Canada-China Relations Committee on Nov. 9th, 2020

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number four of the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations. Pursuant to the motion adopted on Wednesday, September 23, 2020, the committee is meeting on its study of Canada-China relations.

Today's meeting is in hybrid format, pursuant to the motion adopted by the House on September 23, 2020. The meeting is also televised and will be available on the House of Commons website.

To ensure an orderly meeting, I would like to outline a few rules to follow.

Members and witnesses may speak in the official language of their choice. Interpretation services are available for this meeting. You have the choice, at the bottom of your screen, of either floor, English or French. Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. If you are participating by video conference, please click on the microphone icon to unmute yourself.

However, when one of the members here at the committee is asking questions, don't wait for me to respond. I should warn you that at some point when a member's time is up, I have to cut them off—or cut you off as witnesses—at that time. I just wanted to let you know that ahead of time.

I remind you that all interventions by members as well as by witnesses must be addressed to the chair. Please speak slowly and clearly.

When you are not speaking, your mike should be on mute.

I would now like to welcome our first panel of witnesses. We have, as an individual, Mr. Steve Tsang, director, SOAS China Institute, University of London; Mr. Adam Nelson, senior adviser for Asia-Pacific, National Democratic Institute; and, Ms. Mabel Tung, chair, Vancouver Society in Support of Democratic Movement.

Welcome, everyone, and thank you for being here.

I should let you know that Mr. Tsang has to leave at 11:50 Eastern Time.

We will start with opening remarks.

Mr. Tsang, the floor is yours for five minutes.

[Professor Steve Tsang, Director, SOAS China Institute, University of London, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

In my five minutes, I would like to explain that the Chinese government's hardline approach toward Hong Kong now is not something that's totally unavoidable. They have chosen a hard line by a clear decision. We should not forget that in 2003, when there were also half a million people going out in the streets of Hong Kong to protest a national security law being introduced, the government at the time, in both Hong Kong and Beijing, agreed to pull back from that process. Hong Kong basically returned to normal.

So there was nothing inherent in the situation in 2019 through 2020 that required this very strong hardline approach by the Chinese government. It did so because things changed. Things changed in terms of China's leadership. Xi Jinping took a very different approach from his predecessor. Things changed also because, as a matter of reality, Hong Kong is not economically as significant to China as it was in 1997 or in the 1980s, when the Chinese government agreed to give Hong Kong its special status after 1997. Hong Kong now accounts for less than 3% of the Chinese economy. Back in 1997 it was something like 20%. In the 1980s we were talking about over 30%. This change made Hong Kong dispensable.

About two years ago, the Chinese government also changed, under Xi Jinping, the way they looked at Hong Kong's place in China. Instead of seeing Hong Kong as a completely unique place, as a Hong Kong special administrative region, they started to see Hong Kong as part of what they call the Greater Bay Area, which in fact has Shenzhen at the very centre of it. They wanted Hong Kong to be part of the Greater Bay Area and to contribute to the Greater Bay Area in ways that neither Shenzhen or Guangzhou could do, but Hong Kong was no longer seen as all that special.

You had the enormous protests in Hong Kong in the summer of 2019. The Chinese government under Xi Jinping essentially saw Hong Kong as rebellious and dispensable, and therefore things would have to change. As a result of this, they introduced the state security law this year. Under the Hong Kong Basic Law, Hong Kong's constitution, the Chinese government has every right to ask Hong Kong to introduce some kind of a national security law. It is provided for in the Basic Law in article 23. But instead of doing so, the Chinese government chose to have the National People's Congress standing committee impose an external state security law to Hong Kong. I think it was deliberately to intimidate people in Hong Kong to make sure they got the message and stop protesting—or, from their perspective, stop rebelling.

From their perspective, they have succeeded. The older-generation pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong have gone quiet or have chosen to retire. The younger people have been sufficiently intimidated that we are not seeing the kinds of massive protests and demonstrations in Hong Kong, even though this is going to be a major change to Hong Kong. The state security law also has this extraterritorial application built into it, reflecting that the Chinese government really is no longer all that worried about the international responses to how it deals with Hong Kong. I think we should bear that in mind.

