, I had the extraordinary privilege of being admitted into the history of ancient Chinese thought program in the department of philosophy at Fudan University in Shanghai.

Because of this, I was taken aback to read in the evidence given to the committee by a senior government official that the Chinese:

...place an importance on the values of collectivism and harmony, owing to a Confucian heritage. Understanding the extent to which China values unity and the needs of society at large, rather than freedom of individual choice...we just have to understand that. That's where they're coming from.

Later, this earlier witness elaborated, “Some elements of collectivism and harmony are at odds with individual rights. They're different.”

Let me point out that this assertion by our ambassador is consistent with the official propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party under General Secretary Xi Jinping. The Chinese Communist Party upholds its political legitimacy by claiming that China's traditional culture demands, in this modern age, a non-democratic single-party autocratic rule.

I could not disagree more with this interpretation, and I believe it is utterly refuted by the vibrant democracies based on respect for human rights and the rule of law existing today in Taiwan and South Korea.

The troubling question for me in terms of our policy towards China is that, if Canada accepts this idea that China values unity and the needs of society at large rather than freedom of individual choice, does that mean, for example, that Canada will stand idly by in the face of the horrendous and massive program of cultural genocide against the Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims in China who are confined, as we know, to the so-called re-education camps where they're not permitted to practise their religion at any time over their years of incarceration? The previous witness did not know how many Uighurs are incarcerated, but I can tell you that the U.S. State Department says three million, at least a million. The total population of Uighurs in China is about 10 million.

The other thing, with regard to a response we're not making, is that Canada has put the names of officials from Sudan, Russia, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia on our Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act's Magnitsky list, but in sharp contrast, no Chinese officials complicit in the persecution of Tibetans, Uighurs, Falun Gong, Chinese Christians, democracy activists and so on have been designated.

I believe this sends a strong signal to the PRC regime by omission, and the signal is that hostage diplomacy and the arbitrary imposition of trade sanctions against Canada is a policy that works. Our lack of any substantive response to this emboldens the Chinese regime to do more of this kind of thing in the future.

A second point, the evidence given by our public servants in the previous meetings of this committee repeated over and over the formula that Canada's priority in China relations is “the immediate release of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, as well as clemency for Robert Schellenberg”.

However, in response to questioning, one of the officials indicated there are two Canadians, Mr. Schellenberg and Mr. Fan Wei, whose charges on the death penalty are public and available. Why is this focus on Kovrig, Spavor and Schellenberg, three Canadians of non-Chinese origin, to the exclusion of Canadians Huseyin Celil and Fan Wei, who are not?

I judge that this would be deeply troubling to all Canadians formerly resident in the PRC prior to becoming Canadian citizens and joining our national family.

Do we also thereby tacitly accept the Chinese government's claim that persons of Chinese origin in Canada have an obligation of residual loyalty to the Chinese state regardless of their Canadian citizenship? Is this why the serious problem of Chinese state harassment of persons of PRC origin in Canada, in gross violation of the protections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is essentially unaddressed by our government?

Let me conclude with recommendations that I have for the Government of Canada on how to much more effectively further Canada's interests in China.

The PRC regime's flouting of the standards of international diplomacy is without question becoming more and more blatant as the years go by. Last week, the Czech government's president's office acknowledged the leak of a communication received by that office from the PRC embassy in Prague. In that communication, the PRC threatens that if the speaker of the Czech Parliament travels to Taiwan as planned, then three Czech companies with extensive business in China would be punished, including the famous Petrof piano company.

Unlike the PRC sanctions against our canola seeds—the canola seeds being falsely accused of having severe impurities in their dockage—in this Czech case there is no longer any pretense that there is any legitimate basis for the PRC's threat of trade retaliation if a nation does not comply with the PRC's political agenda. The companies menaced were simply chosen because they have ties to politically influential people in Prague.

The larger question is that Taiwan has a national government utterly in control of its territory, fully legitimated by a liberal democratic election process. Why, then, should the Czech Speaker not go there? The Czech Speaker has not gone, because a few days ago he tragically died suddenly.

Canada has lost the respect of the Chinese regime through our non-action in response to their outrages against us. It is high time for us to kick back by retaliating, especially on China's persistent illegal imports into Canada of the noxious drug fentanyl.

