Thank you.
The problem I perceive here—and I'll try to make it a little clearer because I alluded to it in my previous comments—is that we now have, clearly, two different purpose clauses. And in a way, I'm grateful that Ms. Duncan has made her amendments, because it really highlighted that fact.
Her amendment would read in subclause (2), “This Act is intended to ensure consistency with Canada's rights and obligations under international law”. If we were using the same formula as in the existing clause 6, we would say, “The purpose of the Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights is to ensure consistency with Canada's rights and obligations under international law.”
Now we have two purpose clauses. It's not at all clear to me that those two purposes are necessarily consistent with each other. In other words, in the new subclause (2), with this subamendment, we are saying that the purpose of this act is to ensure consistency with Canada's rights and obligations under international law, but in what will become subclause (1), we're saying that the purpose of this act is to “safeguard the right of present and future generations...to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment”, for example. There are others there, too, but I just picked that as an example.
What does a court do if confronted with an argument that an obligation or a right of Canada has been implemented under an international convention that happens to contradict safeguarding the right of present and future generations of Canadians to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment? Well, the section says that if there's a conflict, the international convention will prevail. To a certain extent, I find that reassuring, because it would at least enable the effect of this Bill C-469 to be somewhat gutted if we can arrange an international convention on the subject, which would, in effect, overrule some of the more outlandish and extreme provisions of Bill C-469.
But it's not at all clear to me that subclause (2) will have the effect of overcoming what will become subclause (1) here, because subclause (1) doesn't say that it's subject to subclause (2).
There are two stand-alone purpose clauses. They may well come into contradiction with one another. There is nothing in the bill that gives a judge any guidance about whether the judge should follow what will be subclause (1) or should follow what would be subclause (2). Personally, I'd like him or her to follow subclause (2) and really gut subclause (1) in such a case, but I have no assurance that's what will happen with this amendment, even with the subamendment.
It's very difficult to discuss these things, Mr. Chair, in isolation. One would almost have to find a concrete example. That's where I was going a moment ago when my time ran out. I do thank my Conservative colleagues for allotting to me their one and a half minutes each on this debate.
I was getting to the Marine Liability Act because it might serve as a concrete example of how this will work. I regret that I'm not as familiar with the Marine Liability Act as I would like to be. As with my colleague, Ms. Duncan, across the way, I just didn't have the time to really sit down and work it through. But my impression, generally speaking, is that the Marine Liability Act would limit in certain circumstances the liability of a shipowner responsible for an incident of pollution in Canadian waters. I may be wrong.
I also want to say--along with my colleagues--I am by no means an internationally trained lawyer, so I don't ask you to accept what I say on that basis. I'm only trying to look at this as a lawyer who has some facility with the interpretation of statutes.
Let's suppose that under the Marine Liability Act, pursuant to an international convention, we are passing a law that limits the liability of shipowners in polluting incidents in Canadian waters. I suppose as long as the Marine Liability Act, as passed pursuant to the international convention, duplicates the provisions of the international convention, this new subclause 6(2) as amended would kick in and would indicate that shipowners are only going to be liable up to the maximum of their liability under the Canadian implementation of the international convention on marine liability.
But subclause 6(1) will say that the purpose of this act is to
(a) safeguard the right of present and future generations of Canadians to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment;
(b) confirm the Government of Canada’s public trust duty to protect the environment under its jurisdiction;
I think those are the two that apply.
So what if a judge decides that the liability limitation in the Marine Liability Act does not adequately safeguard the right of present and future generations of Canadians to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, and therefore the purposes enumerated in subclause 6(1) are not being met if we are meeting the purpose enumerated in subclause 6(2)? What will a judge do?
In the absence of some qualification of subclause (1) to say that it's subject to subclause (2), it's not at all clear to me that a judge would say that he or she was going to apply subclause (2), rather than disregarding it in favour of subclause (1).
That, to the best of my ability, articulates why I believe it's not sufficient to simply tack on subclause 6(2) with a new purpose, rather than integrating it somehow as a superordinate safeguard that would, in appropriate cases, really gut subclause 6(1).