Mr. Chair, I am aware that I have only about 22 seconds left. I want to underline that I used the term “state” security law deliberately, because what they've introduced is not really a national security law. Hong Kong does not face a national security problem. Hong Kong faces a regime security issue.

This is what they are looking at. This is what they are dealing with. Therefore, we can expect the Chinese government to continue to take a very hard line towards Hong Kong, with all its implications for friends of the Hong Kong people, like the Canadian government.

I will stop here and hand it back to you.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Mr. Tsang.

Now we'll hear from Mr. Nelson.

Mr. Nelson, you have five minutes. Please proceed.

[Adam Nelson, Senior Advisor for Asia-Pacific, National Democratic Institute]

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today.

I'm Adam Nelson, senior adviser on the Asia-Pacific team at the National Democratic Institute, dialing in from Washington, D.C. I do want to acknowledge that Washington, D.C., is the traditional land of the Anacostan Piscataway people.

I am always happy to speak about the future of democracy and human rights in Hong Kong. The city is near and dear to my heart, as I spent nearly a decade living, working and studying there, primarily focused on democracy, human rights and social entrepreneurship in both mainland China and Hong Kong.

With offices in over 50 countries, NDI is a non-partisan, non-governmental organization that has worked for over 35 years to promote democratic principles of transparency, accountability and inclusion worldwide and to support the development of democratic institutions. We work closely with our sister organizations, the International Republican Institute, the Center for International Private Enterprise and the Solidarity Center, to do this work.

Along with many other global donors, Global Affairs Canada has been a strong supporter of our work, particularly in the Middle East and Eurasia, and we want to thank them for that support.

Before I speak about NDI's work in Hong Kong, I would like to note that in the realm of relations with China, NDI stands for pro-democracy, not anti-China.

Since 1997, NDI has worked with partners from across the political spectrum to help Hong Kong realize the democratic promises made in the Basic Law and the Sino-British joint declaration. We have done this by partnering or working with Hong Kong academic institutions and the entire range of political parties and civil society groups to advance non-partisan research, education and dialogue to support inclusive and citizen-responsive governance.

In addition, NDI has conducted regular comprehensive assessments of Hong Kong's democratic progress, including rule of law and protection of civil liberty, as part of our ongoing “Promise of Democratization in Hong Kong” series.

Clearly, our work has had an impact. Fearing our work, Beijing singled us out as an organization for sanctions—and NDI's president as well—to get us to stop doing our programs. We are not. In fact, we are looking for ways to expand and to continue supporting the people of Hong Kong in their democratic aspirations.

The fundamental challenge with Hong Kong's new national security law—barring succession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces—is mainly that the law can be and is now being used for whatever Beijing or Hong Kong's leadership want it to be. They will fit any action, whether peaceful protest or criticism, into the law.

We have seen pro-democracy champions arrested and charged, young people grabbed off Hong Kong streets, legislators harassed and independent media attacked. Some have found the operating environment so fearful that they have fled the city to the U.K., Europe, Taiwan, the U.S. and, of course, Canada.

We also see Beijing's strident “wolf warrior” diplomacy in play when their ambassadors strike out and threaten the west in response to any criticism of China's abuses under the new law.

NDI itself is seeing a rising fear among our historic partners. Some partners fear the national security law enough to curtail their relationship with NDI, thereby having the intended impact: a chilling effect on democratic discussion.

Many pro-democracy groups, aside from certain key leaders, fear standing out in advocacy or statements for fear of their families being targeted back in Hong Kong or arrested upon return.

NDI will continue to support efforts on two lines: first, in supporting pockets of democratic resilience in Hong Kong's now closing space and, secondly, in international advocacy, by liaising with the international community on democracy and governance issues facing Hong Kong and primarily working to amplify the views of Hong Kong citizens themselves.

We are currently finalizing the report of our latest public opinion poll. In the last several years, we have conducted a series of surveys to engage Hong Kong citizens' perspectives on democratic development and political reform. The second survey was conducted in the fall of 2018, and the latest was done in the fall of 2019, which has provided a direct comparison on how the protest movement has affected people's attitudes. One notable result has been the prioritization of democracy over the economy, especially among young people.

