Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee.
The world has changed profoundly. The multilateralism model based on the rules-based order that Canada has subscribed to over the years has been undermined by geopolitical rivalry and a winner-take-all set of rules. This leaves one question: What is the new playbook for middle economies? It's something that in my view, and because it cannot be the same multilateralist model, remains indetermined and undefined.
There's a Cold War 2, which concerns enmeshment rather than the decoupling witnessed in the Cold War. We are in a world where power is based on who owns and controls data and intellectual property, where people fight over IP and data in an arena defined by an intangibles versus tangibles marketplace and in a world where democracy becomes eroded due to private gain. We therefore need a playbook and a policy orientation to suit this reality, particularly in the context of a Canada-China relationship moving forward.
In the time I've been allocated, I'd like to emphasize that this position requires both de-risking in areas where we can engage and decoupling in areas where, due to rules, values and standards, we must limit our engagement. The need to continue trading with China and engaging with China around international tables means that our ability to de-risk depends entirely on our ability to understand what the risks are.
When we think about China, we should think, in my view, about intellectual property, data, AI, demographics and maritime and land-based corridors. Despite the demographic challenges facing China's current economic and political models, it has raced ahead with technology-related IP and its own data governance standards in order to reap longer-term benefits from others. Canada must compete in this very complex terrain by adding value to the global supply chain with its own IP-protected technology advancements. This would enable Canada to engage and negotiate with China with strength and remain a serious economic player in this changed global context.
Global powers have acknowledged the risks associated with narrow maritime corridors like the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. Alternative corridors are now being developed. The U.S. seeks to win Saudi Arabia's support in a new land-sea corridor partnership running from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, while China pushes billions into a new middle corridor trade route linking it to Europe. Cross-continental corridor competition is also being pursued on the African continent.
As these new routes develop, and based on the challenges that China will inevitably face in negotiating its middle corridor with Europe, China will be monitoring how climate trends will make parts of the Arctic inhabitable over the next 25 years and, with its Arctic vessel and icebreaking capability, will be planning accordingly. China will therefore come to Canada with its own ideas of ocean governance in the Arctic and will negotiate around these ideas. At the same time, China will maintain its capability to massively disrupt North America through data, AI, IP and cyber and even by way of TikTok algorithms.
The fact that we must work with China, buy things from China and co-operate with China on agendas like the climate makes for challenging and complex geopolitical terrain. This is even more acute for middle economies like Canada, which are more vulnerable in the face of the geopolitical tactics of others.
Sun Tzu said that when in doubt, go to higher ground. Maya Angelou said that when we know better, we do better. In terms of Canada's relationship with China, my view is that all roads lead to a priority consideration, which is national capacity building. This requires us to be honest about our civil service capacity to operate in an intangibles marketplace and to question whether or not we have the institutions required to defend our interests in this intangibles world. This priority, I feel, is a precondition for the execution of the government's Indo-Pacific strategy.
We need intellectual bilingualism across the national civil service and the security sector so that data science, big data, algorithms, AI, ICT, large language models, sensors and devices, all of which I would refer to as the core enablers of emerging transformative technologies, are standard parlance and knowledge across government. This would enable Canada to strongly advocate for international civil service capacity in this multidisciplinary domain.
In my engagements in Europe, Southeast Asia and the Middle East over the last 18 months, it is evident that we have some work to do to catch up on the global realities. We must also have a solid ocean governance framework firmly in place in order to be in a strong negotiating position when China starts building infrastructure and maritime corridors through the Arctic. Lastly, we must do everything we can to maximize the strength of our higher education system, which, in my view, remains one of the strongest national instruments of power here in Canada, and protect this central mechanism for thought leadership and intellectual property by having effective, relevant and centrally agreed strategies, such as a strong research security framework.
In conclusion, I recognize this is complex terrain and a wicked problem. As a research professor of international security, I have had to learn and adapt my knowledge, research and teaching pedagogy to these realities. I will just leave off by saying that we must all learn, develop mechanisms for this knowledge and capacity building, and seek to become better.
Thank you very much.