Canada-China Relations Committee on Jan. 29th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 31 of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship. Pursuant to the order of reference of May 16, 2022, the committee is meeting on its study of the Canada–People’s Republic of China relations with a focus on Canada’s Indo‐Pacific strategy.

I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses and members. Today’s meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. Members are attending in person and at times may be attending by Zoom. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, you'll click on the microphone icon to activate your microphone. Please mute it when you're not speaking.

On interpretation, for those on Zoom, you have the choice at the bottom of your screen of floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel. I will remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage that.

I'd like to welcome Ms. Damoff in place of Robert Oliphant.

Now I'd like to welcome witnesses for our first panel.

There was an update to our agenda. Dominique Caouette, professor and chair of Asian and Indo-Pacific studies at the Université de Montréal is not attending. There is job action at his university, and he's not permitted to take part in this evening's event.

We do have with us Fen Osler Hampson, chancellor’s professor and professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. Also, we have with us Mr. Gordon Houlden, professor and director emeritus at the University of Alberta's China Institute.

Gentlemen, you each have up to five minutes for an opening comment, after which we will proceed to questions.

Would you like to begin, Mr. Hampson?

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson, Chancellor's Professor and Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual]

Certainly.

I’d like to thank the Chairman and Committee members for the opportunity to appear this evening.

I would like to focus my remarks on China's approach to global governance and its implications for Canada.

The foundations of the current order were built after the Second World War and are anchored, as we all know, in the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system. For many years, Canadian foreign policy under both Liberal and Conservative governments was based on the premise that including China in the institutions of global governance would encourage it to become a responsible member of the international community and socialize it to adopt western norms and values.

Today I would suggest that we need to revisit that premise. In addition to its apparent steps to acquire a dominant position in the world, militarily and economically, China has embarked on a quest to acquire a dominant role in global governance.

The first pillar of that strategy is to strengthen its position and leadership within existing international institutions, particularly within the UN system and its specialized agencies.

The second pillar is a more ambitious quest to build a new economic order centred on the BRICS, which one day—and I stress “one day”—may parallel the Bretton Woods trading and monetary system.

To achieve this goal, China is using its wealth and power through its trillion-dollar belt and road initiative, which I think you're all familiar with, but it has developed a number of other new initiatives. These include the global development initiative and the global security initiative, which are also part of that blueprint for a new world order, and more recently its much-touted global civilization initiative and community with a shared future. However, its ambitions don't stop there.

The Human Rights Council, as we all know, has been one of China's targets in the UN system. UN peacekeeping is another area where China is expanding its role and influence. Over the past three decades, China has provided 50,000 peacekeepers to some 30 UN peacekeeping missions. It's the second-largest funder of those missions and today contributes more peacekeepers than any other permanent member of the Security Council.

Chinese personnel and staff also occupy many critical positions in the UN Economic and Social Council. It would also like to fill the leadership position of the department of peacekeeping operations, which today is filled by a French national and that probably isn't going to change for a bit.

Why does this matter?

Over the years, UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations have played an essential role in fostering democracy, advancing human rights and contributing to developing open markets. China's reputation and influence in those missions will move the goalposts away from democratization and good governance. China is also actively expanding its influence in bodies like the International Telecommunication Union, the International Organization for Standardization, the International Electrotechnical Commission and the third-generation partnership project. These are all vital standard-setting bodies for a wide variety of highly innovative Internet-based technologies, which, as we now know, are the focus of intense competition between China and the United States and its western allies.

Why does this matter?

A dominant position in these organizations, especially in the key global technology standard-setting bodies, gives a country control at the leading edge of the technological frontier, especially in setting technical protocols, standards for data exchanges, formatting and communications network security and performance, thus conferring a competitive advantage to its technology sector.

The second pillar of that global governance strategy is centred on creating its own separate international institutions and global forums, such as expanding BRICS, which has added six new members. China is also keen to replace the American dollar's dominance as a global reserve currency and the economic clout that comes with it.

Now, that's not going to happen any time soon because China would have to lift its capital restrictions for the renminbi, but never say never. The world is changing. The renminbi's global use is being aided by renminbi-clearing banks, the People's Bank of China's bilateral swap lines and China's cross-border interbank payment system.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Mr. Hampson, we've come to our five minutes. If you have a concluding paragraph—

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

I do.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

—then perhaps work the other points in there. Thank you.

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

What does this mean for Canada and Canadian interests?

First, we must become more active in offsetting Chinese influence, not just here in Canada but internationally and in those institutions where the Chinese are making a real bid for power and influence.

