Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for the question, Mr. Housefather.
While I won't comment on the trade risk, what I would say is that the effect of this would be to allow either party, one or the other, to request facilitation, and it would prevent, as you pointed out, a party from signing the process by refusing to go to facilitation.
With regard to the concerns you've raised about whether this risks increasing trade tensions, I would say the outcome would require, again, online undertaking to submit to facilitation at the request of the other party. It would take a little more of an interventionist stance, but I would highlight—and perhaps this is actually responding to Mr. Shields' question—that the outcome of this process is not binding arbitration. What the government has put on the table is very explicitly a facilitation exercise and is different from binding arbitration, which does exist in the current environment, whereby the CRTC actually has the power, at the end of the day, to impose a deal.
What this amendment drives to is slightly different in the sense that it is trying to help the parties reach a mutually good deal, so to speak. Again, if ever there were an instance of a party engaging in bad faith or not engaging in good faith, that is backed up by the CRTC's ability to respond to that bad faith behaviour by imposing administrative monetary penalties on the party that may not be playing fairly, so to speak.