Canada-China Relations Committee on Feb. 6th, 2023

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

That, too, is a very important question. We touched on it earlier, Mr. Genuis, when I was answering Ms. McPherson's questions about research guidelines. I think that there are—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Yes, I saw your statements on it.

Very specifically, is there any instance where you think it would be acceptable for Canadian institutions to collaborate with Chinese military institutions?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Given the sensitivity of that particular subject matter, there would need to be a very strict standard. It's hard for me to conceive of a scenario.

Again, these decisions are taken independently by the academic institutions that have research partnerships. Those guidelines are there. I think they guard against—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I think it would be helpful if you provided clearer advice.

I have 30 seconds left. I want to get in one last question.

Following Mr. Chong's questions about CGTN and noting the directive you issued on RT, is the government considering issuing a directive regarding CGTN similar to the directive issued for RT?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

You heard my answer to Mr. Chong. As a matter of first principle, those are decisions that are typically undertaken by the—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I'm almost out of time. Are you considering a directive?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

I was endeavouring to complete the answer to your first question.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

It's yes or no. Are you considering issuing a directive?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

We endeavour to respect the independence of the CRTC, which is an administrative tribunal that makes those decisions. We'll always take decisions consistent with that principle and—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

You issued the directive with RT. Was that consistent with the principle of respecting its independence?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Where appropriate, we will look to other potential decisions. At this moment—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Are you considering that in this case, though?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Gentlemen, I hate to interrupt. You are both out of time on this round of questioning.

Thank you.

We'll now go to Mr. Chiang.

I believe you're going to share your time with Mr. Cormier. Who is going to lead, you or Mr. Cormier?

[Paul Chiang, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

I will.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

All right. Go ahead for five minutes or less.

[Paul Chiang, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for allowing me to be here tonight.

I'm going to go back to Commissioner Lucki, since we're talking about the alleged Chinese police stations here.

Again, my concerns are for my constituents. They have been amply clear to me in regard to these police stations that they are fearful for their safety. They look at it as being a police station, but in your professional view, is this considered a police station or are they just a front for something else?

[Commr Brenda Lucki]

In the media, they've referred to them as police stations. For us, it's any place that causes interference, intimidation or harassment in any form. It's not a police station how we define a police station. In some of these cases, it could be as simple as a room behind a commercial retail store. It's not what we call police stations. I think the reference is probably because of the.... I'm not even sure why that is the reference.

We have to make sure that your constituents and all Canadians feel safe. It's important that, if they are directly threatened, they first of all call 911. We don't want to see anybody get hurt because of any interference, harassment or coercion. If it isn't an urgent matter, and they feel safe to come forward.... If they don't feel safe, maybe they feel safe coming with their member of Parliament or somebody. Even if we start off by getting the information through another source so that they can feel safe....

When Ms. McPherson was talking about the runaround that some people are getting, that's exactly why we created the 1-800 number and the email address, so that people could have that one spot to report if they felt.... We are educating the other police of jurisdiction, but sometimes they don't have the specialized expertise in foreign interference that our members of the RCMP have.

[Paul Chiang, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Thank you so much, Commissioner.

Through these investigations, has there been any other locations discovered?

[Commr Brenda Lucki]

No. So far to date there have been three in the greater Toronto area and one in Vancouver.

[Paul Chiang, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Chair, I cede my time to Mr. Cormier.

[Serge Cormier, Liberal, Acadie—Bathurst, NB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

My question may have been touched on a little earlier today, but it is always nice to have answers in French, if possible.

I noticed that Ireland and the Netherlands had ordered the closure of these so-called police stations. How did these countries close these police stations? Did they investigate, as Canada does, and did it take months or years? What process did these countries adopt when they ordered the closure of these police stations?

My question is for anyone who wants to answer.

[Commr Brenda Lucki]

I don't know the specifics of the investigations you're referring to, but what I can say is that, of course, we have to meet the threshold of our Criminal Code if, in fact, we are going to lay charges. We have several Criminal Code offences that can be leveraged, such as breach of trust, criminal harassment, unauthorized use of a computer, fraud for obtaining trade secrets, intimidation, mischief and bribery of officers.

Then we have a whole suite of allegations or charges that can be laid under the Security of Information Act offences, such as unauthorized communications, communicating safeguarded information and use of trade secrets. These are all specific charges for various types of foreign interference.

