Evidence of meeting #17 for Electoral Reform in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was broadbent.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Jean-Pierre Charbonneau  Minister for Democratic Reform, Government of Quebec (2002-2003), As an Individual
Yasmin Dawood  Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair in Democracy, Constitutionalism, and Electoral Law, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, As an Individual
Ed Broadbent  Chair and Founder, Broadbent Institute

3:05 p.m.

Bloc

Gabriel Ste-Marie Bloc Joliette, QC

Thank you.

For parties to have the same chances, should a reformed method of voting come with a reformed method of party funding?

At the moment, the funding comes more from the private sector than the state.

3:05 p.m.

Minister for Democratic Reform, Government of Quebec (2002-2003), As an Individual

Jean-Pierre Charbonneau

Let’s not confuse issues. I believe that the funding of political parties is one matter and reforming the method of voting is another. However, that gives me the opportunity to come back to—

3:05 p.m.

Bloc

Gabriel Ste-Marie Bloc Joliette, QC

We only have about 20 seconds left.

3:05 p.m.

Minister for Democratic Reform, Government of Quebec (2002-2003), As an Individual

Jean-Pierre Charbonneau

I would like to have talked about the referendum in the 10 minutes I was given, but I did not have the time to do so. What would be most helpful is for the committee here to do its work and, after lengthy study of the matter, to propose a solution to the people. After two general elections in which they could test the change, the people could ratify those provisions. That was how they did it in New Zealand: there was a referendum at the outset. However, I would point out to you that the territory in that country is not at all the same as Canada’s.

3:05 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Francis Scarpaleggia

Thank you very much, Mr. Charbonneau.

Ms. May, you have the floor.

3:05 p.m.

Green

Elizabeth May Green Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First, I want to thank all the witnesses here today very much. This is really interesting.

I'm going to focus my first question to Mr. Broadbent.

I can't fail to begin by thanking you for your service to Canada, sir, and for being here today.

It came to me when I was reading your evidence that we had testimony about what's good for parties, and I'll just reprise it because you had another comment about this being good for voters. That difference came up when Professor Pippa Norris was testifying to us. She's at Harvard right now. What she said was about choosing the values, because we now realize it's a question of values. What do you value when choosing an electoral system? If what you value is to help larger political parties, then you like first past the post, but if your value is to privilege how voters feel about the effectiveness of their vote, then you move to proportional representation.

Mr. Broadbent, I wonder if you have a sense of what we should focus on. Obviously, you want proportional representation and you prefer a mixed member system. How do you see teasing out that difference between what works for voters and what works for parties?

3:05 p.m.

Chair and Founder, Broadbent Institute

Ed Broadbent

As Mr. Charbonneau has mentioned, and I've experienced it, very often when politicians find that they get elected by first past the post, they conveniently forget about any commitment they might have made to an alternative system. It's very tempting. Anyone who pursues power and wins it by one method is unlikely to want to change it to another.

I'll be quite candid here. I was quite delighted with Mr. Trudeau's campaign. He's the first prime minister in history to say he would bring in change to get rid of first past the post. I, for one, have taken that commitment very seriously, and I think it was a commendable promise.

However, that cuts into what you're saying, Ms. May. Since first past the post is the most reliable system for maintaining power, it's implicitly to say that I'm prepared to adopt a system that may not work for my power interests. Particularly, as I said very briefly in my comments, for me the value of making a positive vote is very important in a democracy, while not to vote.... As I said, the survey we did after the last election showed a very high percentage of Canadians voted for a party of their second choice to avoid electing someone else. That doesn't maximize the value of participation, and that's why a PR system or a mixed system is much better in terms of meeting the value needs of individual citizens.

3:05 p.m.

Green

Elizabeth May Green Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC

Thank you.

I want to turn to Professor Dawood.

I also had the benefit of looking at your 2012 paper in the University of Toronto Law Journal, in which the term “partisan self-dealing” is used quite a lot. It was a new term for me. You've reflected on the legitimacy of the process being essential and that the composition of this committee aids in the legitimacy of electoral reform.

