Good morning, Madam Chair.
I am the Competition Bureau's senior deputy commissioner responsible for the mergers and monopolistic practices branch.
I will begin my remarks by providing some context about the Competition Bureau and its mandate. Then, I will move on to our role as it relates to merger review and the factors we consider in our examination of mergers. Lastly, I will speak to recent merger reviews within the Canadian media sector.
The Competition Bureau, as an independent law enforcement agency, ensures that Canadian consumers and businesses prosper in a competitive and innovative marketplace. Headed by the commissioner of competition, the bureau is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Competition Act.
Under the Competition Act, mergers in all sectors of the economy are subject to the review of the commissioner of competition to determine whether they will likely result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition. The question for us in our review is whether there is evidence to support that the combined company will be able to exert market power as a result of the merger to the detriment of customers, suppliers, or ultimately Canadian consumers.
Where we find this to be the case, the act also requires the bureau to assess evidence of economic efficiencies gained by the parties as a result of the transaction. If the efficiencies gained are greater than the anti-competitive effects, the act mandates that the merger be permitted to proceed. The bureau's role in merger review is to obtain the necessary evidence and undertake careful analysis and consideration before reaching a determination. The factors involved in our evidence-based economic analysis are governed by our legislation and jurisprudence in this area.
When the bureau does determine that a merger is likely to substantially affect competition, we seek to remedy those effects either through a consent order of the Competition Tribunal that is negotiated with the merging parties, or failing agreement, through an application to the Competition Tribunal for an order to prevent, dissolve, or alter the merger.
As part of the bureau's approach in examining a merger, we consult with a wide range of industry participants, suppliers, competitors, industry associations, customers, and industry experts. We consider many different factors, including the definition of the relevant economic market, the level of economic concentration, and the level of competition remaining in the market. Our mandate requires us to analyze the anti-competitive effects of mergers that result from an enhanced exercise of market power. All bureau merger analyses are grounded and bound by the legal and economic tests laid out in our act and associated case law. In line with this, our reviews of media concentrations under the act have consistently adopted an economic lens in assessing potential anti-competitive effects.
In media concentration, there have been a number of recent reviews. In 2014 the bureau reviewed Transcontinental's acquisition of 74 Quebecor community newspapers and determined that transaction could have potentially resulted in a substantial lessening of competition in certain regional markets. We required Transcontinental to sell 34 newspapers within these regional markets in order to preserve competition within those markets. In 2013 the bureau also reviewed Bell Canada's proposed acquisition of Astral Media. Following our review, we determined the transaction would have led to increased prices and reduced choice and innovation in the television distribution industry. We addressed these issues through a consent agreement that required significant divestitures from Bell in relinquishing ownership of over 10 channels, as well as behavioural restrictions that prevented them from imposing restrictive bundling requirements.