Evidence of meeting #31 for Canada-China Relations in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was china.
A video is available from Parliament.
7:50 p.m.
Liberal
7:55 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
About twenty years ago, Chinese intelligence services were described in reports by CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, as the most active perpetrators of economic espionage. In the mid-2000s, CSIS reports expressed concern about the People’s Republic of China’s use of Mandarin in the media to influence the diaspora. Moreover, in 2010, the reports predicted an increase in intimidation and interference. So we’ve been seeing a trend for the last twenty years or so.
What have we missed?
7:55 p.m.
Professor and Director Emeritus, University of Alberta - China Institute, As an Individual
That is a challenge, and poses a constant threat. It’s a fact of life. History reveals that, over the last 100 years, Chinese intelligence services have focused on the Chinese diaspora, with whom they are most comfortable, since this population speaks Mandarin or one of the Chinese dialects.
The current Chinese government—like many of its predecessors throughout history—seems to hold that a Chinese person always remains a citizen of China, even if, technically, that is not the case. The Chinese government can still exert influence over that person, who, in its view, must have a certain allegiance, a certain respect for Beijing. It’s very difficult to counter that. Most members of Canada’s various diasporas, such as Brazilians or Greeks, take a natural interest in their country of origin. When a country’s intelligence service has the ability and the will to control and use its diaspora against Canada’s interests, even if only a very small minority of that diaspora is targeted, we need to monitor it closely.
Is there any way around it? No.
For me, it's a bit like crabgrass. You pull it up and it comes back.
It will always be like that. They will continue to use their power in the diaspora to follow their own interests. It's naive to think it's going to stop. You won't be able to stop it. We're a very minor influence. We have to continue to combat it and to be aware of it.
7:55 p.m.
NDP
Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
One of the goals of the Indo-Pacific strategy is to expand our diplomatic relationships in the Indo-Pacific. In your opinion, what does China think about that changing dynamic?
7:55 p.m.
Professor and Director Emeritus, University of Alberta - China Institute, As an Individual
I don't think China lies awake at night worrying about Canada.
7:55 p.m.
Professor and Director Emeritus, University of Alberta - China Institute, As an Individual
Maybe they don't care because they have a tous azimuts foreign policy. They have folks in their embassy in Copenhagen who speak Danish. Like any great power, they do everything in detail so other people notice. They really didn't like the fact that we called them a “disruptive” actor. They don't like it when they are criticized. They have thin skins in that regard.
On the idea that they are somehow particularly terrorized.... We've seen the recent efforts of foreign ministers to have a dialogue again. They're there for the long term. Was it Talleyrand or Palmerston who said that France has no permanent friends, only permanent interests? That's the way China will continue to see it.
They don't like what we're saying now. They'll hope to be dealt better cards tomorrow, but we have to remember.... There's one thing that bothers me about all of those strategies that I've seen in the course of my career. We write them as if it is we who are changing things at that end. I can assure you that there is a Canada strategy there somewhere or a North American strategy. Sadly, their influence on us, I believe, over time will be much greater than our influence on them. We can and should be influencing the Indo-Pacific in any way we can, but they're going to influence us quite profoundly. In the case of China, what they call the “physics of power” tilts in their favour.
7:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you for that.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. I think that out of your comments we will be able to distill perhaps the way forward in the relationship that we could have, should have and hope to have with China as we proceed in the Indo-Pacific. Thank you for your time. You've been very generous with it tonight.
We will suspend for a few moments while we get our next panel in place.
8:05 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
I'd like to call our session back to order.
Our second panel will involve Paul Evans, who is a retired professor, from the school of public policy and global affairs at the University of British Columbia. I don't know if “retired” or “recovering” is a better description for anybody in a profession that's as all-consuming as the ones many of us around here have had.
We have Victor Ramraj, professor of law and chair of Asia-Pacific legal relations at the University of Victoria and the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives. As another Alberta representative, we have Jia Wang, deputy director of the University of Alberta's China Institute.