What are the consequences for us?

We've heard evidence that Canada's external trade with China is about 4.7% of our exports—probably less because of current situations—as compared with 75% with the United States. Most of our sales to China are of primary commodities: canola, soybeans, potash, wood and so on.

In the unlikely event that we did incur the wrath of the Chinese regime by standing for our Canadian principles and maintaining the rules-based international order and that China decided to block us further from access to their market in consequence, the consequences would be highly disruptive to certain sectors that need compensation, but I would suggest not as severe as some people who speak in support of China would make out, because these are global commodities that are saleable elsewhere.

Canada's continuing to do nothing in response to China's violations of the accepted norms of international diplomacy and trade will not, in my view, sustain the status quo in our deteriorating relations with China and will certainly not allow us to see movement in achieving the release of Celil, Spavor and Kovrig.

Let me just say one last thing. My friend Anne-Marie Brady spoke to New Zealand's parliamentary inquiry on foreign interference earlier this year. She details the Chinese Communist Party's massive scheme of enticing foreign politicians, academics and business people to promote China's agenda through political lobbying, the media and academia. Besides offering business opportunities or free trips to China by using bribery or honey traps and so on, there are also consultancies in which prominent advisers pocket up to $150,000 U.S. per annum just for being affiliated with PRC entities. As long as the foreign adviser promotes relations with China on PRC terms, the money keeps coming.

I urge that the committee look seriously at Australia's 2018 Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act. Canada needs to come to terms with Chinese money benefiting Canadian political campaigns and rewarding Canadian politicians and public servants who are seen as friends of China.

Mr. Chair, I welcome vigorous and challenging questions from members of the committee on any of these and any other topics. There are many topics that I have been unable to address in this short statement. I do regret that.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much.

Next we have Mr. Calvert.

[Phil Calvert, Senior Fellow, China Institute, University of Alberta, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Before I start, I want to apologize for my informal appearance. I'm actually just transiting Toronto on the way to go trekking in Turkey, so I'm stopping in to do this.

My statement is about eight minutes. I'll go through it as quickly as I can.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before this committee. It is an honour to have the opportunity to discuss the Canada-China relationship, something that occupied a sizeable portion of my career in Canada's foreign service.

I've had the privilege of observing and participating in the Canada-China relationship for over 30 years. This included three postings to our embassy in Beijing between 1984 and 2008, as well as serving as deputy negotiator for Canada during China's accession to the World Trade Organization, and later on as director general for north Asia in what is now Global Affairs Canada.

These assignments were both fascinating and difficult because managing Canada-China relations, even at the best of times, is challenging. China is complex and full of contradictions. Its diplomatic face can be smooth and sophisticated, or ham-handed and brutish. As Canada has now witnessed first-hand, its reward-and-punishment approach to relations with all but the most powerful of countries means that relations can turn on a dime and suddenly enter a deep freeze. That's what Canada is experiencing now. With the arrests of the two Michaels in retaliation for Canada's detention of Meng Wanzhou, bilateral relations have plunged to their lowest point since Canada and China established diplomatic relations 50 years ago.

The Meng Wanzhou case presents some very difficult choices for the government. There is no perfect solution. It can let the case work its way through the court system. If the judge rules that the extradition should proceed, this will lead to a trial and possibly many years of detention and imprisonment under very difficult circumstances for the two Canadians. If the Minister of Justice decides to intervene in the case and release Meng in order to obtain the release of the two Michaels, it rewards China's bad behaviour. Let's not forget that they are not the first Canadians to have been arbitrarily arrested in response to actions by the Canadian government. For this reason, it is imperative that such a decision be part of a broader, comprehensive strategy for managing our relationship with China.

China sees this issue, I believe, in geopolitical terms and Meng's arrest as part of a larger U.S.-led strategy to hinder China's rise and to undermine China's leading companies. They will not back down. For this reason, I believe the only way to obtain the release of the two Michaels is through the release of Meng Wanzhou, either as a result of a judicial decision or action by the Minister of Justice.

