Canada-China Relations Committee on Nov. 22nd, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

There's that, too.

We will now go to Mr. Cormier for six minutes or less.

[Serge Cormier, Liberal, Acadie—Bathurst, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would also like to wish Mr. Chong a virtual happy birthday.

Mr. Bondaz, thank you for being with us today and changing your schedule.

The first question I wanted to ask you is substantially the same as the one asked by my colleague Mr. Chong. I wondered whether Ms. Pelosi's visit was a pretext for using these military maneuvers.

So I will move on to the other questions.

Earlier, you said we all had a key role to play in terms of global stability, and probably in all our discussions, whether they are diplomatic, trade-related, or otherwise.

When you talk about a role to play, you are certainly talking about members of Parliament, about parliamentarians. With that said, you are certainly also talking about everyone who does business with these countries.

What do we have to do, to preserve that stability in the near future?

There are certainly going to be a lot of upheavals if a conflict erupts between China and Taiwan. We need only look at what has happened in Ukraine.

In your opinion, how can we preserve that stability?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

Thank you for your question.

As you pointed out, stability is fundamental today, since any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would have considerable consequences, exceeding by far the already tragic consequences of the war in Ukraine.

There are several ways to contribute to maintaining this status quo and, most importantly, to making the Chinese authorities understand, and convincing them, that any unilateral change to the status quo in the strait accomplished by force would not only be risky, but would come at too high a cost for Beijing.

We have to be very clear: we are now increasingly coming around to using cost, rather than denial, as the deterrent. In the years to come, China will one day have the military capacities it needs to take the island of Taiwan. The question that arises is therefore not whether or not China is militarily capable, in the long run, of taking control of the island by force, but whether the prohibitive cost of taking control is acceptable to the Chinese authorities.

Obviously, if taking control of Taiwan by force resulted in political instability in China because of the problems or costs it engendered, then, obviously, the Chinese authorities would think twice before launching into that undertaking.

So there is a role to play, not only for many countries, but also for parliamentarians directly, if only through declaratory diplomacy. Talking about Taiwan is already, in itself, a message sent to the Chinese authorities, the objective, again, being not to change the status quo, but actually to call for it to be upheld. The objective is therefore not to press any particular policy on the Taiwanese authorities; it is to deter the Chinese authorities from ratcheting up the pressure on the island a bit more.

I would say, regarding declaratory diplomacy, that what was done at the G7 18 months ago was already a good thing. The parliamentary visits were also positive. Those visits have always happened, regardless of what government is in place in Taiwan or in the countries that send parliamentarians. Pursuing these parliamentary exchanges is obviously an excellent thing.

The embassy of China in France has brought express pressure to bear to prevent visits by French senators, for example. Those visits took place. The provocation would actually be to halt the visits, much more than to continue them. Those visits have always existed and they are useful as a reminder that even though there are no diplomatic relations between our various governments and the Republic of China in Taiwan, there is economic cooperation and trade, in particular, and they are extremely advanced.

[Serge Cormier, Liberal, Acadie—Bathurst, NB]

Speaking of China's military expenditures, I think you said they had quintupled.

Where is Taiwan if we compare the two powers, in terms of military investments rather than in terms of weapons power?

Where are they, generally, in that respect?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

The balance of power has actually changed enormously in the Taiwan Strait, in favour of Beijing and against Taiwan.

Today, the figures are between $250 and $300 billion dollars in military spending on the Chinese side and more along the lines of $15 to $20 billions on the Taiwanese side. So we are now looking at a 1 to 15 ratio, and this forces Taiwan to develop weapons systems and strategies that are increasingly asymmetric.

Over the months and years to come, that is going to result in a change in the policy of buying American weapons or, more broadly, the development of the most asymmetric possible capacities in Taiwan in the context, in particular, of a change, including in Taiwan's doctrine on the use of these weapons systems for some years now.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

I'm sorry, Mr. Cormier. You are just about out of time, so we'll call it for the moment.

[Serge Cormier, Liberal, Acadie—Bathurst, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Bondaz.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

All right. Thank you.

We will now turn to Monsieur Bergeron for six minutes or less.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

When I started out in politics, I always claimed that no one would ever make me sing. Today, however, for the very first time—and one swallow does not a summer make—given that it is Mr. Chong's birthday, I will sing: “Happy birthday, dear Michael, Happy birthday to you.”

So there, now you can say publicly that you made me sing. With that said, I am very happy to be with you this evening.

I would like to thank Mr. Bondaz for his very informative remarks and also for agreeing to accommodate the members of this committee who were caught a bit short at the last minute.

In your article entitled “La France, une puissance d'initiatives en Indo-Pacifique”, you pointed out that the French intelligence-gathering ship Dupuy-de-Lôme transited the Taiwan Strait in 2021. In an interview about that crossing, you said that operation illustrated the consistency of France's Indo-Pacific strategy and its desire to stay the course in defending freedom of navigation despite the threats from the People's Republic of China.

I have some questions for you in that regard.