Each of you will have five minutes and 20 seconds, or thereabouts, to make an opening statement.
Ms. Wang, we'll start with you.
8:05 p.m.
Jia Wang Deputy Director, University of Alberta - China Institute, As an Individual
Good evening.
Thank you to the committee for this opportunity to appear before you for this important discussion on Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy. Several esteemed colleagues have already spoken before me. It's a tough act to follow, but I'll try my best to share my observations.
I also note that I'm the only one who is not a gentleman with a beard tonight.
8:05 p.m.
Voices
Oh, oh!
8:05 p.m.
Deputy Director, University of Alberta - China Institute, As an Individual
IPS is an ambitious strategy with a broad spectrum of objectives, from trade and investment to sustainable development to people-to-people connections to peace and security. Much work and many resources have been put forth to implement this strategy and promote it in the region.
Canada, as we all know, is heavily dependent on global trade, much more so than our leading trading partners such as the U.S. and China. As Canada needs to diversify our market and supply chains and the world's economy and security agendas increasingly pivot to the Indo-Pacific region, the launch of the IPS study, I think, is very timely.
The framing of China's role as an increasingly disruptive global power has caught a lot of attention. The term Canada uses has gone further with a more negative connotation than other countries', including our closest ally, the U.S., which called China a “strategic competitor”.
Canada's framing prompted a very strong reaction from China, perhaps not surprisingly. A disrupter, however, can also refer to a global power that challenges the norm, spurs tectonic changes and also shakes things up. It is my understanding that the second layer of this meaning was considered in the policy thinking but is rarely mentioned.
As Canada endeavours to expand engagement with the Indo-Pacific, we must recognize that many regional players' views and policies towards China don't necessarily align with ours. ASEAN, which was elevated to Canada's strategic partner status last year, for example, collectively endorsed an inclusive and engagement approach. They favour multilateralism and dialogue rather than isolation and containment. They prefer working with both China and the U.S. rather than being pulled firmly into the orbit of one single great power. Perhaps our regional path forward can be informed in part by the vast experience of the countries in the region.
Aside from geopolitical considerations, the reality is that the Indo-Pacific economy and supply chains are highly integrated both laterally and vertically, with China at the very centre. The size of the Chinese economy roughly equals the rest of the Indo-Pacific combined. Despite the attempt to decouple and de-risk from China and the rise of localization and protectionism in the region, China remains the top trade destination for most countries in the region. Since 2020, ASEAN has become China's number one trading partner. Major ASEAN economies saw double-digit trade expansion with China. Intermediate goods, raw materials, investment and technologies from China play a vital role in the leading industries of these emerging economies.
China's economic reach in the region is both broad and deep into all segments of the supply chains. Diversifying from China in the region won't be easy or even possible. By boosting our presence in this region and engaging with nations other than China, Canada and Canadian entities will inadvertently increase their exposure to China directly or indirectly. Enhanced competencies and knowledge of the region and China are needed to manage this complexity.
Canada's strategy towards Asia, the Indo-Pacific, shall be put into the broader context of a broader global vision. Emergence of regional hot spots and global shocks are nearly inevitable in our volatile world. When there are other competing priorities, countries in the region would ask and wonder if Canada is here to stay and if Canada is really committed to advancing common goals long term in the Indo-Pacific.
We should also not lose sight of what the endgame is for us in our global pursuit and perhaps walk back from that point in contemplating our steps to get there. If the ultimate aim is peace and security, peace and prosperity or, at a minimum, survival of humanity and our planet, we shall try to avoid a binary, value-based approach, where we only see things through the lens of good versus evil, democracy versus autocracy, which implies that confrontation is inevitable. It is not a shared perspective by the majority of the world's population, especially not by countries in the Indo-Pacific.
Perhaps capitalizing on our past success as a visionary and a thoughtful middle power and bringing back a nuanced approach and pragmatism in our foreign policy thinking might help us go further in the Indo-Pacific.
Thank you.
8:10 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you, Ms. Wang.
