Canada-China Relations Committee on April 19th, 2024

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Okay.

If I understand correctly, senior scientists concealed their activities. You've put policies in place to protect you and the Canadian public. When you noticed something, you took action.

It seems to me that it was quite a while before you noticed anything, and people were able to do things that weren't appropriate.

I understand that you took action when you finally noticed the red light, but before that, were there people who were incompetent in the face of this situation? Did you take it too much for granted that everyone was good, that everyone was nice? I understand that the science culture is collaborative. That's good, but in this case, it's as if we were entering an armoury: There were Chinese students and there were a lot of people. That seems to have been negligence or incompetence.

Take your pick: Was it negligence or incompetence?

[Heather Jeffrey]

Mr. Chair, I would say that in retrospect, the policies that were put in place on students, for example, afforded too much latitude to scientists who obviously had a clandestine agenda of which we were not aware. As a result, those policies have been changed. However, the policies were respected in those cases. The policies that we have put in place now are far more stringent, and our compliance mechanisms are strengthened and regularly revisited.

We have learned lessons from this and strengthened our policies accordingly.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

So you've strengthened your policies as a result of the negligence you observed.

In early April, the Minister of Health confirmed that there was a list of people with whom we shouldn't do business. Several entities were on that list, but there was no mention of the Wuhan Institute of Virology or the Thousand Talents Program.

Why is that?

[Heather Jeffrey]

The composition of the list is done by the public safety and security services under the auspices of ISED. The Public Health Agency isn't privy to the details of why certain institutions have been placed on that list, but we are in full compliance.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

If I understand correctly, the agency didn't make any mistakes.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Villemure.

Now we'll go to Dr. Ellis for the next five minutes.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Dr. Poliquin, on the transfer of the Ebola and Nipah viruses, would you say that national security was lax and that science took precedence over national security?

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would say that at the time, there was a long-standing effort by China—as demonstrated in west Africa by deploying over 100 health personnel, as an example—to help combat—

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Dr. Poliquin, I'm sorry to interrupt you. I didn't ask for a lecture on Ebola. I've had those before.

My question today is whether national security was lax and science was chosen over national security. Is that not true, sir?

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

Mr. Chair, in this context, the aim was to reinforce public health security through the development of medical countermeasures. That was the stated purpose of the collaboration, and as such, the transfer was authorized.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

That being said, we know these scientists were under investigation for perhaps nine months before the transfer occurred. If the transfer had not occurred, what would the harm have been?

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

The efforts under way were for the development of medical countermeasures, and several potential candidates for the treatment of Ebola and Henipah have been published since then.

It is difficult to ascertain what could have happened but, certainly, innovations that have been published in the public domain would likely not have occurred.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Thank you very much.

Before Dr. Qiu's collaboration with the PRC and the Wuhan Institute of Virology, was the Wuhan Institute of Virology a level 4 lab? Answer simply yes or no.

[Heather Jeffrey]

I'll turn to Dr. Poliquin on that.

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

Are you asking whether the...?

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Was the Wuhan Institute a level 4 lab before Dr. Qiu's collaboration?

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

As far as I understand, the WIV was developed as a level 4 facility.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

That was not my question, sir.

Did Dr. Qiu's involvement help the lab, which is now a long-standing level 4 lab, get developed?

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

I cannot speak to whether Dr. Qiu was involved and essential to that process.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Thank you for that.

Do you know if the Government of Canada had an MOU with the PRC or the WIV, the Wuhan Institute, to help with its development into a level 4 lab?

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

I'm not aware of such an MOU, should it exist.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Dr. Lucas, do you know of any MOU that may or may not exist?

[Dr. Stephen Lucas]

I'm not aware of any.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

I'll ask Ms. Jeffrey the same question.

[Heather Jeffrey]

There was no MOU to establish a level 4 lab. In 2007, there was a science and technical co-operation agreement with China to boost collaborative research and development in the life sciences, including for vaccines. That's the only co-operation agreement of which I'm aware.