Thank you.
This system encountered its most critical existential threat when the western system of nation states prevailed in Asia. While the China-centric system preached the homogeneity of the Chinese civilization among all states on its periphery, the western notion of nation states emphasizes their heterogeneity, and hence, differing and competitive national interests.
What we have witnessed with China’s foreign policy in recent years is an assiduous attempt to break away from western discourse and re-establish the traditional Chinese model of hegemonic stability. In China’s view, China’s primacy in the region stands a reasonable chance to prevail. China, through its power, will create an alternative order based on a different set of values.
This is essentially the goal that the current Chinese leaders are pursuing. China’s rising vitality and intensification of its foreign policy behaviours is the manifestation of its bid for regional hegemony and global power. That regional hegemony may not deny U.S. access to the East Asian and West Pacific regions, but it does dictate that the U.S. must follow the rules developed and enforced by the regional power. This is the fundamental cause of the escalating strategic rivalry and great power competition we are witnessing between the U.S. and China.
The U.S. has traditionally played the role of an offshore balancer to ensure the plurality of the region by channelling power into the region. However, as China strategically applies its “carrot and stick” foreign policy to displace the United States, first in the Asian region and then more broadly across the globe, this great power competition most likely will continue to intensify.
Here I wish to say a few words in particular about China’s mentality about the west, which is highly relevant for the discussion we are having here today. When China’s regional superiority crumbled in the 19th century, what ensued was a sense of pathos, of self-pity and a sense of victimhood targeted toward the west. With China’s rise and resumption of great power status, it rapidly evolved into China’s own destiny manifesto, a firm belief in China’s preordained and predestined superiority to lead the world and a mentality as well as an urge for revenge when the west seems to reject or disrespect China’s rightful status. In other words, China today still maintains a high level of victim mentality abnormal for a great power, which translates into a heightened sense of vulnerability, hostility and retaliatory actions when it is triggered. Due to this mentality and China’s newly acquired capacity and instruments to inflict damage on other countries, the policy toward China by any country has become increasingly challenging.
As shown by the recent Meng Wanzhou case and China’s retaliation, Canada is caught between two great powers in their tug of war. In China, there is no doubt that the reparation of the ties or the so-called renormalization of bilateral relations will have to be predicated upon Meng’s release, or at the minimum, upon her not being extradited to the United States, combined with significant policy moves from the Canadian government to show goodwill toward China. Anything less than significant will be appreciated by China but unlikely to generate the policy change people would like to see. The recent Chinese reaction to Canada’s position on the coronavirus outbreak in China is one such good example.
The question of how to effectively deal with China while protecting Canada’s national interests is apparently a hard one. While the desire is to maintain neutrality and avoid the difficult binary situation of picking a side, Canada may not eventually have the option or the luxury to do so. Canada and the United States are close allies and we share important common interests, from democratic values to international norms and rules, from national security to bilateral trade and economic prosperity. Recent developments have deepened the disagreements between Canada and China, both on domestic political issues and its foreign policy behaviours. These are basic facts.
To deal with China effectively at this difficult time requires Canada to develop more leverages and influence vis-à-vis China and open up more space, new space, between the U.S. and China in the era of great power competition. Alliance management should not just be the leader of the alliance managing the partners. In these fluid times, it is also critical for the partners to manage the alliance relationship in order to mitigate or minimize the potential chance of victimization or collateral damage on specific issues.
Canada could develop a more astute and sophisticated understanding of China and calibrate the outcomes of each interaction between China and Canada before they happen, but beyond that, how to shape the policies and behaviours of great powers, as well as to prepare for and manage the consequences of decisions, will be of utmost importance. In addition, there are increasing demands among middle powers in Europe and in Asia to develop co-operation among themselves in order to restrain and balance the hostile behaviours of great powers. This is a potential direction that Canada could consider more as a policy orientation as well.
Thank you again, Chair. I look forward to the discussion.