Now we'll go to Professor Ramraj for five minutes and 20 seconds.
8:10 p.m.
Dr. Victor V. Ramraj Professor of Law and Chair, Asia-Pacific Legal Relations, University of Victoria and Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, As an Individual
Good evening, Mr. Chair and Committee members.
Thank you for inviting me to share my thoughts on your study.
The greater the density of ties between two societies, the greater the ability to survive during difficult times. Dense societal ties ensure resilience when official ties are strained.
One of the strengths of the Indo-Pacific strategy is its recognition of the importance of non-official ties, notably in pillar three.
What is the role of government in building people-to-people connections? The strategy outlines specific ways of connecting people, such as investing in visa processing, air services agreements, scholarships and humanitarian assistance. However, if Canada is truly committed to engaging with Asia, what can governments do to foster enduring societal ties for the longer term? Cultivating meaningful economic ties is critical in trade and industry, small business, clean tech, agri-food and the like, but let me spotlight two other possibilities.
In his remarks to this committee in November, Mr. Frank Des Rosiers mentioned that indigenous business leaders participated in a trade mission to Japan last January. This initiative, alongside the Indigenous Peoples Economic and Trade Cooperation Arrangement, IPETCA, as it's known, demonstrated the significance of indigenous businesses in the global economy and their role in advancing Canadian and indigenous engagement in Asia.
Considering that two-thirds of the world's indigenous peoples live in Asia, facilitating these initiatives could play a critical indigenous-led role in building ties across the Pacific.
A second possibility concerns universities. For division of powers reasons, some creativity is needed here, as with tri-agency funding. What is clear, however, is that Canada's universities serve a critical long-term role in supporting the Indo-Pacific strategy. The role of universities is not limited to teaching undergraduate students about history, politics, language, literature and geography or generating research. Universities send students to Asia on exchanges, field trips, co-ops, internships and study tours. They send them for language training and field work. With more than 1.4 million students in Canadian university classrooms each year, universities are an obvious and untapped focal point for strengthening Canada's ties to Asia. So too is the growing number of Canadian university alumni in prominent positions in the region who want to engage with Canada.
While the strategy's aim of increasing China-related capacity at its missions is laudable, where will the experts come from? What about India, Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam? Excellent work is being done in Canada, but the number of experts is nowhere near what it should be and nowhere near that of our peers. Taking Asia seriously will require a generational investment in universities by all levels of government, including a dedicated Canada research chair type of scheme to foster capacity building on Asia.
Let me add two cautionary notes. First, while there are clearly genuine threats to security that arise from foreign governments, focusing too much attention on threats can distract us from developing deeper expertise on Asia. Demonizing foreign actors and stoking fear can undermine social solidarity and people-to-people ties. This is a time for us to invest in learning more, not less, about the diversity of Asia. We have to hold our rhetoric in check.
Second, while it is critical to distinguish between real and perceived threats, for universities, and for the role they play in democracies, the costs of failing to do so are high, especially for academic freedom. Universities are diverse, cosmopolitan institutions that thrive on critical thinking, empathetic listening and reasoned disagreement, but testing ideas also requires engaging with world views that challenge our own. An awareness of security threats is important, but university researchers should be resolutely encouraged to exchange ideas and engage robustly with their peers in Asia. Intellectual decoupling is a dangerous game.
The Indo-Pacific strategy might be read by some as a document about geopolitics and national security. A more nuanced reading, however, recommends a more holistic approach that focuses as much, if not more, on fostering dense, multi-layered and enduring connections between Canada and Asia.
8:15 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you very much, Professor.
Now we'll go to Professor Evans for five minutes.
January 29th, 2024 / 8:15 p.m.
Professor Paul Evans Professor Emeritus, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, As an Individual
Thank you. The professor emeritus really just takes the role of a pensioner in coming to this group.
Thank you for a third opportunity to appear before the committee. This time it's on the China dimension of the government’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
Now at the implementation stage, the strategy provides a platform and resources for dozens of initiatives involving multiple departments here at home and multiple players in the region. Not since the era of Canada’s “Year of Asia Pacific” in 1997 has there been such a surge of regional interest and activity.