We have also just begun a comprehensive remote analysis that will examine the political environment in the aftermath of the new law and the decision to delay the legislative council elections. We are working with Canadian partners to conduct polling and social media monitoring to look at the information environment and map the sources and proliferation of misinformation, work we are now doing strongly with civic technology partners in Taiwan. The polling is still in the field but shows some indication of lack of trust in a credible polling environment ahead of the legislative council elections next year and a strong desire for Hong Kongers to leave the city.

Canada has a long history of leveraging its moral standing within the global community to push and advocate on democracy and human rights. I'd be happy to speak about how the Government of Canada can continue to play a constructive role in light of this situation in Hong Kong.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Mr. Nelson.

Now, for five minutes, we have Ms. Tung.

[Mabel Tung, Chair, Vancouver Society in Support of Democratic Movement]

Thank you.

It is an honour for me to be invited and to represent my organization, the Vancouver Society in Support of Democratic Movement. It was formed in June 1989 after the June 4 Tiananmen Square massacre.

Over the past 31 years our organization has assisted and sponsored many Chinese democracy dissidents and activists to settle in Canada. As Canadians with Hong Kong roots and connections, we have witnessed year-long anti-extradition law protests and thousands of arrests and police atrocities towards the peaceful protesters.

Ever since the national security law was passed, it has been used to crack down on the legitimate and peaceful expression of opinions. People have been arrested for possessing flags, stickers and banners with political slogans. The law is also used to prosecute pro-democracy political figures and activists.

Many Hong Kongers who participated in the movement fear they will face the same fate the student protesters in Tiananmen Square did 31 years ago. They look to western democracies for protection and safe harbour. Already 46 Hong Kong citizens, many of whom have taken part in past demonstrations, are seeking asylum in Canada, citing harassment and brutality at the hands of police, and fear of unjust prosecution. We expect this number to increase once our border is open to foreign visitors.

Over this last year we helped several young people seeking political asylum in Canada. Their situation is one of struggle and hardship. They're not able to study due to the high tuition fees for non-residents. They suffer from PTSD and yet they're unable to afford costly psychological treatment, which is not covered by refugee claimants' medical coverage and they're unable to find jobs due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We urge the Government of Canada to expedite processing of these existing cases and to allocate resources in preparation for a large number of asylum seekers in the coming months.

Domestically, the Canadian political elite face a rude awakening to the true colour of a totalitarian regime that uses bullying and hostage diplomacy towards Canada, a state they see as lesser to them. Even as our politicians are scrambling to reassess and re-evaluate Canada's engagement with China, China has for years been infiltrating every corner of Canadian society. The infiltration is most prevalent within the Chinese communities across the country.

In the past 50 years, many Chinese have emigrated overseas to escape political prosecution, seek new opportunities or reunite with their families, but the CCP treats overseas Chinese as an intangible asset for trade, cultural exchange and technology and for importing know-how and influencing foreign governments. Many countries have the same attitude to their own people living overseas, but the CCP's use of overseas Chinese transgresses many moral and legal boundaries.

The Confucius Institute that we have in B.C. does not teach language and culture only, but also the CCP ideology and values, inside our Canadian education system. Also the “thousand person” scheme has been investigated by the FBI and found to be a scheme to access U.S. science and technology. A similar scheme in Canada serves the same purpose, to get Canadian science and technology. CSIS has already warned our universities about this issue.

The CCP also recruits overseas Chinese to serve its purposes and to speak out for the CCP by flooding social media with news and materials to advertise the achievements and the greatness of the CCP and China. These media include the Chinese and Hong Kong TV channels, WeChat and some productions made by Chinese language media in Canada.

A good example is that recently many local Chinese organizations, including the Chinese Benevolent Association and the National Congress of Chinese Canadians, put out an advertisement in local newspapers in support of the national security law, to create the illusion that local Chinese communities support the law, even though the law is against our Canadian values of freedom of speech and expression.