Second, many developing countries are interested in the BRICS because there is widespread dissatisfaction with the governance structures of existing international institutions. Accordingly, Canada should be a strong champion of governance reform to counter influence in those institutions.

Third—and this is my final point, Mr. Chair—we should be under no illusion that China will support our positions and aspirations for leadership in the UN and other bodies. That's not the reason to throw in the towel or walk away from our international commitments and responsibilities. It does mean that we're going to have to work much harder to make new friends and build new international coalitions beyond our traditional western support group to advance our values and interests.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Hampson.

We'll now turn to Mr. Houlden for five minutes.

[Gordon Houlden, Professor and Director Emeritus, University of Alberta - China Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair Hardie, for the opportunity to speak to the House of Commons China committee on Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy.

I can answer questions in either French or English.

It has been just over a year since the public release of the Indo-Pacific strategy, but we've already seen significant changes in the strategic environment.

Before directly addressing Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy, I'd like to examine some of the risks of open conflict that characterize today's Indo-Pacific. The complex nature of the region is revealed in several ways.

First, it is, counterintuitively perhaps, characterized by the general absence of interstate armed conflict with only one major intra-state conflict present at the moment—the civil war in Myanmar. However, there is an arms race under way in Asia. Twenty-six per cent of global arms purchases are made in the Indo-Pacific region, compared to the case in the United States where it is 65% of total arms purchases. These are the heavy battalions, which means that open warfare in east or southeast Asia, should it come, risks being especially violent and destructive.

The Indo-Pacific does contain a number of latent conflicts, some of which could produce major wars that would profoundly affect Canada and Canadians. Just as in Europe in 1913, the current lack of interstate warfare can lead to a false sense of security. Let me just very briefly touch upon those risks.

First, the situation with Taiwan is a leftover and unresolved conflict from the Chinese civil war of 1946-49. Formerly autocratic Taiwan, now democratic, is vulnerable to attack by the People's Republic of China, either by direct assault or through a wide range of grey-area pressure tactics.

While President Biden has publicly stated that the U.S. will come to the defence of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese assault on the island, there are some doubts among the Taiwanese public regarding the willingness of Washington to defend the island. The precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the failure of U.S. Congress to authorize additional funding for Ukraine and Taiwan feeds this uneasiness.

Members of the House of Commons are well aware of the limitations of public polling, but some polls have indicated that a slight majority of Americans would not support a U.S. military action in defence of Taiwan. Unlike the situation of Ukraine, in which Russia has a four-to-one advantage in terms of population, for Taiwan, China has a population that is 60 times larger. Only direct U.S. military intervention, in my view, could prevent Taiwan being overwhelmed in the case of attack.

As well of course, there is also insecurity and instability in the U.S. given that this is an election year. Historically, I would submit, whether during the Roman Empire or in the history of more modern circumstances, there has been chaos or weakness in the metropole, in the centre, when distant provinces or allied states have been overwhelmed.

There's also the frozen conflict in the Korean peninsula. The 80-year division remains a latent but increasingly dangerous threat. Pyongyang's nuclear weapons capacity is growing in both quality and quantity including in terms of a range of delivery options.

I happen to believe, based on limited visits to North Korea, that Kim and his generals want to die in bed as do most dictators, but the DPRK's reach, as it increases, has the ROK, Japan and U.S. now planning how they might defend against a conventional attack on the Korean peninsula or an even more ambitious regional targeting by Pyongyang.

The United Nations Security Council consensus on isolating the regime is broken, with Russia engaged in huge arms purchases from the North Korean regime and China harassing Canadian efforts to enforce the sanctions. Canada is working to enforce those sanctions, but it is problematic when two UN Security Council members are either directly undermining the sanctions regime or undermining its enforcement.

I could also speak about the South China Sea—a topic that I've probably spent too much time on as someone who comes from a landlocked province—or the China-India border, which I believe to be somewhat less hazardous given that I fail to see the net interest of either party in engaging in a broader conflict.

U.S.-China relations remain fraught. Each views the other as a medium- to long-term threat, and the armed forces of both countries have shaped their forces and their weapons systems towards the possibility of a war between the most powerful militaries on earth. We did, however, see in late 2023 an effort by both Washington and Beijing to re-establish a high-level dialogue aimed at reducing the risks of hostilities.

The U.S. is greatly distracted by wars in Europe and the Middle East, despite decades-long efforts to disengage from the Middle East and west Asia in favour of the Indo-Pacific. They just get close to being finished in the Middle East, and they get dragged back. That's a consistent theme.

