Canada-China Relations Committee on Nov. 27th, 2023

[Newton Shortliffe]

Thank you for that question.

Modernization of the CSIS Act will assist in a number of different ways.

As I mentioned earlier, we are seeking to develop the means to provide information to Canadians, whether it be on cybersecurity or other threats to the security of Canada. Some of the measures we're seeking are improvements to our act that will allow us to more easily share information and provide briefings to other levels of government—which are quite constrained right now under the CSIS Act beyond the federal level—as well as to the private sector and elsewhere when there are threats. In addition, we are looking for improvements that will allow for the improved ability to investigate different kinds of threats, which will increase the speed with which we are able to provide intelligence to the Government of Canada.

The CSIS Act is quite old. It's no longer fit for purpose. It was written in 1984 and, notwithstanding some modernization and some changes that have been made, we find it does not keep pace with the current technological reality.

One thing we're looking for and consulting Canadians on is the idea of perhaps reviewing it every five years, as an example, in order to ensure that we do keep up with technological change and with changes in society, so we don't end up in a situation where we're unable to do quite logical things that we think most Canadians think we should be able to do easily.

The modernization wasn't written specifically for the Indo-Pacific strategy, but it will definitely assist our ability to participate and to support the Government of Canada's objectives in the Indo-Pacific strategy, if successful.

Perhaps I can call on my colleague to make a couple of comments.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Answer very briefly, if you could, Ms. Estabrooks.

[Sarah Estabrooks, Director General, Policy and Foreign Relations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

I think it's valuable to point to the sophistication of the threat actors in that region and the fact that the democratic norms we adhere to and value as Canadians are not shared universally. We look for modernization of our authorities in order to really build authorities and powers that respect the values of Canadians but help us to counter incredibly complex and sophisticated threat actors.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you for that.

Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

We'll now go to Mr. Boulerice for six minutes or perhaps a little more.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses who are with us today to talk about these extremely important issues.

A lot of people in Quebec and Canada are concerned about cybersecurity and the growing volume of cyber-attacks. They endanger Canada's national security, but also the interests of individuals.

In connection with the strategy we are discussing today, what measures are being taken right now to address these cyber-threats and guarantee the cybersecurity of the federal government, but also of everyone in Quebec and Canada?

[Newton Shortliffe]

I imagine that is a question for me, since I represent the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

On cybersecurity, as I mentioned, this is something that we work on with our partners. In terms of specific measures that Canadians and Canadian companies can take to protect themselves, I would recommend that the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security is the entity that is most appropriate to direct such questions to.

The CSIS role is to understand what targets threat actors might be after and why they may be seeking to target different parts of Canadian society: why they would be targeting different departments, different levels of government, and which sectors of the economy might be targeted and why. We provide intelligence to our government partners to inform the decision-making that is then made in terms of response, but the response does ultimately lie with others.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Thank you for that answer.

You referred to partnerships. What is the status of the partnerships between Canada and the regional actors to improve cybersecurity, which is so important for everyone?

[Newton Shortliffe]

What I can say about that is that there is great interest on the part of our counterparts throughout the region, our allies and the various organizations that we're seeking to improve our relationships with. In speaking with my colleagues in other government departments, I know they also find great interest on the part of their counterparts in understanding the cyber-threat, especially the cyber-threat that comes from certain countries—China being the largest threat that all of us face—and finding means to confront it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

You have time for just a very brief question, Mr. Boulerice.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

In what area of cybersecurity is Canada well equipped? In what aspects of cybersecurity should we invest more resources? Without going so far as to say we are weak, should we be focusing on certain aspects in particular?

[Newton Shortliffe]

It's cybersecurity or cyber-threats across the spectrum in terms of where we see them. Where it is probably most significant or of greatest concern right now would be in terms of economic security, but also in the possibility of using cyber-tools for impacting, for example, our democratic freedoms or the integrity of our institutions. Those are the areas where we tend to be most focused right now, but it is a really broad threat that touches almost everything.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much.

We'll now go to our second round.

We're beginning with Mr. Chong.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I just want to finish up the question I had earlier for the representatives from CSIS.

The Indo-Pacific strategy mentions that Canada will “bolster Canada's long-standing collaboration with...the Five Eyes”. It also mentions that Canada will “make meaningful contributions to the region's security...with regional partners and allies”. Does the government intend to expand our intelligence relationship beyond the Five Eyes in the region?

[Newton Shortliffe]

Yes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Okay. Thank you for answering that.

The question I now have concerns legislation, Canadian law. You mentioned that you believe there need to be updates to the CSIS Act to better equip CSIS to respond to the threats we are currently facing.

I'm wondering whether you also think that a foreign agents registry is an additional tool that is required. As you know, the government is undertaking consultations about this. It has announced that it intends to introduce one at some point. Do you believe we need a foreign agents registry, such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. have had for some time?

[Newton Shortliffe]

I believe a foreign agent registry will help. It will provide information that CSIS and other entities can use to help identify threat actors and differentiate those from others who might not be engaged in threats. I wouldn't want to comment beyond that.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Okay. Thank you.

I have a question now for the representatives from our armed forces.

This month, Estonia accused a PRC ship of damaging an underwater gas pipeline and two data cables. Most of the world's Internet and data traffic travel over submarine cables. There is a major cable from Port Alberni to Japan that carries a lot of data traffic.

I'm wondering whether or not, in your professional opinion, we have the submarine capacity to monitor threats to our submarine cables. As you know, we have four diesel battery-powered submarines that are nearing the end of their lives. To my knowledge, we have no autonomous submarine capacity in the Royal Canadian Navy, and yet we face these threats. I would like your analysis about whether or not we are equipped to monitor threats to our submarine infrastructure on our coasts.

[MGen Gregory Smith]

Mr. Chair, that's a far-ranging question.

There are hundreds of thousands of kilometres of undersea cables, of course. I don't know if there's any country in the world that can monitor that.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Just to be clear, I'm not talking about monitoring in the mid-Pacific, where anchors are not going to drop thousands and thousands of feet. I'm talking about monitoring it in our own maritime waters, where the threats are the greatest, as we saw recently in the Baltic Sea.

[MGen Gregory Smith]

Thank you, Chair, for that precision.

Actually, with respect to my technical expertise, I'm an army person. I don't know if a submarine is the best thing to actually monitor those either. I would just say it's a very large problem. Obviously, the fact that it's happened several times within the Baltic Sea recently illustrates the sheer challenge of what we're dealing with right now.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I guess my question is, are we prepared for monitoring the threats that Finland, Estonia and other states in the region have faced because of the severing of these cables and pipelines?

[MGen Gregory Smith]

Mr. Chair, I would just reiterate that it's a very big challenge. We have some assets that can help in that. It's something we're working with all of our partners to deal with. It's an emerging challenge. It's something NATO is dealing with. As we can see, based on the threats and what has occurred physically recently, it's a very topical problem.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I don't have any more questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Chong.

We will now go to Ms. Damoff for five minutes or less.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thanks, Chair.

Thanks to all the witnesses for being here.

My question is for CSIS.

We've talked about cybersecurity and foreign interference. I'm wondering if you could tell us how you, versus CSE, fit into that. I know that Canadians often get confused and assume you're doing the same work, but you're not. Can you just put some clarity on how that's working in the Indo-Pacific strategy specifically?