We urge the Canadian government to ban the Confucius Institute from our schools, monitor the activities of the United Front Work Department, ban Huawei, ban WeChat, and impose the Magnitsky sanctions against Chinese and Hong Kong officials directly implicated in human rights abuses in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Ms. Tung.

I now give the floor to Mr. Paul-Hus for six minutes.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here.

I'll start with you, Ms. Tung. You wrote a letter in the Vancouver Sun where you mentioned that once the Chinese regime has your picture, they can use facial recognition technology to identify you when you cross the border. You also talked about harassment.

You also just told us about it in your testimony. You tell us that we should be concerned about the technological means available to the Chinese regime and its ability to follow citizens even here in Canada.

Technologically speaking, can the Chinese regime follow citizens who are on Canadian territory?

[Mabel Tung]

Yes. Yes, I do. It has happened so many times. When they take your picture, they put it into their system. When I go back to Hong Kong, I think once I enter the Hong Kong airport they already have my face in their recognition technology. They know who I am and what I have done in Canada.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Ms. Tung.

My next question is for you, Mr. Nelson. You lived in Hong Kong for about 10 years. During the years you spent there, considering the fact that the Chinese regime can track your every move through facial recognition, were you worried, not about your personal safety, but about the security of the information you were transmitting about yourself or other partners? Should we be worried about Canadian companies based in Hong Kong? Should contractors be concerned about the security of the information they transmit?

[Adam Nelson]

I would note that when I lived in Hong Kong, it very much felt, as Professor Tung noted, like a safe city. I moved there in 2006. Things changed drastically when Xi Jinping came to power.

I would travel to mainland China, and when I came back to Hong Kong it felt like a place where one could be particularly free. That is not what Hong Kong is today. For example, on my last trip to Hong Kong, I was there with NDI's president, Derek Mitchell, and our regional director, Manpreet Anand. We were followed from their arrival at the airport. People took our pictures. They took our pictures as we were having meetings around the city and as NDI's president was meeting with other ambassadors and folks in the city. They would put those into mainly Beijing-run newspapers. It was done in an effort to scare and intimidate along with the sanctions that have been forced against us.

In addition, I do think that the environment in Hong Kong under the national security law, in terms of data and the presence of mainland security forces, is very difficult. It's quite scary. I myself, given the work I'm doing—even the fact of joining this meeting, which is illegal under the national security law and, I believe, prosecutable—do not feel safe going back to the city. I would fear what Beijing might do to target me.

Finally, on your question of Canadians in the city, I think we can't ignore the fact that the Chinese ambassador to Canada did overtly threaten the 300,000 Canadian citizens sitting in Hong Kong. We've seen that they have followed through with those threats in the past. If I were a Canadian company executive or a citizen sitting in Hong Kong, I would also be nervous.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Nelson.

Mr. Tsang, in August, you said in the Globe and Mail that you expected a strong reaction from Canada and a response from the Canadian government to the actions of the Chinese government.

Are you satisfied with Canada's response or should much more be done?

[Prof. Steve Tsang]

I think the Canadian government has done well, but I think there's always scope for the government to do more. What we're dealing with in Hong Kong is something that I don't think any single western democracy can take on and can deal with on its own and be successful. If we all work together...and there's no reason why Canada should not take a lead in such a matter, since Canada has the second-largest group of foreign nationals in Hong Kong, the first one being, of course, the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom citizens in Hong Kong are the BNO passport holders. They are not U.K. passport holders. Looking at the full national passport holders, Canadians, in fact, number above everybody else in Hong Kong, which gives a very good reason for Canada to take the lead in such a matter and to co-ordinate with the other democracies and other countries that have significant number of citizens in Hong Kong, to make it very clear that if something happens to them, then the governments will act collectively to help them.

The Chinese government under Mr. Xi Jinping does behave a bit like a schoolyard bully, and we know how schoolyard bullies behave. When they meet with serious, real strength that can cause them serious damage, they usually back off. If they don't do so, they will push.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you Mr. Tsang.

Thank you Mr. Paul-Hus.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Now we'll hear from Mr. Fragiskatos for six minutes.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the witnesses.

My first question is for you, Mr. Nelson.