I will now give you five conclusions to which I have come. These are more directly aimed at Canada's IPS.

First, it was overdue, but its release a year ago was a net-positive step.

Second, while the conflicts in the region are latent as opposed to actual, they're deep and pressure is building particularly in regard to Taiwan, the Korean peninsula and the South China Sea.

Third, political turmoil is a genuine risk in the United States in 2024—not a certainty but a risk—and foreign policy will not be untouched. Evidence of U.S. paralysis or a new administration's reduced interest could encourage adventurism.

Fourth, Canada will remain, on balance, a minor factor in the Indo-Pacific region, but major events in the region will profoundly affect Canada. That's the harsh reality for us—modest influence but potentially great impact.

Finally, with the dynamic Indo-Pacific—and I've noted some of the ways in which that region has shifted over the course of the last 12 months—and with the risk that the latent security challenges could morph on short notice into immediate security challenges, a public update of the IPS should be undertaken on an annual or at least a biennial basis.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much, Mr. Houlden.

We'll now turn to our first round of questioning, and we'll begin with Mr. Seeback for six minutes or less.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Hampson, in February 2022, you came and testified at the Standing Committee on National Defence. You made a comment about the extent to which Canada's military was under-strength and how Canada's armed forces might not be up to the task of confronting what's going on now.

The Indo-Pacific strategy that the government's released has the following phrasing:

Canada is stepping up as a reliable partner in the region to promote security and stability across the region and at home.

Canada will increase our military engagement and intelligence capacity as a means of mitigating coercive behaviour and threats to regional security.

Has your assessment of the status of Canada's military to meet these threats changed since you talked in February 2022?

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

I forgot what I said two years ago. I don't know whether I should be flattered that somebody was paying attention. I probably should be.

I don't think the delta on that has changed very substantially. Yes, there are commitments under way to add to the strength of our navy, or at least to replace old stock, but we have yet to, shall we say, really put any of that new capital into the water.

I think there's a lot of positive rhetoric in the Indo-Pacific strategy around boosting our defence capabilities, but at the end of the day, one has to ask, “Where's the beef?” I would say it's still more hat than cattle.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Those are some of the complaints that I'm seeing and hearing about the Indo-Pacific strategy. It talks a lot about things, but the actual deliverables aren't there when they're specified. However, most things aren't specified.

I was reading an article by Hugh Stephens from the school of public policy in Calgary. He says:

While it is expected that some details will be lacking when a new comprehensive strategy is unveiled, the lack of specificity and details on the paths to implementation of many of the IPS’s elements is concerning.

That's my concern. It seems like it's a lot of talk, but there are no actual mechanisms within the strategy to measure the deliverability of the things they've said. Would you share that concern, or any concerns you have around that as well?

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

At the end of the day, people will look and our allies will look at our capabilities, which have not increased substantially in the past two years. Yes, we're doing things to upgrade surveillance in the Arctic, and that's important for the defence of North America, but we're not moving, for example, in the same direction that our Australian friends are moving. They are committed to increasing their defence spending by some 4%—I think that's correct—or to bring it up to 4% of GDP with their proposed acquisition of new nuclear-powered submarines.

I'm not suggesting that we should necessarily move in that direction, but we're playing a catch-up game and we're falling further behind, I'm afraid, even with the new commitments the government is making.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

I'm going to switch gears a bit to business. In your book, you mentioned that “Canadian relations with countries of the region are under-developed and our businesses under-perform in their markets.”

Can you expand a bit on that in the minute and 40 seconds we have left?

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

I'm not sure what book you're referring to. Is that the “Braver” series with Derek Burney: Brave New Canada?

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

It's The Indo-Pacific: New Strategies for Canadian Engagement with a Critical Region.

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

The short answer is that we have a long way to go. The Indo-Pacific paper is aspirational.

One of the concerns I have.... Yes, the business community is suddenly beginning to pay a lot more attention, because I think they see the writing on the wall in terms of protectionism south of the border. Yes, there may be some new opportunities, but at the end of the day, if we're really going to boost our economic fortunes, we have to engage with the major emerging economies of the Indo-Pacific. That's a horn that I and others have been blowing for many years that preceded the Indo-Pacific strategy statement, which, as Gordon said, was long overdue, but you're not going to achieve that overnight.