If this latter approach is taken, it would need to be part of a broader decision that would include turning down Huawei's 5G application and restoring Canada's access for canola, and other outstanding issues. I also think Canada could play a leading role in crafting a collective response to China's practice of taking hostages. China has been engaged in this practice with virtual impunity for some time, and has arbitrarily imprisoned citizens of a number of countries. If all countries affected by this practice could commit to a common and collective response—trade measures, for example—when a citizen of one of the countries is taken hostage, it would send a strong message to China that such actions will not be tolerated. It's a complex and tough situation, and charting a way forward will be difficult. There's been talk, particularly from China's side, about getting through this current situation and putting the relationship back on track, which implies returning to the way things were before Meng's arrest. I don't think we can go back to the way things were before. This case has done significant harm to China's image in Canada, and has led to a fundamental shift in Canadian attitudes, and in the relationship itself.

China is and will continue to be important to Canada, both as an economic power and a global player, but the current situation has underscored the importance of approaching China with a critical eye and an understanding of what drives its foreign policy decisions. China's approach to foreign affairs is tough, strategic and driven by power rather than principle. It is almost exclusively focused on advancing its own interests through the exercise of hard and soft power, including in global institutions. Its perspective is informed by its history of being carved up and invaded by foreign powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Because of this, China is determined never to be weak again and is focused upon returning to its earlier prominence as a global power. Within the Chinese system there is a strong undercurrent of skepticism and suspicion of the west's intentions and ultimate agenda with respect to China.

We should also keep in mind that a fundamental driver of Chinese foreign policy, indeed all policy, is keeping the Communist Party in power. The leadership is thus focused on stability, which requires sustained economic growth, peaceful relations at its borders and, increasingly, addressing middle-class concerns about environmental degradation and corruption. Securing and maintaining this stability is also part of Xi Jinping's drive for a stronger global presence and leadership role for his country.

Successful management of relations with China requires a clear sense of Canada's priorities and interests and a tough-minded commitment to advancing and defending them. Stories of early Canadian missionaries in China, of Norman Bethune and of Canada's decision to sell wheat to China in the wake of the great famine, all provide good imagery and heartwarming content for speeches but are largely irrelevant. China deals in power and respects power. A firm and strategic push-back in defence of Canada's interests and knowing where our leverage lies will garner respect. Being too accommodating out of concern for friendship or fear of offending will make us seem weak. China plays this game well.

It is also important for our government to avoid the tendency to view China through a preconceived ideological or political lens or through a single issue. Doing so undermines our capacity to deal with the complex reality of the country and our relationship with it.

The past two decades have seen wide swings in how successive governments have initially approached China. An overarching long-range vision supported by all parties would put Canada in a more advantageous position to consistently manage our relations with this country.

Moving forward, Canada needs a balanced approach based on a realistic understanding of China as it is, the opportunities and the challenges. This approach should also inform Canada's approach to Asia as a whole and our view of China's place in our approach to the region. With its strong focus on China over the last decades, Canada may have overlooked opportunities to form deeper ties with other countries whose markets are easier to navigate and whose systems—in Japan, for example—are based on the rule of law. The CPTPP should help in this rebalancing and diversification of Canada's trade interests in Asia. Canada's public support for broadening the agreement to include Thailand and Taiwan would further help this diversification.

Canada should also give consideration to its relationship with Taiwan, a vibrant and progressive democracy and the only Asian country to approve same-sex marriage. Canada and Taiwan have a healthy trading relationship with good potential for the future. Prime Minister Trudeau's public statement in support of Taiwan's meaningful participation in organizations like ICAO and the World Health Assembly is a good signal, but there is more that Canada could do to advance our interests there. A visit by a Canadian economic minister to support Canadian commercial objectives would respect the parameters of a “one China” policy and would send an important signal to both China and Taiwan.

Successful management of Canada-China ties requires coordination and coherence. Many federal government departments and most provinces have interests in the country. Although provinces sometimes compete for investment and students, they should be encouraged to buy into Canada's broader agenda in China. On core and important issues like human rights and the two Michaels, Canadian governments at all levels should present a united and consistent front in their discussions with their Chinese counterparts.

Canada-China relations are in a difficult place right now, and there is no easy path forward, but this is also an opportunity to objectively assess the relationship and to develop a realistic and balanced approach to our ties with this important global power.

I wish you all the best in these important deliberations.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Mr. Calvert.