I want to put to you a different proposition and see if you would agree that the legitimacy of our process of electoral reform is also connected to the extent to which the governing party appears to be dealing against self-interest. This picks up on the point Mr. Broadbent just made. In legal terms, evidentiary weight is given to a statement against self-interest.

I know your paper is already written and in press, but do you think there's additional legitimacy to be gained by knowing that the party in power is doing something unprecedented in opting for a system that may not benefit them?

3:10 p.m.

Prof. Yasmin Dawood

Absolutely. It rebuts the worry or the presumption that partisan self-interest is the only motivation for a particular proposal for reform. If the governing party selects a reform option that is not optimal for that party's political success in a future election, then from a legitimacy perspective that would certainly be viewed as being a more principled decision than a decision that was clearly self-interested in the sense that it would enhance the governing party's political success in a future election.

Therefore, yes, I think to make a disinterested selection would add to the legitimacy of any proposal by a governing majority, which is why it is so important to make sure the process is, in fact, both fair and perceived to be fair. You don't want a situation in which successive majorities cherry-pick rules that help them, and then the next majority comes along and picks its own set of reforms that it can push through because it has a majority power in Parliament.

3:10 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Francis Scarpaleggia

Thank you.

Ms. Sahota is next.

3:10 p.m.

Liberal

Ruby Sahota Liberal Brampton North, ON

Thank you.

I'd like to begin by thanking all the witnesses for your valuable time and for imparting your wisdom to us.

I agree with you. I think this is a very good step that our Prime Minister has taken, a very ambitious goal. I know the minister has committed to making a change involving electoral reform. I hope we can come to some kind of consensus agreement within this committee, as Ms. Dawood has stated, or at least a majority opinion on the legislative process to support any kind of change.

If, as you were just stating, that were not to happen, are there any constitutional issues that you see, Ms. Dawood, in moving forward on electoral reform without it?

3:10 p.m.

Prof. Yasmin Dawood

The constitutional question is a somewhat complex one. I don't know how much time or interest there is for hearing all the details, but I will say that until the Supreme Court's Senate reference decision, it seemed pretty clear that Parliament could actually make electoral reform decisions or changes to election laws, provided it went through the normal parliamentary process. The court, in many of its cases, has said that the electoral system falls within the domain of Parliament.

The court has recognized a number of constitutional limits on what Parliament can do. These tend to centre around the right to vote, as protected by section 3 of the charter. There are also distributional requirements in section 51A of the Constitution Act. Apart from those types of restrictions, it would have seemed, before the Senate reference decision, that Parliament could bring about electoral reform.

As you know, in the Senate reference decision the court said that various proposals to reform the Senate did in fact amount to a constitutional amendment, even though they didn't actually envision any changes to the constitutional text. For example, concerning the consultative elections, the proposal was that these would take place without actually changing any of the language of the Constitution, but the court found nonetheless that this amounted to a constitutional amendment.

The point is that the question now is whether electoral reform it is the kind of amendment to the Constitution that would in fact require provincial consent according to the 7/50 rule, whereby seven provinces that have 50% or more of the population agree to the change.

What I did in the paper I was describing was try to figure out whether there's a way around this. Is there a way for a future court decision to say no, to say that in fact electoral reform does not need to be approved via a constitutional amendment involving provincial consent? In my opinion, there is an argument for that. There is also the argument on the other side that in fact a constitutional amendment involving provincial consent is required.

Did that answer the question?

3:15 p.m.

Liberal

Ruby Sahota Liberal Brampton North, ON

Well, it leads to many more questions, actually.

I saw some nodding from some of our other witnesses. If there is something you'd like to add, or if you agree or disagree with that statement, please do.

3:15 p.m.

Minister for Democratic Reform, Government of Quebec (2002-2003), As an Individual

Jean-Pierre Charbonneau

Madam, I do not feel that the Constitution concerns itself with the method of voting. The important thing is to preserve democracy. Democracy is a parliamentary majority, but, in this case, given that this debate is about the method of representation, it is also a popular majority. If Parliament decides to pass legislation, not only must it be supported by a majority of members, those members must also represent a majority of the people.