It's going to require a substantial commitment on the part of not just the business community but Canada's leaders—more than team Canada missions but real follow-up. One of the concerns I have is that, as we see developments south of the border and the prospect of an election that may bring a former president to power, that's just going to suck the oxygen out of the Indo-Pacific strategy. It's going to be difficult for our leaders, who need to be courting the Americans, to be, at the same time, jumping on airplanes to go south and to go west. That's also true, by the way, of the business community.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

With that, thank you, Mr. Seeback, for your questions.

We'll now go to Mr. Fragiskatos for another six minutes.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you to both of you for being here tonight.

Professor Hampson, there's a lot in your nuanced statement that you leave us with, but I always like to turn it back to the witnesses. If you were to share with us, sir—or emphasize, rather—a key point that you want this committee to really take in, what would that be? What is the critical thing that you want us to keep in mind on these issues as a committee?

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

My comments were very much focused on the Chinese game that is being played in existing international institutions. They're putting a lot of their people into key positions. You see that in the staffing of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, but it goes beyond there.

Number one, I think we have to put more people in the field. Some of the things the Chinese are doing aren't necessarily bad, and they may well be in our interest, but at the same time, it's also a competitive game—a highly competitive game—that's being played. That means having more people in the field and more people in New York. I think we have 24 officers there right now. That's grossly understaffed compared to other countries of a similar size to ours.

One of my colleagues just did a terrific report on Canada at the UN, and one of their principal findings, based on extensive research, is that we don't have enough people in the field, and we don't have enough people at the specialized agencies watching what's going on and advancing our own interests.

It's a real capability challenge, and that means also funding those missions properly.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

It's an interesting point. Some have said recently, in fact, as we know, that Canada should pull out of the United Nations. What do you make of comments like that?

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

It's not in our interest to do so. We will then, as I've suggested, really be leaving the ground to our enemies, our adversaries, our competitors, who will fill the void. We're already seeing that: The Americans are experiencing that because they were pulling back.

As I've suggested, when it comes to promoting democracy and human rights, one of the principal avenues for doing that has been through peacekeeping—through peacebuilding missions in which Canada helped to write the resolutions, the enabling resolutions. Put people in the field to do those jobs. Those missions, by the way, create an enormous space for our civil society actors, who are much more important in some ways than what our officials do, because they're on the ground. They're promoting democracy. They're promoting human rights.

If you're not there, it's goodbye, and it goes well beyond that to the technology frontier, as I've suggested, where those international organizations that I mentioned play a key standard-setting role. We have to be there.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Houlden, Professor Hampson just commented to us—and the comment has been made before—that while there is understandably plenty of tension between Canada and China, there are areas of co-operation. What areas of co-operation should we continue to look at? My mind goes to climate change, for example.

[Gordon Houlden]

Climate change makes good sense. China is 20% of the world's population, so there are going to be areas where we have common ground.

Health would be another. Unfortunately, it's been damaged in the eyes of the Canadian public due to some of the factors involved in the pandemic: vaccines that didn't go forward, suspicion about the origins of COVID, etc. That is still an area that we can't ignore. The next pandemic is more likely to emerge in China than anywhere else.

When I was a deputy head of mission, I was there during SARS, and we had no medical expert. Every day I was going to the briefings by the health organization, trying to make sense of the technical terminology. When I came back a few years later to be the director general in Ottawa, I said that we needed a health agency doctor in place who speaks Chinese. We did so, but the person was removed before the pandemic. We had someone there when the timing was useful but not essential, and then we didn't have someone there. Little things like that can be hugely important.

I think there are also areas of biodiversity in that broad environmental category. China is almost the same size as we are. It has a lot of species at risk, and it has a lot of clout in the UN system. I think the COP meeting in Montreal was a success overall. It might be hard to think back, but even in a time of fraught relations bilaterally, I understand that worked reasonably well.

A hard-nosed assessment of where we have an interest and where it happens to align—some things won't—with the Chinese interest can work. Finding those areas is not always easy, but it can be done. That's why I look forward to at least a better dialogue at senior levels. It can be behind closed doors, or it can be public. However, we can't go on indefinitely.

Our allies, the Australian prime minister, the Germans, the French, the Americans, the Brits and others—all of our G7 and Five Eyes partners—have been engaging at high levels with China. I'm not saying that it's all our fault that the Chinese are punishing us, but we need to fix that.

It's not a perfect analogy, but we kept our embassy in Berlin open until September 1, 1939. In other words—I'm a former diplomat—you talk. If that utterly fails, you turn it over to the other side, to the military, but we need to be talking. A dialogue from a distance by loudspeaker doesn't work. We need to be there on the ground, having regular contact in both directions.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.