Mr. Chair, I have a couple of things in response to that.
First of all, in response to the premise of the question—which is a very important one—some members may have noted a very recent but excellent report by the Rhodium Group based on economic modelling, which costed the impact of an economic blockade on the global economy, mainly because of the supply chain for chips. If you imagine China doing what it did as an exercise in August, but using that to enforce an economic blockade, that alone would have—they estimate—something like a first-order impact of two and a half trillion dollars on the global economy.
There are two reasons why that's important.
It gets to the question asked, Mr. Chair, which is, how do we work with partners to ensure that disruption to an essential part of everything we do—our whole economy—is something we don't wait to plan for the day after there is an embargo? There are very active discussions.
I think what's also important about the Rhodium Group study is that this should not be a concern only for China itself. Its own economy would be impacted by disruptions to supply chains in the chip sector—Canada's, as well...and China's most immediate neighbours. The premise of the Chinese government that what happens across the Taiwan Strait is an internal affair.... With respect, even the kind of exercise they undertook in August would have an immediate global economic impact.
I think a scenario where China takes over Taiwan and then controls that supply is very hypothetical. There are lots of variables there. That's why organizations like the Rhodium Group have responded to your question by isolating even a more limited impact. It would make the economic impact of Ukraine look small by comparison.