Of course, we have to meet the threshold of the evidence in order to bring somebody to court. Shutting them down.... I will say that with police culture often our success is by charges laid, but it's also through disruption as well, because we haven't heard very many new complaints on those three stations in Toronto and the one in Vancouver as a result of the disruption we have done with those particular locations.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Cormier. There's not very much time left for a follow-up question.

I want to thank our panellists, Minister Mendicino, Commissioner Lucki, Ms. Geddes and Mr. Vigneault. You've been very generous with your time this evening, and we thank you for that.

We'll take a quick break while we get our second panel in place.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

In the interest of making sure we have enough time for questions before our allotted time runs out, we will commence with our second panel.

Joining us now is Adam Fisher, director general, intelligence assessments, from the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service. We have Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère, assistant deputy minister; and Lesley Soper, director general, national security policy, from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. We then have Brigitte Gauvin, acting director general, federal policing, national security; and Matt Peggs, chief superintendent, criminal operations officer of O Division (Ontario), from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

I understand we will have opening statements from Mr. Fisher and Ms. Gauvin.

We will start with Ms. Gauvin for five minutes or less.

[Brigitte Gauvin, Acting Director General, Federal Policing, National Security, Royal Canadian Mounted Police]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the honourable members of this committee for the opportunity to discuss the issue of foreign interference today concerning the allegations of police stations that are allegedly affiliated with the People's Republic of China and operating in Canada.

My name is Brigitte Gauvin, and I am the acting director general of federal policing in the national security program. I am accompanied by Matt Peggs, the officer in charge of criminal operations in O Division, which is in Ontario, where the RCMP is responsible for federal law enforcement.

The study of this issue is important from a law enforcement perspective, and the RCMP takes this very seriously. While I cannot discuss precise details of ongoing investigations, I want to assure this committee that the RCMP may leverage criminal offences to investigate potential threats to public safety involving a state actor, including Criminal Code offences such as intimidation, criminal harassment, uttering threats and also specific foreign influence threats of violence or violence offences under the Security of Information Act.

Today, I'll focus on explaining three specific concerns from a law enforcement perspective.

First, why is foreign interference, including the activities allegedly connected to the police stations, a problem? This is because the foreign interference threat is multi-layered. It can range from students being pressured to support activities that are favourable to a foreign country, to the theft of intellectual property or the coercion of an individual.

The common thread among each of these foreign interference-related activities is that they are clandestine, deceptive activities that may involve threats to a person and are detrimental to Canada's interests.

This state-backed harassment and intimidation of Canadian communities is no different, as foreign actors seek to benefit another country by limiting certain dialogue and messaging in Canada. There is a collective concern on this topic, which has been expressed both domestically and internationally. This is not only because these alleged police stations have been reported to be operating in the greater Toronto area, but also reportedly around the globe.

This is concerning for several reasons. These alleged police stations may contribute to the involuntary return of individuals to China. Also, families living in both China and Canada may become the target of harassment, intimidation or experience other negative consequences. If the activities of these alleged police stations are consistent with those reported by Safeguard Defenders and the media, they would be operating outside existing Canadian legal mechanisms.

Second, how is the RCMP responding to the alleged police stations issue, and how is the RCMP countering foreign interference more broadly? The RCMP has a specialized team dedicated to countering foreign interference. The ultimate goal is to ensure that the public feels safe in their own communities, building trust and confidence where possible, enforcing relevant legislation or disrupting activities.

We are working directly with the community, our domestic and intelligence law enforcement, security and intelligence partners and other Government of Canada partners on this issue. Our efforts include investigating, preventing and disrupting foreign interference, and we use the knowledge gained from our strategic and criminal intelligence functions, as well as our collaborations with our partners, to adapt to the criminal methods used by foreign actors.

As mentioned, I cannot share specific details about the RCMP's investigations. This is because the investigations are ongoing, and foreign interference investigations are some of the most sensitive national security investigations the RCMP currently conducts.

Third and finally, I will explain how the Canadian public can assist in countering this activity. We encourage the public to report state-backed harassment and intimidation, as this will allow us to investigate and will assist the RCMP in creating a more complete picture of the criminal threat environment. The local police of jurisdiction are typically the first to learn of a foreign interference-related issued. The RCMP works closely with its law enforcement partners, including police of jurisdiction, to respond to these state-backed threats.

If someone is in immediate danger, 911 or local police should be contacted. If an individual is not in immediate danger, the RCMP's national security information network may be contacted by phone or email.

In conclusion, I would like to re-emphasize that the RCMP is taking this situation very seriously. This is a nationwide and global issue. The alleged police stations rightly concern Canadians. We share these concerns.

Thank you for your time today.