Now we have Mr. Evans.

[Professor Paul Evans, Professor, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before the committee, albeit virtually, by video conference from 15,000 kilometres away in Singapore.

I've been studying and teaching international relations for more than 40 years, mostly dealing with U.S.-China and Canada-China relations. The focus of my remarks today will be about government-to-government relations between Canada and China. The overall relationship is, of course, much broader and includes human flows and cultural, business and educational exchanges, but this is an era in which high politics matter and government policies are in flux.

All of us are aware of how the fates of Michael Kovrig, Michael Spavor and Meng Wanzhou have generated a major diplomatic rift and changed the emotional landscape of feelings and emotions in both countries. Trust and mutual respect have been badly shaken. More recently the COVID-19 virus has affected Canadian interactions with China and our views about how to evaluate the competence of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

In the midst of these and other controversies, it's tempting to think that when they're resolved we can revert to normal in our bilateral diplomatic relations. I think this is unlikely. Rather, we have entered new territory, the product of forces much larger than individual incidents and consular cases and much larger than commercial issues like Huawei's potential involvement in our 5G telecommunications network. We are living amidst major shifts in economic, diplomatic and technological power, the emergence of a multi-polar world order and a resurgence of great power rivalry.

For almost all of the past 50 years, there has been a consensus in Canada about the main outlines of a China policy, one that we came to call “engagement” and that at one time involved a strategic partnership between our two countries. Engagement was built on three pillars. First, the closer interaction with China was of commercial value and would benefit the prosperity of Canadians. Second, it was initially important to end China's isolation and later to integrate it into what we now call a rules-based international order. Third, it served the moral purpose of supporting economic and societal openness that would lead, over time, to political liberalization in China.

Engagement, Canadian-style, depended on a geopolitical context in which Canada had room for independent manoeuvre when it moved in somewhat different directions from Washington—for example in recognizing the PRC eight years ahead of the U.S. Engagement with Canadian characteristics overall was very successful, but it now has to be rethought, not out of anger about specific Chinese actions or fear about the hard edge of growing Chinese power and influence. It needs to be amended because of new circumstances that are not likely to change anytime soon.

The geopolitical and geo-economic balances are shifting. China is now a major global player, present in virtually every international institution and proving capable of creating some of its own. Moreover it is increasingly assertive in pursuing its own interests and in challenging the liberal dimensions of those institutions, particularly as they relate to human rights and democracy. China doesn't need Canadian help in the way it did in the past, and in some instances it is championing positions that challenge us directly.

The belief that economic openness would produce political liberalization now seems mistaken, at least for the time being. Under Xi Jinping, China is more repressive domestically and along its periphery than at any time since Mao Zedong. In addition, a new American consensus has emerged, spearheaded by the Trump administration but with broader bipartisan support, that the American version of engagement is dead. It has been replaced by a framing of China somewhere along a continuum of strategic competitor, adversary, rival or enemy. Washington is engaged in a full-court press, militarily, diplomatically and economically, to counter China's rising influence and power. As Henry Kissinger recently stated, this has led the U.S. and China to “the foothills of a cold war.”

As Washington is making abundantly clear in its pressure on Canada and other governments on the matter of Huawei and 5G, the costs of a made-in-Canada choice could be steep. Caught between Xi Jinping's China dream, Donald Trump's America first and a deepening geostrategic competition between the two, what can Canada do?

Let me make three recommendations.

First, rather than signing up for Cold War 2.0 and the active containment or confinement of China, we need to discuss and define a more flexible policy frame. Engaging in China 2.0, a sort of post-engagement engagement policy, is one way. Another would be co-existing with China. Neither is premised on changing China but on finding ways to live with China. Neither locks China into defined roles as friend or adversary, partner or competitor, ally or existential threat, but allows Canadian interests and values to determine the course of action on an issue-by-issue basis. Co-operate where we can in areas including climate change, global economic and financial governance, peacekeeping, agri-tech and the Arctic, to name a few. Push back where we must, particularly in matters related to interference in our domestic affairs and gross violations of human rights.

