Canada-China Relations Committee on Oct. 4th, 2022

[Paul Thoppil]

Mr. Chair, I'm going to ask my colleague Weldon to respond.

[Weldon Epp]

As the member has alluded to, there have been a series of missile tests. There has not yet been a nuclear test. There are deep concerns that it could be coming. Canada, along with its closest partners in the G7, plus others, have repeatedly called out the DPRK for its reckless use of missile testing, including, as you have mentioned, overnight over Japan.

I guess the best way, I would say, to answer your question is that there are a couple of things going on. One is obviously that, with the new administration in Seoul, with some fairly major ruptures to the international order in terms of what's happening in Europe and with behaviour that we've seen before from the regime in the DPRK, it's unfortunate but not.... I would say it's more than “unfortunate”. It's disturbing but not entirely surprising that North Korea is attention seeking and raising the cost of what could be, again, a pivot towards renewed negotiations.

While the risk to security, not least maritime security and the security of people in Japan, is of great concern and the Government of Canada will continue to call out the DPRK for that, we've also seen in the past real quick pivots between escalation on the part of the DPRK and, as we saw during the Trump administration in the U.S., seeking breakthroughs in negotiations.

DPRK analysts, of which I am not one, are following this very closely. In the meantime, all of this activity does allow the regime in the DPRK to learn from and improve its capacity, which is a great concern to Canada.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you.

That's all I have, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

All right. Thank you, Mr. Oliphant.

We will now conclude with a round of two and a half minutes for Mr. Bergeron, followed by two and a half minutes for Ms. McPherson.

Go ahead, Mr. Bergeron.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I was very interested in Brigadier-General Laforest's answer earlier to a question from Mr. Chong. He said that when HMCS Vancouver and USSHiggins sailed through the Taiwan Strait was just a simple trip from point A to point B, when it was clearly a political response to the increasingly more aggressive policy of the People's Republic of China in the Taiwan Strait and the China Sea.

On that point, in fact, in an episode of 60 Minutes that was broadcast on CBS in September, President Biden stated that the American army would take measures to defend Taiwan against an “unprecedented attack”. The Hill Times reported on October 2 that Lloyd Austin, the American Secretary of Defence, had said that the United States would honour their commitment to Taiwan, but gave no further details.

What would Canada's position be in the event of a military escalation between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan?

[BGen Éric Laforest]

Thank you for your question, Mr. Bergeron.

Of course we are concerned, as is everyone, by the rise in tension in the region.

Regarding the transit by HMCS Vancouver between the south and north regions of the China Sea, it was really to connect two points of operation that we had to have in those two locations.

For the rest, we are monitoring the situation. Decisions will be made at the appropriate time.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Does anyone from the Department of Foreign Affairs have something to add?

[Weldon Epp]

I just might say that the question you posed is an important one but a hypothetical one in terms of how we might respond to a particular scenario.

What is important is to say what we're already doing. As the brigadier-general has already pointed out, Canada has expanded its defence and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific in recent years. That includes the enhanced naval presence that's been referred to and co-operation with our partners, increasingly discussions with Japan and Korea, and so forth.

If you're watching the activity and you're seeing the degree to which the Canadian presence and regularity of our operational exercises has increased, you'll understand that we are following these developments with great concern.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Epp.

Now for our final bit of questioning, we go to Ms. McPherson.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I just want to take a moment to thank all of you for being here again. I realize that we are making you spend time away from your families and spend time away from dinner, so thank you for being here and providing this information for us.

Today, I had the great privilege of listening to Mr. Alex Neve and Mr. Mehmet Tohti talk about what is happening in China with the Uighur population.

We have a new ambassador to China who has just, after some delay, been appointed. Will she be doing an investigation into what is happening in China with regard to the Uighur population?

[Paul Thoppil]

I am going to ask my colleague, Jennie Chen, to respond to that.

[Jennie Chen]

My sense is that Ambassador May, given her previous background handling human rights files during her time at the Embassy of Canada in Beijing, will be seized with this issue from day one. I am confident of that.

We are absolutely providing her briefings and as much information as possible right now as she prepares for her upcoming assignment. She is very much aware of the Government of Canada's priority concern over the situation of Uighurs, as outlined in Minister Joly's statement of November 1 in response to the Xinjiang report.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you.

One of the things that I've been seized with as a parliamentarian is ensuring that none of the supplies that make it to Canada are using slave or forced labour. We have seen some legislation come forward from private members but none from the government.