This summer, I had the opportunity to meet European Parliament member Raphaël Glucksmann. He told me that for Europeans, and the French in particular, Taiwan was something that had more to do with the United States. Obviously, he disagreed with that perception.

You said that the transit of the Taiwan Strait by the Dupuy-de-Lôme is an illustration of the consistency of France's Indo-Pacific strategy and its desire to stay the course in defence of freedom of navigation, despite the threats from the People's Republic of China.

To what extent does that view reflect reality?

From a strictly political perspective, we are told that Europeans have little interest in Taiwan, too little, in fact, and seem to believe it is something that has more to do with the United States.

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

Thank you for your question.

I think a distinction has to be made in relation to the actors that have the biggest role to play. In that regard, the United States is obviously the leading actor, in particular as a result of the security guarantees given in the Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress in 1979.

That doesn't mean that Europeans have no role to play or that Europeans are not interested in what goes on in the Taiwan Strait. Clearly, there is growing interest in Europe in helping to maintain stability in the strait.

Europeans have started to stop ignoring Taiwan. That is a criticism I make on a regular basis: that for a very long time, we never mentioned Taiwan in our official communications. Even in France, in certain official documents, the tension in the Taiwan Strait was not even mentioned. Now, it is, for example in the new national strategic review announced by the president a few weeks ago. The tension in the Taiwan Strait is mentioned there expressly. So there is growing awareness in Europe of the importance of maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. Europeans are talking about it more and more.

The next question is about the asymmetry between our interest in maintaining stability and the resources, including military, that we have for making sure that stability is maintained.

Regarding France, the transit of our intelligence-gathering ship, the Dupuy-de-Lôme, was not intended so much to get France involved in the Taiwan Strait issue as to remind China that freedom of navigation and overflight in international waters, including the Taiwan Strait, is extremely important. That is why France, like Canada, Australia, the United States or Japan, regularly has ships transit in the international waters of the Taiwan Strait.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you for that answer, which tends to confirm that France is an Indo-Pacific power, like the United Kingdom and other European countries, and that it does have a role to play, with the allied countries or countries that share common values in this important region of the world.

How can we incorporate the French strategy into what is happening in the region, for example, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, and the AUKUS accord?

Might France eventually want to join it? Will it want to continue to maintain an independent policy that is entirely aligned in ideological terms, if I may put it that way?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

Thank you for your question.

As you know, the French government wants to emphasize the concept of strategic autonomy. The alliance with the United States in no way means a 100% alignment. France is obviously not equidistant and neutral, but it does not want to align itself completely on certain cooperative actions that may take place in the region, for example the quadrilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, India and Australia known as the Quad. In fact, let's be very clear: those four countries are not inviting France to participate in or join the Quad.

For both France and Canada, the question of joining certain working groups within the Quad might arise, since the work done by those groups goes well beyond security and military matters. However, when it comes to joining the Quad, per se, the question does not even arise. In addition, regarding AUKUS, since France was excluded from this trilateral accord of industrialized nations from the outset, there is obviously no reason to join it. Once again, we have to distinguish between full and complete participation in certain security and military cooperation and the role that France can play. France has played an extremely proactive role in the region, together with all its partners, including Canada.

As you pointed out, France is an Indo-Pacific nation. Seven of France's 13 overseas territories and communities are in the Indo-Pacific and more than 1.6 million French citizens live there. We have 7,000 soldiers stationed there permanently and we have five military operation and command theatres there. France is therefore an Indo-Pacific nation and an Indo-Pacific power and obviously plays its role with limited resources as a balancing power. I refer to balances in the plural, because the actual term “puissance d'équilibres” with an “s” is the one chosen by the French president to try to explain France's policy in the region and, more broadly, in the world.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Dr. Bondaz.

We'll now go to Ms. McPherson for six minutes or less.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

My gift to Mr. Chong will be not to sing for him today. That will be a present I won't provide. I come from a long family line of people who mouth the words in church, so we are not musical.

I'd like to thank the witness for his testimony today. It's been very interesting. Of course, he's been speaking an awful lot about the changing status quo and how dangerous that is.

I think what I've gathered from your testimony is that you don't necessarily expect that there would be a full-scale invasion—of course, not ruling it out—but rather more of an incremental approach to taking control of Taiwan by China.

What I'm trying to think of and trying to get my head around is this. How can Canada ensure that we are responding to those small steps, not waiting for the small, incremental steps to build up but rather having the ability to push back—and knowing when to push back and how to push back—on that incremental change that we see China trying to impose upon Taiwan?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

Thank you very much for your question.

As you mentioned, it's a very incremental push on the Chinese side, what some people might call the salami-slicing tactics.

For sure, we need to support Taiwan and make sure that every time China tries to change the status quo by force, there is a collective and coordinated answer at least at the G7, because that's one of the key levels that have been chosen over the last few years to make sure we have a united answer, and more broadly a transatlantic answer to address what's going on in the Taiwan Strait.

