Canada-China Relations Committee on Jan. 29th, 2024

[Dr. Victor V. Ramraj]

I'll have to look up the details of that case. I can't comment on the specifics, but one of the points that I learned during my time in Asia—not just in Singapore but in the region—is that a lot gets done through informal channels, whether in terms of politics or of discussions with colleagues. There's a lot that can be said and done behind closed doors through unofficial ways, rather than writing to the newspapers, by having private discussions or having private, influential conversations.

In those contexts, there is a lot that can be done by Canadian academic—

[Tom Kmiec, Conservative, Calgary Shepard, AB]

I'm sorry, Professor. I'm running out of time. I love your train of thought.

Just for my last question here, do you think it's a failure when the Canadian government doesn't stand up for Canadian academics who are trying to fulfill their jobs and teach students overseas at international universities?

[Dr. Victor V. Ramraj]

I'll make a general comment, which is that I think the Canadian government and all levels of government should robustly defend academic freedom and the rights of professors and students wherever they are—in Canada or abroad.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Kmiec.

We'll now go to Ms. Damoff for six minutes.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you for letting me join your committee tonight.

I'm going to start with Ms. Wang because she doesn't have a beard, and I quite liked that comment.

You talked about the importance of not framing things as good versus evil, and I know you've written about how increased tensions can lead to misinformation, disinformation and also the impact of anti-Chinese hate here in Canada. I wonder if you could just elaborate on that a little bit.

[Jia Wang]

The purely value-based approach can be problematic. Of course, we will firmly defend Canadian values, including freedom of speech and respect of all human rights, but in the reality of working with many other countries, if that's the only topic we focus on, and then we open the conversation by pointing fingers and saying, “We are a democracy; you're not a democracy,” there seems to be no common ground or space where we can actually have a conversation or have engagement to tackle some of the global issues, including climate change, public health, nuclear non-proliferation and even biodiversity. We have to reserve that space because these are some of the issues that could potentially pose an existential threat to the whole human race.

If we're always framing things, especially opening a conversation with that kind of framing, I wonder if we may not be able to get things done. Like some other speakers mentioned, sometimes you can get more done by using diplomacy. It could be harsh. They could be challenging, difficult conversations, but we still need to have those conversations. Rather than having megaphone diplomacy, we sometimes need that quiet diplomacy, behind closed doors, to talk about issues and focus on specific issues rather than having a broad stroke and making a value statement.

When it comes to the diaspora community, especially the Chinese community—I happen to be a member of that community; I was born and raised in China—there is a concern. With a lot of these policies, although they're not naming a certain group or singling out a certain group, people are feeling the pressure. They're feeling like there's a target on their backs and they're being scrutinized more just for, sadly, being a member of a certain ethnic group. That is not a good feeling and, also, I don't believe that is Canada. Those are not Canadian values. That is something we do have to be careful about.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you very much.

Professor Evans, could you comment on the role China might be able to play with North Korea? We've seen rising tensions and escalations with North Korea. It has been cozying up to Russia on arm sales.

Could you comment on the role that China might be able to play in de-escalating tensions in the region?

[Prof. Paul Evans]

I had the opportunity over 12 years to run 22 meetings with North Koreans, 10 of them with the Chinese in those sessions. The baseline on this is that no one has influence over North Korea. It's extremely difficult. In the case of China, the tensions between North Korea and China are considerable. This is not a loving relationship, but it is one in which the Chinese feel they do not want North Korea to disappear. At the same time, they don't want it to start throwing nuclear weapons around in the region. That its actual influence is minimal is not quite right. There are certain things they can control with North Korea.

On balance, North Korea runs to its own drummer. This is made more complex now, because of the very quickly growing relationship between Russia and North Korea, where China is an observer of some of the things that are occurring.

We try very hard, Ms. Damoff, to bring North Koreans and the Chinese into dialogue mechanisms on what a Korean peninsula might look like. It was a major Canadian initiative in the 1990s and into the early 2000s. As Canadians, we're not part of that discussion any more. This is a grey zone interaction between the United States and China.

I don't think we can look to China to solve our North Korea problem, and the world's North Korea problem. The Chinese may just be able to put some limits on the techniques the North Koreans will use.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Professor Ramraj, you mentioned the inclusion of indigenous-led businesses on the trade mission. Could you elaborate a little on that?

[Dr. Victor V. Ramraj]

I don't know first-hand. I was reading the transcript of the previous meeting.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Could you just provide your thoughts on the importance of it? I've done a lot of work with the CCAB, and Tabatha Bull, who is amazing. What is the importance of including indigenous-led businesses in anything we're doing in the region?

[Dr. Victor V. Ramraj]

Again, this is in the policy. It was in my comments that two-thirds of the world's indigenous peoples are in Asia. My area is more southeast Asia. If you look across southeast Asia and at the number of indigenous people, there are different kinds of laws, including adat laws. Other forms of laws are abundant. It seems to me that having that engagement between indigenous peoples and Canada, and indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in places like southeast Asia....

Taiwan is an excellent example. That engagement would strengthen Canada's ties at a different level from the official level.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Ms. Damoff.