What is the government doing to ensure that we do more than just have one seizure of goods that are from forced labour, which, I believe, was actually returned.

[Jennie Chen]

This has been a whole-of-government effort really to address our concerns and risks around forced labour emanating from Uighurs and Muslim minority populations in China. We are working very closely with our trade colleagues within Global Affairs Canada, as well with ESDC and CBSA, to come forth with not only the international pieces but also the domestic architecture necessary to advance this file.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

We're quite a long way into this. I'm wondering when we can expect there to actually be some concrete action on this.

[Jennie Chen]

A considerable amount of work is currently under way.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much.

That brings us to the end of this panel's work, and I'd also like to thank all of the panellists online or in person for their time and the answers to the questions that we posed to you this evening.

We will now take a brief break so that we can change over to our second panel of the evening. We'll take five minutes starting now.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you and welcome back for our second panel of tonight's hearings.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses for the second half.

Joining us by video conference, from the University of Alberta, we have Gordon Houlden, director emeritus of the China Institute. In person we have Lynette Ong, a professor from the University of Toronto. From Hong Kong Watch, we have Aileen Calverley, co-founder and trustee, who is also here in person.

Mr. Houlden, have you been oriented to all of the translation services and everything else at your disposal?

[Gordon Houlden, Director Emeritus, China Institute, University of Alberta, As an Individual]

I have. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

All right.

We will start with you, Professor Houlden, for a five-minute opening statement.

[Gordon Houlden]

Thank you very much.

It's an honour for me to be able to speak to you on such an important topic.

In late 2022, we see a relationship between Canada and China that remains very cool and is characterized by minimal engagement despite the importance of the issues in play.

While the release of Huawei's CFO Meng Wanzhou and Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor over a year ago has removed the factors that weighed most heavily on the relationship, I see no significant rebound or any sign of a return to the previous complex web of exchanges at the leadership level, at the ministerial level or by federal and provincial officials.

Stringent COVID restrictions on the Chinese side have also prevented a resurgence of business visitors in both directions. The flow of Chinese students to Canada has partially resumed, but the nearly million-strong prepandemic wave of Chinese tourists to Canada awaits, at a minimum, the lifting of COVID regulations in China.

Beyond these mechanics, if I might say, of diplomatic, commercial and people-to-people connections, the erosion of trust on both sides, in my view, makes any early return to a pre-2019 bilateral relationship unlikely in the foreseeable future. An additional restraining factor is the predominantly negative view of China held by the Canadian public and media. On the Chinese side, the state-controlled media has lightened its criticism of Canadian policies towards China since the release of Meng Wanzhou, but there's a wariness that remains, in my view, on the part of Chinese officials towards Canada. One could say the relationship is in stasis or even stagnation.

Complicating any return to a more normal and more positive state-to-state relationship is the emergence of a number of Chinese domestic and international factors. I'll cite them very quickly. I've listed eight, I think.

The U.S.-China relationship is strained and getting more difficult, where both U.S. and PRC leaders engage in regular direct criticisms. There are the U.S. and PRC legislative and regulatory moves to restrict trade and investment.

The emergence of Taiwan is arguably the highest profile issue dividing Washington and Beijing. It is the factor that, in my view, has the greatest potential to generate open warfare between the two adversaries, with consequences, of course, for Canada.

Beijing's crackdown on Hong Kong—a territory with deep Canadian historical links and a massive constant presence of Canadian citizens—using the national security law hangs like a sword over our relationship with Hong Kong and with China.

Xinjiang, like Tibet, has been a matter of human rights concern for decades. I first visited in 1983 and I've seen a steady deterioration, not at the same pace, over time. Ongoing hardline Chinese policies show no sign of softening. I would note that while western concerns regarding Xinjiang are widely shared, most less-developed countries and Muslim-majority states remain silent on Xinjiang, which I think is unfortunate.

Allegations of interference in Canadian political affairs erode both public and government support for enhanced relations with Beijing.

Limited Chinese support for Moscow's war in Ukraine is unhelpful, although there are signs of an increasing Chinese wariness regarding Russian war aims.

The pending announcement of a Canadian Indo-Pacific strategy will be seen, or at least portrayed, by Beijing as part of a U.S.-led strategy to isolate and contain China.

The positive side is limited. Bilateral trade is relatively stable, although with the exceptions of western agricultural products and Atlantic seafood, our exports have a very low profile with Canadians. Chinese imports continue to be roughly triple the size of our exports. The movement to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains is very modest.

