Just very briefly, these two cases deal in general terms with videotaping on private and quasi-private premises. In the case of Milner, the complaint the plaintiff had was that there was a vehicle outside their house taping the activities that were going on in and around the house for the purposes of understanding whether there was a bogus disability insurance claim. In Heckert, the plaintiff's complaint was that there was a camera at the end of her hallway in her apartment building that could obviously tape her entering and exiting her apartment.
In the case of Milner, it was found that there was a lawful interest with respect to the defendant insurance company's ability to be able to monitor the activities to establish a fraudulent claim. I think it's quite interesting in obiter that the judge, as he or she was then, mentioned that in the process of taping, the daughter of the plaintiff was seen semi-dressed, and had she advanced a claim, it would have been problematic for the defendant. It raises issues that my colleague talked about earlier about whether what they do with this information is secure.
In the Heckert decision, the most recent one, it was found that there was a reasonable right to privacy in entering and exiting one's home. Those activities were captured, and that judgment falls within violation of the law as it stood in 2008.
These are interesting because they deal with the fuzzy line between the private and public domain. In Milner it was found untenable that the private domain could be analogous to a public place—at least, this is what the critics were saying. It's obviously not what the judge felt. In both cases the factual matrix is clear. Video surveillance by a defendant with a legitimate interest in information that might be secured from it has to be balanced with the plaintiff's interest in what information is being recorded and how that's stored, and how the person performing the surveillance might be dealt with.
I'm not sure the Privacy Act provides a bright line here. This is relevant to our discussion today and certainly builds on my colleagues, because Google Street View and other groups like that don't have a nexus like these cases. There's no direct-connection test here with respect to their rights to privacy, whether it's a lady who's concerned about the tidiness of her garage or other activities, directly or unintended, by consequence of surveillance.
I have a couple of questions. Since counsel may not be familiar with the cases, I'll broaden my question. Has PIPEDA been affected by these and/or other court rulings in preparation for this kind of technology? If so, how will you be adapting in light of these kinds of cases from the common law, whether they flow directly from the decisions or as they may be raised as issues in obiter?