China will keep changing the status quo. Their ultimate objective, of course, is to completely alter the status quo by taking over Taiwan. Once again, I think it's very important to underline that every time the Chinese try to shape the narrative, try to make sure that their language elements are being spread out, we need to counter it.

I think there is also an informational battle in which we need to make sure that the words we use are not the ones that Beijing has chosen to use, but are the ones that can best present and describe the situation in the most accurate manner. That's why in the concept of “taking back” Taiwan, those words should not be used. We talk about “taking over” Taiwan. The concept of reunification is not even a real concept. It's a unification, because Taiwan has not been part of the PRC since 1949.

I think we need to push back every time China tries to change the status quo—of course physically, but also in terms of words, in terms of narratives. In the so-called battle of narratives, we should make sure that the Chinese narrative is not the one we start using and that we keep describing and analyzing what's going on in the Taiwan Strait in the most accurate and neutral way possible.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

You spoke about how important parliamentary visits are, delegations going to Taiwan. Is there a risk that they would change the status quo? I certainly think there is some real value in them, and I would like to just hear your thoughts on the risks as well. We recognize the benefits. Are there some risks there with regard to how the PRC would respond?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

I would say the risks are limited. To be clear, the provocation would not be for these visits to continue in the same way they have for decades, but to stop them. What would be the message sent to the Taiwanese if suddenly the French, Canadian, European or even American parliamentary officials and MPs just stopped visiting Taiwan?

What's going on is that China is trying to change the status quo by preventing us...by threatening foreign MPs in order to stop them from going to Taiwan. I think the case of the Speaker of the House was kind of specific because it was, of course, a major visit with a lot of political significance. China used it, of course, to try to change the status quo. For all of the other visits, even though China has been opposing and criticizing them, they have not been overreacting and trying to use these kinds of regular and average visits to try to change the status quo.

Once again, I would say the provocation would be to stop visiting Taiwan, to not keep doing what we've been doing for four decades. All of these parliamentary visits are not challenging the one China policy that each of these democratic states has been implementing over the past few decades. These parliamentary visits are one way to make sure that we can strengthen and deepen co-operation and exchanges with the Taiwanese society, with the Taiwanese economy and so on.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you.

I am running out of time, but I did want to ask some questions about.... I know you spent some time speaking to the secretary-general of the Taiwan international co-operation and development fund. I am the international development critic for the New Democratic Party. Taiwan has now gone from a country that was a recipient of foreign aid to a country that is a donor country. How has that worked in the diplomacy efforts and the efforts of the Taiwanese to maintain the status quo?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

Thank you very much for the question.

I would say that that Taiwanese ODA has been quite limited for the last few years. Compared to the U.K., Sweden, or even Canada, it remains a very tiny percentage of Taiwan's GDP. Taiwan could do even more. Taiwan is doing that not only with its “diplomatic allies”, the term that Taipei uses to mention the 14 countries that have diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. The political regime in Taiwan is of course trying to expand these supports.

I think we need to be clear that in the Indo-Pacific, there is a huge potential for multilateral co-operation projects, which the Taiwanese could be part of. As you may know, Canada, with France, Australia, New Zealand and the EU, through the Kiwa initiative, has a huge co-operation project in the South Pacific to promote biodiversity, and countries, NGOs or non-governmental bodies can join. Why not offer Taiwan to join if they can fund, like we fund, these kinds of initiatives?

Once again, the idea is not to change the one China policy that each of our countries implements but to make sure we can integrate Taiwan as much as possible, including and especially when we are all together addressing global issues, and of course climate change, biodiversity and environmental issues in the Indo-Pacific are some of them.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you.

Now we'll go to Mr. Seeback for five minutes or less.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

It's really interesting testimony and evidence you've given today, Mr. Bondaz.

When you look at how China is trying to change the status quo, you mentioned the 400 incursions of the median line. Would you say that's part of an attempt to change the status quo? Have those incursions continued at a heightened level since the visit from Nancy Pelosi?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

The incursions are not as frequent as they were in August. Let's say the trend is slowing down a little bit, yet China has successfully changed the status quo because these incursions keep going. You have fewer of these, but you still have some incursions when you had almost none in the first part of the year or in 2020 or 2021.

Yes, China successfully changed the status quo militarily, and the objective through these incursions is to increase the pressure on the Taiwan military, because when you cross the median line, you are maybe a three- or four-minute flight away from Taipei, so you are very close to the capital of Taiwan. Second, you try to discredit the government for being incapable of preventing these incursions from happening. You try to get the Taiwanese air force to use its materials. You try to discourage the population and demoralize the population.

I would say that these incursions not only try to change the status quo, but they also have some clear military and political objectives, including in the so-called psychological warfare domain, not only in the operational military domain.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Ultimately, would you agree that the goal is to get rid of the median line by all these incursions?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

This is exactly what the Chinese have been saying. They are now explaining that the median line never existed, and they are quite right. There was never a legal agreement between Beijing and Taipei on the median line, but it was a tacit agreement, and de facto that line was respected on both sides. That's no longer the case on the Chinese side.