Canada-China Relations Committee on Nov. 22nd, 2022

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Let's look at this incrementalism that you've been talking about. You talked a little about prohibitive costs. What would you say are the prohibitive costs that we should be looking at with respect to various levels of incrementalism? For example, you mentioned some islands that could be taken over or a partial blockade. What kind of prohibitive costs do you think should be put in place now to ensure that incrementalism doesn't actually happen in the future?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

It's a very tricky answer because it depends on our political determination. To go until the end, in the sense of escalating the ladder if the Chinese choose to escalate, is very tricky and very complicated. The only answer might be a coordinated answer, not only from the U.S. and its key allies but more broadly from the international community.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Do you think that deepening the integration of Taiwan into other organizations is an effective buffer against these things? For example, Taiwan has asked to join the CPTPP, as has China. What would be your thoughts on that, if Taiwan wasn't invited to join?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

I do not think it would be a game-changer, to be honest. Within international organizations, it would be impossible for Taiwan to participate because the Chinese would block these attempts in the same way they've been doing since 2016. We can still of course wish and support stronger participation of Taiwan in international organizations, but China has the ability to block it. We need to deepen our economic integration, to make sure we have more leverage in case China tries to unilaterally change the status quo.

It's of course a much broader issue than just the question of Taiwan. There's the question of our interdependence with China. There's also the important question of the way we still de facto contribute to changing the status quo by providing China with some technologies that may be used by the People's Liberation Army to change the status quo. With all of these scientific and technological transfers that have been fuelling what we call the military-civil fusion in China, that's where we actually, against our interest, contribute to changing the status quo in China's favour.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Seeback.

We'll now go to Mr. Iacono for five minutes or less.

[Angelo Iacono, Liberal, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I, too, would like to highlight my colleague Mr. Chong's birthday. Tanti auguri.

I would also like to thank the witnesses for being present.

I had the pleasure of joining the recent Canadian delegation to Taiwan last month. It's my second time, and once again I witnessed how strongly Taiwan embraces and shares with Canada the values of democracy, freedom, respect of the rule of law and cultural diversity. Just like we have done recently, the Taiwanese government invested in much effort to address past injustices towards indigenous communities, to create a safe and inclusive society, to protect the environment and to develop green energy. This governmental perspective and behaviour are certainly refreshing to see in the Asia-Pacific and create a counterbalance to some regimes whose values and approach can represent a clear contrast with our western values.

How do you see Canada's role in supporting Taiwan's place in the Asia-Pacific as a haven of democracy and freedom?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

I would say that it's by being inclusive, as inclusive as possible, not only at the political level but in every single co-operation project we may have in the Indo-Pacific. We mentioned the ODA and a development project in the South Pacific—and it could be, of course, in southeast Asia, etc.—and making sure that Taiwan is part of it.

This would not necessarily be at the governmental level; it could be at the NGO level, or at the academic level, or at the civil society level, but we need to make sure that the Taiwanese are not left behind, are not left aside, that they are fully integrated. That's one way to make sure that Taiwan matters, and that Taiwan is one of us in the sense that it's one of the members of the international community. Even though, of course, on the political and diplomatic level there are lots of difficulties, a lot of hurdles, and Taiwan is not a country like any other, for sure, we can make sure to be as inclusive as possible, something we do not necessarily do all the time these days.

[Angelo Iacono, Liberal, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you.

As you know, Canada has supported meaningful participation by Taiwan in international forums, arguing that its absence would damage the global equilibrium. In September 2022, in your conversation with the secretary general of the Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund, you talked about the transition of Taiwan, about a country that provides foreign aid, as we have seen in the case of Ukraine recently. Canada did this during the pandemic, as did Japan, a few years ago.

By coordinating its foreign aid strategy with its diplomatic policy, will Taiwan increase support in the international community for its diplomatic efforts? What opportunities are available in Canada and Taiwan to expand their cooperation in connection with development aid?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

Thank you for your question.

