Canada-China Relations Committee on April 19th, 2024

[Heather Jeffrey]

My understanding is that in August 2018, subsequent to a briefing that was given for general awareness by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the potential concerns regarding the vulnerability of lab employees to potential influence were flagged to the service, and fact-finding began. In September, potential issues began to be identified, and the chief security officer was involved in those discussions.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much.

We'll now go to Mr. Fragiskatos for six minutes.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here.

Just to clear some things up from previous meetings and to ensure the record is correct, were the scientists in question agents of the Chinese state, or were they in fact Canadian?

[Heather Jeffrey]

The scientists in question were Canadian citizens, long-standing employees of the lab, and respected in their field of scientific effort.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

Was the shipment of live Ebola and henipavirus to the Wuhan Institute authorized?

[Heather Jeffrey]

Yes, the shipment to the Wuhan Institute was authorized, as per the standard procedures of the lab. The procedures around its transit were in full compliance with the relevant act and with biosafety regulations.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

You've answered my next question, which was about whether all of this went through the necessary checks, so thank you very much.

Were there any unauthorized shipments or any removal of pathogens from the lab?

[Heather Jeffrey]

Mr. Chair, we have a very rigorous procedure to audit and account for all the pathogens and toxins at the lab, and we are 100% certain that there were no unauthorized removals of high-consequence pathogens or toxins from the lab environment at any time.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Ms. Jeffrey.

In your testimony, you went over steps that have been taken to ensure best practices going forward. Could you reiterate the key or signature advances that have been made to ensure best practices now and in the future?

[Heather Jeffrey]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

There are five main areas of program improvements to security that we made at the lab.

First, around physical security, we have tightened physical security screening measures. We've installed a modernized access control system; we've enhanced radio surveillance and monitoring, and we have strict protocols for delivery and shipping.

We have improved our IMIT information technology to guard against cyber-risks. We have comprehensive threat risk assessments, new procedures for information and travel, and completed updates to key functions.

We have a new policy on affiliations, a new updated approach to student hiring, and strict requirements and new structures for governance and approval, including a science security committee, enhanced incident response and monitoring protocols, compliance monitoring and requirements for declarations of conflicts of interest and affiliations.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much. It's quite thorough.

How were these introduced? Whom was it done in consultation with?

I'm just trying to understand how exactly decisions were arrived at: how you made the decisions to go in this particular direction, who advised, and these kinds of things.

[Heather Jeffrey]

In response to any incidents, including the ones identified in this case, we work with national security, law enforcement and public safety personnel, as well as with our chief security officer in the branch, to identify improvements to protocols and procedures that will help prevent or provide early warning for any such instances in the future.

It's really important to review these constantly, given the evolving nature of security threats, and to maintain our investments—not just physical updates, but also extensive programs for training and employee awareness—because these measures are strengthened by a culture in which one is not only aware but fully compliant with the measures that are in place. We have expended energy on both of these fronts.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

I understand.

You just mentioned employee awareness. Can you go into what is done to ensure as much employee awareness as possible in the context, as you say, of ever-evolving threats?

[Heather Jeffrey]

We've implemented mandatory training to raise awareness and provide guidance on the security responsibilities and accountabilities of all staff and security personnel at all levels. We've enhanced our onboarding and departure procedures. We have clear and regular communication in writing and through town halls and other measures in terms of security and conflicts of interest, and regular updates to those processes.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

To what extent is the organization engaged in the international context and with counterpart organizations, either the Five Eyes or the G7?

[Heather Jeffrey]

International collaboration in this field is key to success. There is a limited set of international counterparts that work in this field and that have labs at the level that Canada does.

We are in constant contact with them, as are our national security and law enforcement personnel, to compare our security posture, to share enhancements and to ensure that we are keeping pace with the evolving nature of the global situation.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Yes, Mr. Villemure.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Excuse me, but I can't hear Ms. Jeffrey's answers. She's speaking softly at the end of her sentences. The volume goes down and she's mumbling a bit, so I can't hear her.

Could she speak more loudly or more clearly?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Yes. If I was back in my old drill as a radio program director, I'd be talking to you about mic technique.

Make sure you speak up consistently. That's lovely. Thank you.

[Heather Jeffrey]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll move it closer.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

All right.

Mr. Villemure, the next six minutes are yours.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for being here with us today, Ms. Jeffrey.

In a few words, since time is limited, how is it that this series of events could have happened?

[Heather Jeffrey]

I would say that we have quite strict security procedures and processes in place.

In this particular situation, we were dealing with two employees—Canadian scientists, eminent in their field—who took measures to hide their affiliations and aspects of their work.

It was through awareness and training that the Public Health Agency and the lab personnel at the time identified a potential source of concern and then launched a series of investigations. Those successive investigations uncovered different layers of incidents. First, there were allegations, and then they sought evidence and enlisted—