It's important to note that the frame of “Indo-Pacific” varies significantly from the previous “Asia-Pacific”. This is not just a shift that's putting more emphasis on India and south Asia. The international policy statement embodies a bigger change in tone, direction and positioning.
“Asia-Pacific” was born in the aftermath of a Cold War, in the late 1980s and early nineties. It, too, was based on appreciation of growing economic dynamism. However, it promoted free trade and open regionalism. It aimed to supplement alliances and deterrence with new co-operative security mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and assisted by Canada. It aimed at the inclusion of the non-like-minded—like Vietnam and China—in the regional order.
“Indo-Pacific” is born in a more pessimistic and zero-sum era. It is characterized by an escalating rivalry between two great powers, anxiety about a rising China and uncertainty about the United States. It is spawning new minilaterals—like the Quad and AUKUS—that are composed of like-minded countries focused on resisting elements of China's rise. There is a new skepticism about open markets and free trade, and a belief that regional economic integration is as much a source of vulnerability and risk as it is opportunity.
Buzzwords of the Indo-Pacific era are things like “decoupling”, “de-risking”, “deglobalization”, “diversification away from China”, “strategic competition”, “industrial policy” and “democracy versus authoritarianism”. We're in a new context, which the Indo-Pacific strategy tries to address.
In this context, Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy repositions China as an increasingly disruptive power. Some 15 countries and two international organizations also have Indo-Pacific strategies, but no two are closer than the United States and Canada in framing the China challenge.
I'd like to spend the last minute of my remarks on the U.S. dimension of Canada's China policy.
As the committee members on your Washington visit no doubt discovered, there are unmistakable signs of a closer convergence between positions in Ottawa and Washington. Both reflect negative sentiment about China. Legislators are focusing on pushing back against China on issues, which include human rights, domestic interference and Taiwan—the issues we heard about.
One way of capturing this is through the famous three Cs—competition, co-operation and confrontation. In the words of Secretary Blinken, this is a China policy that is “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be”.
For America, however, it is, above all, a strategic competition without end that has military, technological, diplomatic and ideological dimensions.
Canada's leaders talk about the three Cs as well and in similar terms, but occasionally with a slight twist. A fourth term in some of the Canadian lexicon is coexistence. That still has supporters and reflects the engagement ambitions of an earlier era. This includes accepting the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China as a nation-state and looking for ways to live with it rather than defeat it. It implies the possibility of mutual respect and respectful dialogue beyond transactional matters. Ironically now, in the Canadian case, those channels are mainly closed.
We need to get a handle on the specific areas of Canada-U.S. convergence on China policy, but also the areas of difference. On the research side, a new Wilson Center-McGill University “Canada-U.S. Commission on China” is asking two key questions: Where we are aligned, how do we co-operate with the United States? Where our interests, values and approach differ, how do we manage the differences with Washington?
Topic areas include artificial intelligence, the Arctic, critical minerals, debt and governance in the global south, supply chain resilience and friendshoring, foreign interference, the prospects for co-operative security and the positioning of Canadian military assets in Asia.
One evident area of disagreement that was hinted at in the early session was the matter of what kind of open, rules-based multilateral trading system we want. Canada has a special interest in that.
A second is whether the scope of technological restrictions should extend beyond dual-use and military technologies in our universities and other areas. Should it also include preserving economic advantages against China? Should we control technology as a weapon?
8:25 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Perhaps at that point, Professor Evans, we'll call time. Perhaps other pieces of what you had left will come out in answers to questions.
For questions, we will go to Mr. Kmiec for six minutes.
8:25 p.m.
Conservative
Tom Kmiec Conservative Calgary Shepard, AB
Thank you, Chair.
Professor Ramraj, I'm going to begin with pillar three. You mentioned it in your statement.
