Canada-China Relations Committee on Nov. 27th, 2023

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

So no visas that go to the Chandigarh office are actually being processed in Chandigarh. They are being sent to Delhi to be processed.

[Ian G. McKay]

Our diplomats in Chandigarh have, in fact, been removed from India, so there is no capacity to process them there.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Okay.

The agricultural office that is supposed to be set up as part of the Indo-Pacific strategy.... There's $31.8 million to establish Canada's first agricultural office in the region. Tell me what the status of that is. How much money has been spent? What has the money been spent on? What's the rollout of the remainder of those expenditures?

[Ian G. McKay]

The objective of the Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada office in the region was to put a physical presence for Canada to promote, facilitate and expand our trade in the same time zone as our client countries in the region.

In terms of the operational issues and the budgetary issues, I would have to defer to Mr. Epp and Ms. Strohan, but, certainly, the objective of having that office is something that was very well received by our agriculture, agri-food and seafood producers all across Canada.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Sure, but the operational stuff is what I want to know about.

[Weldon Epp, Assistant Deputy Minister, Indo-Pacific, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you for the question, Mr. Chair.

The new AAFC office will be announced very soon. It will be operational in the Philippines. Hiring has begun. In terms of the actual dollars, I'm not sure we have that. We'll look during this session, but we're very close to seeing boots on the ground and an open door in our mission there.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

This was announced a year ago—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Mr. Seeback, I'm sorry, but your time has run out.

We will now go to Ms. Damoff for six minutes or less.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thanks, Chair.

I would note that I did read the notes that we got. It quite clearly talks about the People's Republic of China in relation to the Indo-Pacific strategy. That's just to make sure Mr. Seeback knows that I am prepared when I come in here.

My question is about the media attention we've had over the last year with regard to Canada and China's relationship. I'm wondering if you can comment on the minister's decision to develop and implement an Indo-Pacific strategy and how that has impacted and allowed us to navigate the relationship with China over the course of the last year.

[Ian G. McKay]

Obviously China, like every other country in the Indo-Pacific region, is well aware of the Indo-Pacific strategy that was developed by Global Affairs Canada and partner departments across the Government of Canada. I'll be as clear as I can be in terms of China's response. They're not spending a whole lot of attention and time thinking about our Indo-Pacific strategy. I don't think it has enhanced our dialogues going forward, but at the same time I don't think it has hindered our dialogues going forward.

One of the remarkable outcomes of the quiet diplomacy that has been going on between Canada and China over the past year, in the time when we've had our Indo-Pacific strategy published, was the ability for Canada to host, on China's behalf, the biodiversity conference in December 2022, when China was unable to host such a conference. In spite of all the difficulties that we have been and are experiencing with China, I think Canada demonstrated—maybe in a way better than almost any other country in the world—that we were able to work very efficiently, very quietly and very effectively with the Government of China to essentially host or co-host, on their behalf, that biodiversity conference in Montreal.

Between China and Canada, I think that was an extraordinarily impressive feat. It allowed China to save face, if you will, as they were planning to host a global conference, which they found out they were unable to do. Canada stepped up and, at the diplomatic and officials level, worked very effectively to host and co-host that conference in Montreal. I think that was a terrific outcome that happened. All the while, China was aware of our Indo-Pacific strategy having been launched.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you for that.

Earlier this month, the G7 foreign ministers gathered in Japan, and the U.S. hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in San Francisco, which saw presidents Biden and Xi have a summit on the margins. I wonder if you could update us on how these two meetings took place and how things went for Canada in those two meetings.

[Ian G. McKay]

Yes, indeed, with Japan as the host country for the G7 in 2023, they in fact hosted 16 ministerial conferences, as well as the leaders summit that took place in May. In terms of the foreign affairs ministers summit, there was one in April and there was a secondary one in November. At both of those meetings.... Minister Joly, of course, was present in Japan, and things changed between the April meeting and the November meeting in terms of global activities. The focus at the April meeting was to engage with G7 partners and talk about the situation in Ukraine. The focus of the November meeting was on the situation in Ukraine as well as the situation in Israel and the Gaza Strip.

With respect to APEC in San Francisco recently, I think there's no doubt that the event that took up all the oxygen in the room was the anticipation of the President Biden-President Xi summit, which, by all accounts, was a successful four-hour summit. I think it was important, not just to those two countries but also to Canada and all the other APEC nations, and perhaps nations around the world, that China and the United States essentially set a bit of a reset and took the temperature down a little bit on the frictions that had been happening between those two countries. That, in effect, lowers the temperature globally for many countries in their relationships with China. The decision by the two leaders to speak more frequently, to pick up the phone and speak virtually any time they wish, is something that hasn't happened for a while. I think Canada takes great comfort that this was achieved at the APEC summit in San Francisco.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Ambassador McKay.

We'll now go to Mr. Bergeron for six minutes or less.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being with us today, Ambassador.

I also thank Mr. Epp and Ms. Strohan for being with us.

I am one of those people who think that words are important. When we received the government's response to this committee's report on Taiwan, we were surprised by the tepid response to some of our recommendations. In particular, in response to the recommendation in our report that “the Government of Canada offer and declare its clear and unwavering commitment that the future of Taiwan must only be the decision of the people of Taiwan,” the government replied that it “takes note of this recommendation.”

Why this tepid response to the obvious fact that the future of Taiwan must be decided by the Taiwanese?

