Canada-China Relations Committee on Feb. 6th, 2023

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Commissioner Lucki confirmed for the committee, or actually provided news—and it was the first time we were made aware of this—that there were uniformed RCMP officers—she didn't use the word “stationed”, but they were at the Vancouver location. She didn't say they were gathering intelligence, but she said they were there. I think the word she used was that they were there to “disrupt”.

If you're gathering intelligence, are you then sharing it with CSIS? Who would then share it, as he's just outlined, with our allies? Is that how that flow of information works?

[C/Supt Matt Peggs]

Thanks for that question.

There are a couple of things. The uniformed presence in the marked vehicles was at the Toronto locations.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Oh, I thought she said Vancouver. It's my mistake.

[C/Supt Matt Peggs]

It's okay. They were at the Toronto locations. The purpose of that was essentially to show the community we were doing something about this to try to encourage that reporting to come in.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

If reporting did come in, is the flow of information then to Director General Fisher or someone in CSIS, who then can share that with our allies and compare notes? Is that how that flow of information works?

[C/Supt Matt Peggs]

Typically speaking, all of the information that we gather is shared with the service as well.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

You would confirm that.

[Adam Fisher]

I would, yes. It's easier going in that direction than in the other direction, which touches on a previous question from a member. That's where we get into.... It was referenced—

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Can I confirm what you mean there? I'm sorry.

Do you mean our CSIS operatives gathering that information?

[Adam Fisher]

The flow of information is easier from a law enforcement context into an intelligence realm, rather than vice versa. Going from intelligence into law enforcement is difficult because of the intelligence evidence issue, which is a long-standing challenge within the Canadian context. Actually, all of our partners face very similar challenges.

That comes to how police forces handle evidence, and their requirements and their thresholds. It also touches on our requirement to protect sources, in particular, from our Five Eyes partners and others.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

That may beg further questions, but there will be opportunities to do that a bit later on.

We'll now go to Mr. Cormier for five minutes or less.

[Serge Cormier, Liberal, Acadie—Bathurst, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Gauvin, with a last name like yours, you surely have relatives in Acadia.

In your opening remarks, you indicated that you wanted to talk to anyone who might feel threatened or intimidated by these police stations. You also mentioned that this could be aimed at students.

Do you go to these people, or do you let them come to you? One of the things you mentioned was a phone number to contact the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

I would also like to have some answers in French about the process you use to gather information, especially from students. Do you go to them at their university, or do you let them contact you if they have information to pass on to you or if they think that a so-called police station is in their area?

[Brigitte Gauvin]

Thank you for your question, Mr. Cormier.

I would answer yes, in both cases, absolutely.

We encourage people to come to us to make a complaint or inform us of any threats or intimidation they may experience.

We proactively engage with communities, including universities and other institutions that may be affected by foreign interference. As part of our involvement with these institutions and people, including students, we inform and educate them about potential foreign threats and the different means used to make these threats. We also equip them to report these events while protecting themselves.

[Serge Cormier, Liberal, Acadie—Bathurst, NB]

You talk to these people, students or other members of the Chinese community. I read that some people fear for their safety, or for the safety of their family members who are still in China.

Do you feel this fear when you talk to them? Do these people seem to be open and transparent when they tell you about the threats or intimidation they face, or are some reluctant to disclose what they are really seeing?

[Brigitte Gauvin]

When we engage with these persons, we certainly try to get as much information as possible. It is possible, indeed, that people are reluctant to provide information for fear of reprisals from foreign actors. The RCMP is also aware of the intimidation that family members who still remain in China may face. We therefore encourage Chinese nationals in Canada to share as much information as possible, which we take into consideration in our investigations.

[Serge Cormier, Liberal, Acadie—Bathurst, NB]

That's fine.

I have a question that may be for you or other witnesses.

I have heard what China has said about these police stations; that these facilities are not police stations, but rather centres run by volunteers to help Chinese citizens abroad.

What do you think of this claim by the Chinese authorities?

[C/Supt Matt Peggs]

As French is not my mother tongue, I prefer to reply in English.

I just have to remember the question now after I got that out.

Unfortunately, the facts that we've learned through our investigation—to maintain the integrity of it—I cannot share with you today, as we want to make sure that we can proceed with this investigation down the road to try to get to prosecutions. I'm afraid I can't answer that question.

[Serge Cormier, Liberal, Acadie—Bathurst, NB]

I know that the RCMP has a lot of files and a lot of work to do, but I would like to know if, in terms of priority, the issue of these police stations is at the bottom, in the middle or at the very top of the ladder.

[C/Supt Matt Peggs]

I can say that we take this very seriously. It is one of our priority matters, and we're continuing to investigate it. We have actually moved some resources into that unit to bolster that investigation so that we can keep it going. It remains a priority for us.

[Serge Cormier, Liberal, Acadie—Bathurst, NB]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much, Mr. Cormier.

We go to Mr. Chong now for five minutes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I just want to continue the line of questioning that MP Dancho had and that I asked earlier but never got a response, which was on this April 2022 internal report. It highlighted an apparent lack of co-operation in the integrated national security enforcement team and where information intelligence to evidence wasn't flowing. As a result, arrests were not made and an active threat was not thwarted.

My simple question is this: Has this been addressed, or is this an ongoing issue? If so, what should be done by Parliament, by government and by the cabinet to address this lack of inter-agency co-operation when it comes to protecting our national security?

[Adam Fisher]

First, I'd just like to emphasize that, certainly from my perspective—and, I think, the service perspective in general—the co-operation between us and the RCMP and the rest of the national security community is very sound, very good and very healthy. There was a time when that wasn't the case, I think we'd all agree, but we've come a long way. We've done a lot of work to define our lanes and ways that we can help each other in terms of executing our mandates. I just want to emphasize that point.

I don't know how far back this document goes. It's potentially back to days when things weren't so healthy. However, today things are very healthy.

Intelligence to evidence is an issue. It's something that the government has recognized as such and has been putting a lot of effort into trying to address. It's not a straightforward issue at all. However, I also wouldn't want to leave the impression that it's the only avenue.

Again, I don't know the particulars of the case you're citing, but it wouldn't be unusual in such circumstances for the Mounties to tell CSIS, “You're not giving us enough information for us to pursue our own investigation.” We'd have to go back, look at ourselves and see whether there's perhaps something we can do on our own threat reduction mandate. I'm not saying that happened. I'm just saying that would not be an unusual conversation.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you for that answer.

Just quickly.... We're talking about foreign interference today in the form of police stations and other forms of interference.

Christopher Wray, the director of the FBI, said just before Christmas that TikTok is a threat to U.S. national security in two forms. First, it's potentially a real threat with respect to espionage—the ability of TikTok to gather vast amounts of data to track and surveil persons in the U.S. Second, it's a threat in the form of foreign interference because the recommendation algorithms could be used to attack democratic institutions, parties and candidates during and in between elections by serving up massive amounts of disinformation. It is the number one app that's been downloaded worldwide, and it's the number one app amongst a younger generation of our citizens.

Can you tell us what the CSIS assessment is of TikTok with respect to espionage and its ability to track Canadians through the vast amounts of data it collects? Second, what is the CSIS assessment of TikTok's threat with respect to foreign interference and the fact that the recommendation algorithms could be manipulated to spread disinformation to attack our parties, our elections and our institutions?