I think you are perfectly correct. Today, Taiwan is often an underestimated actor when it comes to development aid, and yet Taiwan not only has financial capacities, but, most importantly, it has relatively unique experience in the Indo-Pacific countries. Given that, it is obviously possible to expand cooperation projects and ensure that Taiwanese actors, whether governmental or not, are able to contribute to certain energy transition projects in the region and certain more broadly marine projects. For example, Taiwan plays an important role in promoting biodiversity and combating ocean plastic. I think those projects should lead to the most concrete possible cooperation between Taiwan and international partners to try to depoliticize that cooperation and to avoid, to reduce criticism from China to the extent possible.

If we are to successfully address global issues, including global warming and others, Taiwanese society is essential, as are all societies in the world. So there is a place for the Taiwanese, and we simply have to find the forms of cooperation that are the most practical and technical, and least political, possible, so that such cooperation can take place.

[Angelo Iacono, Liberal, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

You agree that Taiwan has taught us a lot...

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Excuse me, Mr. Iacono. I think you are out of time, unfortunately, but you'll have another opportunity shortly.

[Angelo Iacono, Liberal, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

We will finish this round with Mr. Bergeron, and then Ms. McPherson.

One of our next panellists is already online and ready to go, so we will slide into the next panel as soon as we have concluded this one.

Mr. Bergeron, the floor is yours for two and a half minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Bondaz, in an article that recently appeared in the magazine Esprit, you argue that the People's Republic of China is engaging in a campaign to reinterpret the 1971 United Nations General Assembly resolution 2758, which is based on the one China concept. The new interpretation by the People's Republic of China seeks to convince the nations of the international community that Taiwan is part of the People's Republic of China.

Are we to understand, Mr. Bondaz, that the members of the international community have somehow been lured into this new narrative that the People's Republic of China is trying to impose?

If so, how can we get out of it?

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

Thank you for your question.

As you say, China's objective is to impose this language and ensure that the Chinese position is presented as the universally recognized position, which is not the case.

Resolution 2758, which was passed in 1971, does not mention the status of Taiwan, as the United States, for example, does not in the Taiwan Relations Ac. They take note of the Chinese position, but do not, properly speaking, recognize it.

The objective is therefore to point out that there is a fundamental difference between what is called the one China principle, which is the concept used by Beijing, and the one China policy, which is the concept that Canada, France and the United States use. In the first case, Beijing obviously considers Taiwan to be part of the People's Republic of China, while in the second, various countries such as Canada and the United States make no comment on the special status of Taiwan.

So there is a desire on China's part to impose this language and use what is called discursive power. Within international organizations, that concept is fundamental.

In recent years, as a result of our own negligence, China has managed to incorporate certain Chinese language into certain international documents, including technical procedural documents at the United Nations Secretariat. These are points on which we were not careful a decade ago. Those points are now used by China to try, once again, to impose this language and spread the idea that the Chinese position is a universally recognized one. That is not the case, however.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

Now we will go to Ms. McPherson for two and a half minutes.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the witness. You have been extremely generous with your time, and of course we've grilled you now for almost an entire hour, so I do appreciate that you've been so generous.

You spoke about those places where Canada can learn from Taiwan, where we can build those relationships. We previously spoke a little bit about international development. We know that Taiwan has taken a real leadership role within the sustainable development goals, the SDGs; how they are dealing with indigenous rights within Taiwan; their response to COVID and other health care matters; and, as you mentioned, climate change.

I want to give you one final opportunity to share anything else you'd like to add on what countries like Canada, which share those same democratic values, can do to show our solidarity and our support to Taiwan.

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

Thank you very much for this.

I think we need to speak out and make sure that Taiwan is mentioned in our official communications, not because we want to change our one China policy but because we want to make sure that the status quo is being maintained.

We need to make sure, also, to address directly the Taiwanese civil society, not always making everything political, but making sure that all of the changes, people-to-people changes, concrete co-operation projects can be promoted among and between our civil societies.

I would say, last but not least, that we need to depoliticize some of the co-operation we have with the Taiwanese. It's not about China. It's about Taiwan. It's not about provoking China. It's about deepening our economic, technological, cultural and educational co-operation with Taiwan and making sure, through many co-operation projects in the Indo-Pacific, that Taiwan can be included and can be a part of these projects. In that respect, of course, the French and the Canadians will soon release an Indo-Pacific strategy.