Second, we need to fight for the rule-based international order at the same time as we promote its reform in institutions, including the WTO, IMF and the World Bank, and through regional processes like the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. We need to push back against efforts to unravel or corrode the multilateral rules-based system, whether those challenges come from China or, as we have increasingly seen, from the United States. This will require recapturing a middle power identity that respects our alliance with the U.S. but navigates an independent course in matters like supporting the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or giving a balanced assessment of its belt and road initiative, both of which offer new approaches to international co-operation and development.

We will not be with the U.S. or with China in all matters, but we will not be alone. It is worth looking closely at how other countries facing similar dilemmas are adjusting their China policies. A good start would be to look at Australia, Japan, Singapore and perhaps the United Kingdom.

Finally, a new frontier of the relationship is reacting to China's growing presence, influence and occasional interference in Canada. A higher level of awareness and vigilance is needed to protect Canadian values and institutions at home. We need to do this without sensationalizing or exaggerating Chinese activities and their impact, without singularizing China as the only player in the influence and interference business, and without stigmatizing Chinese Canadians by calling into question their integrity and loyalty.

How, for example, do we keep our doors open to Chinese students and to research exchanges in our universities while closing windows to protect intellectual property and national security in an era of technological competition with China and extraterritorial pressure from the United States? Fashioning a new national consensus and a new narrative for relations with China and building it on a multi-party foundation will not be easy. We haven't tried it in a systematic way since 1966.

The work and recommendations of this special committee have the potential to make a signal contribution.

Thank you so much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much.

We'll now go to our first round of questions, a six-minute round, with Mr. Albas.

[Dan Albas, Conservative, Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank all of our witnesses for bringing your expertise today.

I think I'm going to start with Mr. Evans.

Mr. Evans, Graham Allison's book, entitled Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?, deals with major shifts in global power and obviously it explores the oft-cited observation from the history of the Peloponnesian War, which deal with events from the fifth century B.C., namely that it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.

According to Mr. Allison, tensions aside, when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes for a violent clash. That's the rule, not the exception. I'd like to start by asking you whether the world is facing a Thucydides's trap with the rise of China.

[Prof. Paul Evans]

We had the opportunity to bring Professor Allison to Ottawa two months ago to talk about his book because, I think you're quite accurate, it has grabbed the imagination of people who see a power shift under way and see the potentialities for major U.S.-China confrontation.

I think what Professor Allison is trying to tell us is that unless special efforts are made to reduce tensions between the United States and China, to find new ways to manage relations, that conflict—not just a cold war but something worse—is possible. I think Mr. Allison and a number of Americans are now looking at how to frame that relationship not as China as an adversary or an enemy, but something of a competitor and a partner at the same time, what Mr. Allison calls a “rivalry partnership”. His message to us in Canada was that we could be supportive of that in a variety of activities and international organizations.

Yes, that is the fear we wake up with every day, and if action isn't taken to mitigate that conflict, then “destined for war” is a very strong possibility.

[Dan Albas, Conservative, Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, BC]

Dr. Burton, would you like to rein in the subject?

[Dr. Charles Burton]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Yes, I am very concerned about the rise of China, and particularly such phenomena that we see with PRC citizens in key roles in multilateral organizations who seem to be seeking to undermine the purposes of those organizations, presumably under instruction from Beijing. I mean Interpol, ICAO and other UN institutions.

In general, on the Chinese state's penetration into Canada, we don't have adequate laws comparable to other nations about the transfer of classified technologies to agents of the Chinese state. You may have noticed the total number of Canadian cases on this matter over the past few years, to the best of my knowledge, is zero, whereas other countries are able to bring these people to account. There's the case of the Public Security Bureau, of China's agents coming to Canada under false pretenses to pressure persons in our country. Our RCMP's response is that if we discover that someone has come into Canada under false pretenses, under those circumstances, we immediately deport them back to China—no accountability to the person involved.

I am concerned, in general, about the threat of China's desire to undermine the established institutions of the global order, the WTO and the United Nations, and replace them with what party General Secretary Xi Jinping, in October 2017, defined as the “community of common destiny with mankind”, which is really a reorientation of the global order in the context of his belief that the United States will decline towards China, including the belt and road initiative that will reorient global infrastructure towards Beijing.