Next, we have Mr. Bergeron for six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I’d like to thank the new panel of witnesses for their absolutely fascinating and interesting comments.

First of all, Mr. Ramraj, if I were you, I’d reconsider my decision not to run for office: I think you’ve done rather well.

Professor Evans, I loved that you took the time to compare Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy to that of the United States. I found it frustrating, to say the least, when you were interrupted. I felt as if the power had suddenly gone out while I was watching a riveting film. If you have a few words to conclude your presentation, please go ahead.

[Prof. Paul Evans]

Thank you for that. The film without an ending is a very interesting idea.

What I was going to end with is that we're at a very difficult moment in the Canadian approach to the Indo-Pacific. The China question is going to be of enduring difficulty and challenge, but we also have a challenge with the United States. The Indo-Pacific era is an era that is largely an American projection on what the region is and can be.

In that context, we're able to work with the Americans now. For this alignment I talked about—Canada and the U.S.—your committee discovered an 85% overlap. That overlap would change very quickly if the administration in the United States changes. We don't need to focus on Mr. Trump exclusively on this matter. Americans, including Mr. Lighthizer, Mr. Navarro and Mr. Pompeo earlier, put the U.S.-China relationship into hyper-strategic competition. We'll be side-swiped by that in several ways if it comes to pass.

I think what we're trying to do with our American friends, right now, is identify areas of hard Canadian interest and areas of hard American interest that we can discuss and come up with some common ideas about what to do with China in the Arctic or how tightly we limit the restrictions we put in place on technology interactions with China. Please try to codify some of the areas where we differ.

However, where we think we can take it forward into an administration in the United States is unpredictable. We all know we're in a very fluid situation in Canada on our political future, and in the United States. Some of us are trying very hard to put in place areas where there can be U.S.-Canada agreement and some areas where we had better get ready for a discussion.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you so much.

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy stipulates the following: [...] Canada will pursue dialogue with China to advance Canada’s national interests [...]

It also states the following:In areas of profound disagreement, we will challenge China, including when it engages in coercive behaviour—economic or otherwise—ignores human rights obligations or undermines our national security interests and those of partners in the region.

My question is for all three witnesses. In your opinion, how should we interpret the phrase “We will challenge China?”

[Prof. Paul Evans]

I'm not sure I understand the full import of the question. I think understanding China is complicated. It is not a single entity with a predefined long-term position. China is mobile.

On human rights, if that is the essence of the question, the Chinese situation is abhorrent in a number of ways, but it is flexible around the edges. Canada had good success with China in the context of some issues related to labour and rule of law. We don't change their system but rather their interactions, as Mr. Houlden indicated. China adjusts around the edges on some of these matters, and we think we may have a special ability to try to keep that discussion with them going.

However, I'm not sure I got the gist of the question. Excuse me.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Canada says it will challenge China in areas of profound disagreements, whether that concerns coercive behaviour, economic issues, human rights or security. In other words, what capacity do we have to challenge China?

[Prof. Paul Evans]

The translation was interesting.

Canada is not going to be able to change Chinese behaviour by calling it out, though we must do it for our own domestic purposes. On economic coercion issues, I think we can fight back in specific areas, but I think there's room to talk with China about economic coercion of great powers. It is not only China that uses economic coercion against other countries. The United States, through sanctions, is a principal player.

I guess that, unlike the previous panellists, I don't think China's future is predetermined in some of these areas. In some of them, we can continue a dialogue with them about what might be rules that should be applied in a new global order.

I think we have to work with third world countries, the global south.... Some of the things the Chinese are talking about are appealing. A lot of it is difficult for us, but the world's rules are no longer going to be the rules of the United States and the western democratic countries. They're an important part of the picture—we don't lose that—but the global balance of power is shifting. The Chinese are positioned on some of these issues in ways that we can push back against, but sometimes we can find areas where we can reinforce a common message.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

That's your six minutes—and change, actually.

Ms. McPherson, it's your turn now.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

You got a little extra change there...?

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Yes, but that time, I think some of us had a little extra change too.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

It's true.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to all of you for being here today. It's a very interesting conversation.

I would like to follow up, Dr. Evans, on what you've just said. We heard from the first panel and now we're hearing from this panel that China is playing an important role in sub-Saharan Africa and in developing countries. This is changing that discussion around democracy, the rule of law and what that all means.

As Canada has limited resources—more limited than certainly I would like to see, but limited regardless—and the Indo-Pacific strategy is committing more of those resources to the Indo-Pacific region and developing those relationships, you can see that there would be a problem. Because, of course, of these limited resources, we're pulling resources out of other areas to invest in the Indo-Pacific strategy, which may make sense and which may be a good idea, but that leaves us not investing in sub-Saharan Africa and leaving the continent in some ways—diplomatically, peacekeeping-wise, development-wise—wide open to messages coming from China or from even more malevolent players like the Wagner Group.

How do we balance that? How do we balance our need for that? That's just looking at sub-Saharan Africa. We're not even talking about multilateral institutions, the Middle East or some of these other areas of focus. What do we do?