Whatever one thinks of Chinese domestic and international policies, I see danger in the absence of substantive dialogue between Ottawa and Beijing. U.S. Defense Secretary Austin last week lamented the suspension by China of regular military consultations between the U.S. Department of Defense and the PLA, recognizing this gap carries risks, especially in a crisis. Similarly, the absence of sustained communication between our capitals, Ottawa and Beijing, carries risks and even lost opportunities for Canada.

In late September, the China Institute at the University of Alberta and the People's Republic of Chinse People's Institute of Foreign Affairs—it's a quasi-government body—held one of the few, if not the only remaining, consultations with Chinese officials and former officials. That dialogue has some value, but it doesn't begin to be a substitute for a robust range of official exchanges.

Finally, other than limited prospects, I don't see a swift return to a normal bilateral relationship given the issues I've cited. Barring a new and sharply negative event, which is always possible, the mostly likely course might be a slow return to a more regular pattern of exchanges and visits, such as our European allies have in general. It would be limited, again, by the issues I've provided above. Dialogue and communication of divergent positions need not mean either weakness or appeasement.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Professor Houlden.

[Gordon Houlden]

Now we'll go to Professor Ong. You have up to five minutes for your statement.

[Lynette Ong, Professor, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto]

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the special committee. It is my honour to be here.

Leading up to the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled for October 16, a lot is at stake. President Xi Jinping is widely expected to be appointed for a third term and to hold on to power for at least another five years.

I would like to offer three predictions on the political and economic landscapes of China in the next five years, with implications for our bilateral relations.

Number one is that President Xi will be further consolidating his authority within the party’s upper echelons of power. With his various political campaigns launched in the last decade, most notably the anti-corruption campaign, President Xi has eradicated not only corrupt officials but also members from rival factions.

The foundation of elite support is changing, however, from one that is united by spoils to one that is increasingly ruled by fear. For decades since the reform and opening, spoil sharing has been the glue, in my view, that holds the system together. The arrangement has been eroded by Xi’s attempt to curtail crony capitalism and to reduce the role of entrepreneurs, but a system that is ruled by fear will likely and most probably be less stable than one that's underpinned by the sharing of spoils.

Number two is that at the non-elite level, the party may appear to have a strong grip on society, continuing its stranglehold on civil society while doubling down on surveillance and stability maintenance. However, this facade belies a society that is becoming more contentious and fractious in the coming years, short of large-scale collective actions or social movements.

In the past six months, the first signs of an increasingly restless society have emerged with popular discontent with zero COVID. We've seen the responses to zero COVID evolve from one of widespread compliance in the first 18 months to growing in-person resistance and strident discordance on the Internet.

As I argued in my recently published book, Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China, which is based on a decade-long study of how the Chinese state implements its very ambitious urbanization policy—which has a lot of similarity with zero COVID—non-state actors, such as grassroots brokers and volunteers, play an outsized role. Because these people are embedded within the society and trusted by the community, their administration of everyday policies is more likely to result in compliance than if government officials were sent to do the same jobs. The strategy of outsourcing social control to selected members of society has been fundamental to the exercise of everyday state power in China.

However, recent events have tested the limits of this hugely successful strategy. As zero-COVID policies become more nonsensical, people are required to sacrifice their personal freedom and, at times, be separated from their loved ones and denied medical care because they cannot produce a vaccine certification. We will see discordance being amplified and people becoming more blasé and restive.

As Xi tightens the grip on society after the party congress, we might see more signs of dissidence, as we did with the extremities of the Great Leap Forward in the early 1950s under Mao. Chinese society will inevitably become more contentious, despite political repression.

Lastly, number three is that the risk factors for the Chinese economy have also been amplified. The Chinese economic model has traditionally relied on the real estate sector as a growth engine. That is grinding to a halt as the economy slows. In the past summer, many households across the country that paid advance deposits but ran into failed projects organized a large-scale collective action to pressure the government for a rescue plan. Such large-scale collective action is very rare in China, so we should take it seriously as a sign of something bad to come.

In summary, all is not well on the economic front.

To sum up, in both the economic and the political sense, China is undergoing some structural transformation, which creates enormous uncertainty for its domestic and social stability, as well as foreign diplomacy.

Foreign countries that can effectively deal with China are those that have the capacity to conduct scenario planning and to devise action plans to respond to a range of diverse scenarios in the coming years. No one can be absolutely certain in which direction the political winds will actually blow. We must be prepared to change and adapt our strategy swiftly when necessary, and strong China endowment actually begets this adaptive capacity.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Professor Ong.