It's important that we recognize what's going on, and with our allies, particularly the United States, where there is non-partisan political consensus about this issue. It's not just Mr. Trump. His nemesis Speaker Pelosi has also articulated that we need to stand up for the principles of the rules-based order, which protects middle powers like Canada from the arbitrary domination of hegemonic superpowers. I'm particularly concerned about China because of the values gap that informs that regime, which is so different from what makes Canada a great nation.

[Dan Albas, Conservative, Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, BC]

I'm reading a book right now that describes the United States' approach as unilateral universalism and the Chinese approach as universal unilateralism—so very different approaches indeed.

I'm sorry, Mr. Calvert. I don't believe we have enough time to ask you to fill in that, but I will hopefully be raising some more questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Fragiskatos.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for their very thoughtful perspectives and recommendations. This is a question that I want to put to everyone, to all witnesses, but perhaps I'll begin with Mr. Calvert, based on his career as a diplomat.

When we think about the disputes and challenges that other liberal democracies have faced in recent times with Beijing, what has worked and what has not worked in terms of overcoming those challenges for the liberal democracy, whatever liberal democracy that might be? I emphasize liberal democracy because I think it's important to compare apples to apples. Canada's a liberal democracy, and I'd love to hear any thoughts that the three of you have on that particular issue, because it would be quite useful for this committee to hear that.

[Phil Calvert]

One of the things that has worked for some liberal democracies is size and power, that the countries with more political or economic clout naturally have more ability to respond to China's assertiveness in their own interests. I think what works for Canada is more collective action, assembling the like-minded and gathering together to jointly present concerns or common worries that they have in reaction to specific actions that Canada has taken. We've found over the years that Canada sometimes doesn't have the leverage by itself to influence China, but if you can collectively put other nations on side, that sends a stronger message.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

I'm sorry to cut you off, sir. It's just the time limit.

Professor Evans, are there any concrete examples of how liberal democracies have been able to overcome challenges with China, in specific approaches they've taken: strategies or tactics?

[Prof. Paul Evans]

Liberal democracies have been able, on some matters, to put a focal point on difficulties. It's fascinating to see which have organized to raise some of the special problems of Xinjiang. However, in addressing the challenge of China, the countries we need to work with are more diverse than just liberal democracies.

The balance of force is shifting in such a way that other kinds of countries are trying to have an influence on China, not trying to fundamentally change China's political values and system but some of its behaviours. If you look at the countries of Southeast Asia that are deeply concerned about Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and their activities around that, they're multilateral but are not premised on us, as western countries, pushing an outcome with China. It's a broader collection.

Those are going to be some of the actions that are going to be necessary to constrain certain Chinese actions, recognizing that almost every country wants to work with China more closely, bilaterally and in its economic interests, but also encouraging Chinese behaviour in a proper direction. To me, it's bigger than a liberal democracy challenge, even though there are special elements of that for us.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Burton.

[Dr. Charles Burton]

We should be looking more closely at Australia as a country that has taken certain measures to try to limit Chinese influence through legislation. Certainly, in our own attempt to rally our allies, I believe that this, unfortunately, has probably had the opposite effect to what's intended, in the sense that we can list 14 countries that support us while claiming other countries support us in their hearts but are afraid to say anything.

I think the Chinese government would compare 14 against the total number of countries in the world and see that they retain support for their horrendous behaviour. With regard to Mr. Kovrig and Mr. Spavor, like Kevin Garratt before them, the Chinese have been unable to provide us with any evidence of any wrongdoing whatsoever in their case.

It would be wonderful if Canada would take the lead in trying to come up with some multilateral coalition of the like-minded to try to put some transparency and honesty in our relations with China. Currently, there's a psychology in Canada that the most important thing in our relations with China is the promotion of Canadian prosperity through enhanced trade, but the cost that China wants to extract from us for that in pursuit of their overall agenda, such as removing restrictions on Canadian exports of high tech to China, allowing unfettered Chinese state access to Canadian mining and oil or insisting that we install the Huawei 5G into our telecommunications and so on, these things are not worth the cost to Canada in the long run.

While we, or perhaps some politically connected companies, may achieve profits from collaboration with the Chinese regime, we're better off standing up for our laws and values. If China wants to punish us because of that, then I believe we have to accept the consequences in the overall longer interests of Canada.