It says in one of the subpoints, “strengthen Canada’s international student program”, and then it goes on. What we've seen in the last two weeks is that the government's going in opposite directions. Now it's imposed caps on provinces. It's moved hard to try....
By their own admission, they're saying the system is “out of control”. That's one minister. I'll call him the junior Minister of Immigration. The senior minister of immigration, who's expressed a lot of regrets for all the things he did over two and a half years has said the system's a mess. Now we're massively shutting it down. These are their own words that they're using.
On this subpoint in the Indo-Pacific strategy, how do you think the government's doing?
8:25 p.m.
Professor of Law and Chair, Asia-Pacific Legal Relations, University of Victoria and Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, As an Individual
I'm not sure I'm going to comment on domestic politics. I know the confluence between housing, health care and students is a very complex one. It involves multiple layers of government.
The gist of my comments is that we need to play the long game. I'm hoping that changes in student numbers are short-lived. I'm hoping that we will continue to focus on bringing students in. Students from Asia will be ambassadors for Canada when they go home. I think we should continue to send students abroad. It's that exchange that, over time, develops those really deep bonds.
I come from Victoria, as you know. There are big housing issues there. They were there when I arrived in 2014. These are complicated problems. There are multiple layers of government. A need for coordination is extremely important among municipal, provincial and federal governments.
8:25 p.m.
Conservative
Tom Kmiec Conservative Calgary Shepard, AB
Can I ask you something, Professor? One frame that you gave in your introduction was the role that universities play, and that universities and, obviously, professors, should have freedom of speech and the widest latitude possible to express themselves.
I used to work for a professor who got into politics. He would always say they're inversely related. Everybody used to listen to what he had to say and believed him. Afterwards, he got into politics and nobody believed him. He lost all of the credibility he accumulated over 25 years as a constitutional professor.
What I see in this strategy is that we talk about a worry about academia, but what about Canadian academics that travel to the PRC or to Hong Kong? Do you think the strategy addresses protecting their rights to free speech?
8:25 p.m.
Professor of Law and Chair, Asia-Pacific Legal Relations, University of Victoria and Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, As an Individual
The first point I'll make is that I appreciate the advice to not go into politics.
You may know from my CV that I spent a lot of time in Asia. I'm actually working on a project now on constraints on academic freedom among public law scholars in Asia. With my team of colleagues, we've interviewed 30 colleagues from across the region, and there are all kinds of constraints—hard and soft.
Our interest is in the soft constraints, but what is also really interesting is that public law scholars in Asia find ways of addressing those soft constraints—not always—but it requires a deep understanding of the society and the context in order to do so. If a Canadian colleague goes to Asia, it's going to take some time to understand how to work around those rules.
8:30 p.m.
Conservative
Tom Kmiec Conservative Calgary Shepard, AB
Professor, can I bring up a case of a Canadian academic then—
8:30 p.m.
Professor of Law and Chair, Asia-Pacific Legal Relations, University of Victoria and Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, As an Individual
Please.
8:30 p.m.
Conservative
Tom Kmiec Conservative Calgary Shepard, AB
—Professor Rowena He, who was denied a visa.
She was an educator at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. She was denied a return visa in November 2023. I haven't heard a statement from any government minister about her case. The most prominent, I would say, Canadian academic, specifically on Tiananmen Square and the public's relationship with the stories and the history of it, is denied a visa, fired from her job—unfairly, I would say—denied the ability to keep telling the story of Tiananmen Square in the context of Hong Kong, obviously, and how important the story is, and teaching and educating those—but obviously from a Canadian perspective.
Don't you find it's interesting that the government hasn't said anything, and hasn't intervened in her case? There's been no communication. All in the Indo-Pacific strategy, if we're exchanging a people-to-people connection, you would think the Canadian government would do more to protect Canadian academics who are going overseas to spread the Canadian message that we can speak freely and we can share sometimes tough messages and share our stories and our perspectives on history.
You have a very unique perspective, Professor, so I want to hear it from you. What do you think the government should do on a case like Professor Rowena He?