I see your point, and I don't disagree with the fact that when you have reports that are done for public consumption from the outset, and reports that are done for confidential purposes and the use of governments, you're going to get two different kinds of reports. That is simply a fact.
The reports that are prepared for government use, we want to ensure are as frank as possible, that we use the best possible sources and so forth, so that we make sure our government has the best possible advice from its public servants on the basis of confidential reporting. I'm not just talking about the current government. I'm talking about any government, because this is the way we work in the international world, in foreign affairs and international trade.
If that reporting were to become public, or to be known to become public, automatically our sources would dry up. We would have extreme difficulty getting information. I can state this categorically: where there were serious problems in terms of human rights, we would find our ability to speak to those governments—and therefore our effectiveness—of the unpleasantness of their behaviours circumscribed.
There really are two different purposes that drive these two reports, Mr. Dhaliwal. While it is a question of transparency—and I understand that completely—and while the Canadian public deserves transparency, our duty to the public is also to provide good government and good advice to the government of the day. For a public servant, this is always an extremely difficult balance.
That's why, in this particular case, we have the legislation that allows the Information Commissioner to be someone to whom requesters can go after they receive that information to have it tested. The crafters of that legislation certainly saw that. Eventually a court is also a final tribunal to which requesters can go.