Those who want to make doubly sure could also suggest that we do as they did in New Zealand and establish a mechanism in the legislation such that, after two general elections, there would be a validation. That would let the people try out and understand the system better than they could in a debate on a referendum. A referendum about electoral reform, especially if it offered a number of choices, would be a lot more complex than a referendum to find out if Quebec should be a country, yes or no.

3:15 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Francis Scarpaleggia

Thank you.

Mr. Richards, you have the floor.

August 29th, 2016 / 3:15 p.m.

Conservative

Blake Richards Conservative Banff—Airdrie, AB

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

I appreciate your being here today, all of you.

I'll start, and in this round likely finish, I suppose, with Mr. Broadbent.

I have a couple of questions, at least, for you. I first want to say that I have great respect for your long and distinguished history as a parliamentarian. I have one question that might be seen as a little bit tough by someone who doesn't have the experience you have, but I know you won't take it in any way personally, or that you won't—

3:15 p.m.

Chair and Founder, Broadbent Institute

Ed Broadbent

I can hardly wait now.

3:15 p.m.

Some hon. members

Oh, oh!

3:15 p.m.

Conservative

Blake Richards Conservative Banff—Airdrie, AB

—see it, with your great experience in to and fro—

Yes, and I'm sure you'll have no trouble handling it.

It's this. I felt that I had heard maybe a bit of a contradiction to some of your previous thoughts and statements when you were responding to Mr. Reid's question earlier, so I wanted to ask you about that and explore it a little bit, it you don't mind.

When you spoke to the public round table on proportional representation that was organized by the New Brunswick commission—I think that was in 2004—you made a statement that started by saying that you generally weren't a fan of referendums but felt, and I'm quoting, that

...when restricted to establishing the democratic rules of the electoral system applicable equally to all citizens and when the question is preceded by a thorough deliberative process involving the citizens themselves, it seems to me such a referendum fully measures up to the democratic aspirations and values of classical democratic theorists like John Stuart Mill.

It seems to me that at that point in time you were indicating that a referendum might be something that, on this type of question, you would certainly be in favour of, and I sense a different viewpoint today.

I'm wondering whether you could explain that to us a little bit. It seemed that you agreed with the idea of a referendum when you were working to convince Canadians to proceed with electoral reform and consider electoral reform, but now that we're having serious discussion about electoral reform, you may not share that view any longer.

I'm having trouble understanding and reconciling that. Could you try to answer that?

3:15 p.m.

Chair and Founder, Broadbent Institute

Ed Broadbent

Mr. Chairman, let me say to my colleague, if I can put it that way, that like everyone around this table I change my mind occasionally.

3:15 p.m.

Conservative

Blake Richards Conservative Banff—Airdrie, AB

Very well.

3:15 p.m.

Chair and Founder, Broadbent Institute

Ed Broadbent

If you look with care, I think, at what I said then, it was a democratic option to proceed with a referendum, which I could understand, and I could see people going from that to endorsing the idea. I have thought more about it since, particularly about the legitimacy argument. I'm quite convinced—and I won't repeat it—that steps can be taken that don't necessitate going directly to the people.

The other divisive aspect, I must frankly say, in my experience in watching the divisive impact of a referendum in the U.K. and in reflecting as well upon the experience in Canada of referendums, is that in a regionally diverse country such as ours, whether you win or lose a referendum, as I said in my opening comment, a referendum would end up being much more divisive than the kind of deliberative process in which all members of this committee act in good faith, try to think through all the options, and come up with a recommendation. I think that's much more likely to build a consensus, frankly, in the country than a referendum.

3:20 p.m.

Conservative

Blake Richards Conservative Banff—Airdrie, AB

That's fair enough. We'll have to agree to disagree on that one.

3:20 p.m.

Chair and Founder, Broadbent Institute

Ed Broadbent

Okay. I understand.

3:20 p.m.

Conservative

Blake Richards Conservative Banff—Airdrie, AB

I guess it's easier for you to change your mind at this point in time than it is for some of us around the table who are currently still in the game. I can appreciate that.

We don't have a lot of time left. I'll move to a different topic.

In the past you've also spoken out against the idea of ranked ballots. Could you tell us whether that's a view you still hold, and if so, could you give us some rationale for the basis of that idea?