[Ian G. McKay]

I would agree that the future of Taiwan would be determined—as it will be, certainly, in the short term—through their elections, which I think are happening early next year.

I was not present at that committee hearing, but perhaps if my colleagues Mr. Epp and Ms. Strohan have more detail on the exchange there, they might be able to assist me in responding more fulsomely to your question, Mr. Bergeron.

[Weldon Epp]

As I think the committee is well aware, Canada's long-standing policy takes note of positions on Taiwan, its status and its future, without endorsing or pronouncing on it. Obviously, over the years Taiwan, the people of Taiwan and Canada have worked closely together in many ways—economic and people-to-people. We've watched democracy flourish in Taiwan and Taiwanese individuals exercise their franchise, and, as Ambassador McKay noted, they'll have an opportunity to do so soon.

It's a position of the Government of Canada that we urge all sides not to bring unilateral change to the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, given not only the interests of the people on both sides of the strait but the interests of Canada.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

One of the observations that struck us in our mission to Washington was that we needed to at least try to align our two countries' strategies for the Indo-Pacific region better. The American strategy says that the United States will work with Taiwan for the future of Taiwan, in accordance with the wishes of the Taiwanese. That seems pretty clear to me.

Does that mean that our strategy for the Indo-Pacific region is something other than the idea that the future of the Taiwanese depends on what the Taiwanese want?

[Weldon Epp]

Mr. Chair, I'm happy to take the question. If the ambassador wants to add, he can.

I take the point. It's an interesting one. We speak regularly about Taiwan with our colleagues at the State Department and the White House. I'm stating the obvious: We have a different strategy. Our Into-Pacific strategy is not identical to the American one, but we share many interests and we coordinate closely.

What I would say is that although Canada does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan and we do not, like the United States, have an act of Congress that commits us to the defence of Taiwan or provision of military assets to Taiwan, we have a broad range of ways in which we can continue to support the interests of the region and of the globe in seeing democracy and a free economy flourish in Taiwan. That includes conclusion of negotiations on a foreign investment protection arrangement and a recent MOU on health. There are things that the Government of Canada is able to do with authorities in Taiwan that, frankly, some of our like-minded partners won't do.

When it comes to the United States, they're in a unique category—given, again, acts of Congress, the Taiwan Relations Act and the way in which their military provides security across the region—but you will note recent joint exercises in the Taiwan Strait between Canadian frigates and American frigates. Where we can and where it's in our interest, we do align very closely with the approach of partners, but I wouldn't pretend that our policy and our tool kit track exactly with the United States.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

There's time for a short question and a short answer, Monsieur Bergeron.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Very simply, what did the department mean when it responded to this committee that it took note of its recommendation that the future of Taiwan must be the decision of the people of Taiwan?

[Weldon Epp]

Mr. Chair, I think that response speaks for itself. The government did take note of that view of the committee. This is not a new policy issue, and I think the government will continue to review its posture, given both present circumstances and developments that may come.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Epp.

We will now go to Mr. Boulerice for six minutes or less.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I am very pleased to be here with you today, sitting in for my very illustrious colleague from Edmonton Strathcona.

We are very happy to have the ambassador and the representatives of the government with us today to discuss the federal government's strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. The strategy offers us a lot of opportunities, but also presents challenges and difficulties that it is wise to understand clearly in relation to the geopolitical situation in that region.

First, we need to get a little perspective. What factors influenced the decision to develop and implement a strategy for the Indo-Pacific region in particular? Where did this idea come from?

[Ian G. McKay]

Thank you for the question.

I think there are two primary drivers. One is a long-term driver, in that Canada has made efforts over many decades to be a more engaged partner in the Indo-Pacific, but frankly, we have spent most of our economic history tied to Europe, the United States and Central and South America.

As I said in my opening statement, the recognition of the Indo-Pacific region as having the fastest-growing economies in the world really was a critical driver for all of Canada and for all Canadian businesses. It provides opportunities to diversify our trade, to take advantage of an area of the world that will have two-thirds of the middle class within 10 or 15 years, and to recognize the economic shift that's happening from Europe and even North America to the Indo-Pacific region. It's real. It's coming, and Canada needs to be a part of it.

As a more recent driver of the strategy that I mentioned in the opening, I think the emergence of China as a significant economic and military power—and in some ways a disruptive power—has made it critical for Canada to engage with more partners in the region so that our relationship with the Indo-Pacific isn't determined by our relationship with one or two large players. I think that's going to be a very significant outcome.

Canada, as you will recall, became a strategic partner with the ASEAN nations in September, when the Prime Minister was visiting there. This is critical because I'm not sure there's another country in the world that has the hat trick of being a strategic partner with the ASEAN as well as undergoing free trade agreement negotiations with all of the ASEAN nations and bilaterally with Indonesia, which has a population of 280 million people.

I think those are the critical drivers that led Canada to the development of a strategy that is very well resourced. It encompasses 17 different departments and agencies of the Government of Canada. It means that we're not there as an episodic interloper in the region but as a long-term strategic partner, which we think will benefit all of Canada.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Thank you for your answer, which is informative.

There is something in particular I would like to clarify: what groups in Quebec and Canadian civil society did you consult before or during the development of this strategy for the Indo-Pacific region?

For example, did you consult trade union movements or human rights advocacy groups before developing the strategy?