Let me make it clear at the outset that I do not subscribe to this view, but I think it's important to put it on the record, to put the question and then get the answer on the record. The National Democratic Institute has engaged in democracy work throughout the world in places such as the Ukraine, the Arab world during the time of the Arab Spring, and now in Hong Kong.

There will be those who try to spin your appearance here today into something it's not: speaking on behalf of the organization that does the bidding of the U.S. government on matters of strategic interest to Washington. How would you respond to that?

[Adam Nelson]

This is something that we hear quite a bit, so thank you for the question.

First of all, I would note that we do get competitive U.S. government grants. We get competitive private grants. We also get a lot of funding, as I noted, from Canada, from the British DFID, the Australians and others to do the work that we do around the world.

The work we do is about strengthening global democratic institutions: free and fair elections, political party and civil society development. The work we do is about supporting the partners on the ground. We do nothing except at the invitation of those who we work with.

In Hong Kong, all of the work that we did was because a university wanted to do one of these research reports. A civil society organization wanted to focus on women's political participation and wanted to know how to do some of that work better. They wanted to have youth debates.

We are always happy to step in, as we do anywhere else, and provide the more technical assistance that we've gathered from our 35 years of work, transferring some of that knowledge from other places that face similar challenges, but in some places, of course, there is financial assistance so that they can pay to have the meetings and can pay to produce the reports. We stand by that as well.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much. As I said, it's certainly not a view I subscribe to. In a prior life, I taught international relations for many years at Western University, and one of the areas that I focused on was democratization. Your organization is held in high esteem and deservedly so.

I also want to ask you, Mr. Nelson, what is a general question but with applicability. The answer, at least, has applicability to Hong Kong and Canada's view or approach to the Hong Kong challenge, and it is about the upcoming Biden presidency.

I think it's fair to say, as we've heard at this committee before from expert witnesses, that Canada is caught between a Trump administration that has a particular approach to China generally, and vice versa on the part of China towards the United States. What does a Biden presidency hold? How do you think Mr. Biden and his administration will approach China and what might that mean for a middle power like Canada?

[Adam Nelson]

I wish I had more of an answer on that. It's a question that I hear a lot of people asking: What is the future of U.S. foreign policy on China? I can't speak for the Biden administration. I don't have any contacts with them, personally or professionally.

I will say this. In the U.S., the focus of democracy and human rights on China has been bipartisan. In Congress, we have the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, which is chaired by a senior-level Republican and a Democrat. The recent Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act was a fully bipartisan effort that was put forward.

I would say that I have very little doubt—but I don't know the future—that the focus of continued support on democracy and human rights for both China and Hong Kong and future support for Taiwan will also continue to be bipartisan.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

My last question is for Professor Tsang.

Professor, you just mentioned in the previous questioning that when a bully is basically stood up to—if I understood you correctly, at least—they back off. Because Canada cannot lead this effort, how can Canada and other like-minded countries coalesce around a certain set of issues to pressure China on matters of concern? What are the pressure points that the Xi regime is likely to respond to?

I've asked the question before of other witnesses, but I think it's quite crucial as Canada evaluates its relationship to China and begins to think about working with other like-minded allies, including middle powers, on how to approach China going forward.

[Prof. Steve Tsang]

That is one of those few cases where doing the right thing is probably also the good international move. What I'm talking about is to make it very clear that you really will—and have a plan to—help and protect your nationals in Hong Kong. Three hundred thousand Canadians is not a negligible number.

If you tot up the Canadian and BNO passport holders and the American, Australian and New Zealander passport holders together, you are talking about the bulk of Hong Kong's economic lifeline. If they all left Hong Kong because of what China's government policy is, then they would have to think hard about that.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Mr. Fragiskatos.

Mr. Bergeron, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question is for Mr. Tsang.

As someone who is familiar with the history of Hong Kong and the handover from the United Kingdom to the People's Republic of China, would you say that the administration that was in place at the time of the handover was already anticipating a possible strengthening of power over Hong Kong, or was it the arrival of Xi Jinping at the head of the Communist Party that brought about this change in the People's Republic of China's attitude towards Hong Kong?