We have much to do together. We are already doing a lot in the Pacific. There are many more projects that we can have between Paris and Ottawa on that, to make sure that Taiwan, like any other country in the region, can be fully integrated.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

With that, we will say thank you.

It's already tomorrow morning where you are, Dr. Bondaz, but I hope that getting you on an hour earlier will facilitate an earlier bedtime than you had been thinking of. We do thank you very much for your attendance tonight at our committee.

[Dr. Antoine Bondaz]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would also like to thank the members of this committee.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

If we can just take a very brief moment to make sure that our next panel is teed up, I propose that we do precisely the same. Everybody will get two opportunities, and then we will go into what will probably be a short in camera session.

We'll just take a quick break while we get the next panel totally teed up.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

We will resume now.

I'd like to thank and welcome to the Canada-China committee our two witnesses: Dr. Robert Huebert, associate professor, University of Calgary, and Dr. Yeh-Chung Lu, professor and chair, department of diplomacy, National Chengchi University. Both gentlemen will have five minutes each to make an opening statement.

Mr. Huebert, you warned us in advance that you didn't have anything prepared, so I'll give you the old floor signal when it's time to wrap up your comments, and we'll take it from there. Then we'll go into our questioning after that.

With that, Mr. Huebert, we will give you the first five-minute opportunity.

[Dr. Robert Huebert, Associate Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I have to make a slight correction. I didn't say I didn't have anything prepared. I just don't have formal notes prepared in that context. I have been preparing for what I have been wanting to say for quite some time, actually, because this is such an important topic.

First of all, I welcome the committee's efforts to understand what is very complicated. I have seen from your list that you have come to many of Canada's leading experts and many experts outside.

I'm going to be focusing my comments on Canada, China and the Arctic in terms of how we can understand moving forward.

One of the things, of course, that we have to understand—and this goes with the theme of so many of your previous witnesses—is that there are a lot of misperceptions about what China is doing.

China has a long-standing interest in both polar regions, going as far back as 1984. In fact, for Canada, we first became aware of this in 1999, when their polar research vessel, the Xue Long, showed up at Tuktoyaktuk. They did ask our consent. There was a bit of a bobbling on it nevertheless.

When we look at China and the Arctic, there are five major issue areas that we have to be the most concerned with. They are related to the Chinese efforts with science, with governance, with shipping—and this is related to the polar silk road—with resources, and with the strategic and security dimensions.

The first four are the ones that everybody talks about, and those are the ones that are fairly well documented. The strategic side of China in the Arctic is the one that people are a bit more hesitant to really discuss, but in my view it is going to be the most important for Canada as we move forward.

We look at the issues coming forward, and I would love to get into these in more detail, but I will just highlight some of the key issues.

On the science side, what we know now is that China is one of the busiest countries in terms of mapping the Arctic Ocean sea bottom. They are allowed to do this under the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and they have been focusing so far on the areas that can be considered high seas. We think they are doing mapping in preparation for submarine transits of the region, though, once again, that's still an area of speculation.

In terms of resource development, there are at least three issues we have had with the Chinese in the Arctic. The first one is of course gold mining, as we know with the Holt Mine, and the issue of foreign involvement in that region. There is the ongoing issue of strategic minerals, and there is the issue of fishing. On the one hand, they have agreed to join the high seas Arctic fishing agreement. On the other hand, any observer knows the issue of ghost fleets and the fact that the Chinese really fish with two sides of their understanding to see how that works.

In terms of governance, this is the important one. This is one that I hope we can spend time on.

With the suspension of the Arctic Council, we're not quite sure what is going to be happening, because of the second stage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of this year. China has been making some statements that any consideration of what happens to Russia vis-à-vis governance is something that they will be strongly against, so we have this issue of trying to understand the Chinese-Russian relationship in the Arctic, which is by no means certain but is going to be problematic for us as we try to move forward in the post-Ukrainian stage.

The last issue I will raise is the strategic issue. Be aware that the U.S. just released its most recent nuclear and defence policy, back at the end of October of this year. They highlight China as their “major issue of interest” in the long term—enemy, one could say when you read between the lines—and that is going to spill over into the Arctic.

This October, most people probably are not aware that the Chinese and the Russians for the first time ever sent a joint surface fleet operation into the Aleutian Islands. There were about eight vessels—four Chinese, four Russian—and we have never seen this done before.

We also have a very strong suspicion that the Chinese are trying to prepare their next-generation submarine for under-ice capabilities, which, of course, is going to vastly complicate the issue in terms of how we understand the geopolitical maritime dimension of what is happening in the Arctic.

In sum, there are a huge number of issues happening, all of which are going to have a major impact up in the Canadian Arctic, and one that I don't think is receiving the attention that it needs to.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much, Dr. Huebert.

Now it's over to Dr. Lu, for five minutes.

[Dr. Yeh-Chung Lu, Professor and Chair, Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, honourable committee, for inviting me to join this meaningful event.

I believe our honourable committee members have a lot of knowledge about the current Taiwan-Canada relations and Canada-China relations, so I will touch on those two issues a bit as a background, and then I will focus on the cross-strait relations.

Generally speaking, the Canadian government has continuously supported Taiwan's meaningful participation in the international community, including specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as WHO and ICAO, as well as regional trade partnerships such as the CPTPP. Taiwan already put in our bid, and we hope that we can join this arrangement sooner rather than later.

In terms of geopolitics, Taiwan is a critical strategic hub in east Asia, and the Taiwan Strait together with the East China Sea and the South China Sea constitute major maritime shipping routes between northeast and southeast Asia. Thus, peace in this region is essential to global trade and stability.

As cross-strait relations intensified in recent years, Canadian officials have expressed concerns over China's intention of unilaterally changing the status quo, and the passages of Canada's warships in safeguarding this region are highly appreciated.

If we take a close look at the bilateral trading relationship between Canada and Taiwan, we can see that Taiwan is Canada's fifth-largest trading partner in Asia, with a total volume amounting to $8.2 billion U.S. dollars in 2021. Arrangements such as the avoidance of double taxation between Taiwan and Canada signed in 2016 helped pave the way to creating an environment conducive to promoting investment.

When it comes to China-Canada relations, China is one of Canada's largest trading partners worldwide, placing third only after the United States and the European Union. Trade relations between China and Canada expanded rapidly, yet recent incidents have cast a shadow over the prospect of this bilateral trading relationship.

This year, Canada joined its Five Eyes partners in banning Huawei and ZTE from its 5G networks due to security concerns. Many high-profile cases presented some of China's most concerning trade practices, hence as trade with China remains essential to a certain extent, it is worth a close examination with caution.

For relations across the Taiwan Strait, China has seen Taiwan as a renegade province since the Chinese Civil War and an integral part of President Xi Jinping's enterprise of the national great rejuvenation, which even takes national unification as part of the redemption to the 100 years of humiliation. War games and Xi's own words that “we will never promise to give up the use of force and reserve the option to take all necessary measures” over Taiwan demonstrate how serious and determined Beijing is in retrieving the island democracy.

China, from time to time, has also employed peaceful overtures to lure Taiwan into its plot. The most obvious policy of “carrot” included attracting Taiwan business people, performing artists and students to invest, work and study in mainland China under a policy dubbed “integrated development”.

Across the Taiwan Strait, however, people have found it less and less attractive when asked about unification with China over the decades. The Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan revealed that in October 2022 only 8.7% of the respondents favoured unification, now or in the future. The number dropped significantly from 26.8% in August 1996, only five months after Taiwan's first direct presidential election. Domestic politics mattered in shaping Taiwan people's identity, wherein more and more citizens view Taiwan as a de facto independent country from mainland China.

China's sale on “one country, two systems” has no market in Taiwan, especially in the aftermath of China's rule with an iron first over Hong Kong in 2019.

After U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit on August 4-7, the PLA conducted a 72-hour live-fire test in six areas surrounding Taiwan, together with aircraft and navy ships manoeuvring across the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan considered it to be a blockade simulation. In reaction, Taiwanese people's negative view on China soared, echoing the feelings held by the other side across the Pacific, the United States. From Taiwan's perspective—