Information & Ethics Committee on Feb. 4th, 2013

[John Carmichael, Conservative, Don Valley West, ON]

Have I got time...?

[The Chair, NDP, Pierre-Luc Dusseault]

Unfortunately, your time is up, Mr. Carmichael.

[John Carmichael, Conservative, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, NDP, Pierre-Luc Dusseault]

We will now move on to five-minute rounds.

We will begin with Mr. Boulerice.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. chair.

I thank our two witnesses for being here. This is very interesting.

I want to address the issue of private meetings with the commissioner, her assistants or her employees. I must admit that I am favourable to this recommendation. I have been a member for close to two years. I know that when we arrive on Parliament Hill, we are given a mass of new information, paperwork and forms that appear on our desks, a considerable pile. So that is only one thing among others. Those meetings could allow the new members of parliament to get a better grasp of the rules. This could help them to avoid making blunders or foolish mistakes.

Also, there is another aspect to this matter. When we have been here for a long time, we may get a little too comfortable, and we may think that we are sheltered from criticism.

Of course, this means we will have to meet a lot of people, there will be a lot of meetings. My question is addressed to both of you. Do you think that the commissioner has, at this time, the necessary human resources to do good awareness-building work and to monitor what is going on?

[Prof. Ian Greene]

That's a very good question.

I think I understood most of what you were asking. It seems to me that it's more efficient to prevent a breach of the rules from happening than it is to investigate afterwards and try to pick up the pieces.

When Greg Evans was the first ethics commissioner in Canada, I think his meetings with cabinet ministers were about half an hour long, sometimes longer if something was really complicated in terms of their business, and sometimes shorter if their personal holdings were very straightforward. The meetings were very quick. The great thing about them is that they created a rapport. The commissioner was seen as someone who was there to help them stay out of trouble, not someone who was there to investigate them and punish them afterwards, so they wanted to take advantage of that advice.

In the end, there wasn't a lot of work to do or a lot for the commissioner to investigate, so it seems to me that with an average of four investigations per year, which are time-consuming, expensive, and take a lot of staff time...if you could cut down on those, then there is going to be enough staff time available to have these personal meetings.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Mr. Levine, did you have something to add?

[Gregory J. Levine]

I do have a sense that you could be dealing with a fair number of people. While I think the person-to-person meeting makes sense, it makes a lot of sense from an educational point of view. It may be that it's more efficient—not likely more effective, but more efficient—to have training sessions of some sort so that you're dealing with this. When I look at the definition of public office holders, it seems to me that it includes quite a few people, so you may need to have a different kind of system for most of the public office holders.

[Prof. Ian Greene]

Yes, I was thinking of MPs and cabinet ministers, but there needs to be a different system, as Mr. Levine has pointed out, for the other public office holders.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Mr. Levine, earlier you talked about a somewhat different model for the application of the Conflict of Interest Act, and that was the American model. Could you, Mr. Greene and Mr. Levine, tell us what you think about the fact that the Canadian Parliament might seek inspiration from another way of doing things? What other method, what other approach rather than the current one could be more effective and could inform our work, in whole or in part?

[Gregory J. Levine]

If you want just a myriad of examples of different ethics commissions, every state, every city, and the federal government in the U.S. has a commission. So there are a lot of models out there. I have a concern about them, though, which I tried to raise before. It seems to me that if you want to move towards a model where the ethics commissioner leaves the kind of investigative reporting, educator model that you seem to have, then you really do need to look seriously at the various ethics commissions in the U.S., in New York, in California, and so on. The bigger states have very elaborate apparatuses to deal with ethics violations, and I would do that.

If you want to maintain the kind of model you have, I think it's actually better to look at the provinces, because their models are working and they have good legislation in place.

[The Chair, NDP, Pierre-Luc Dusseault]

Thank you.

I am going to give Mr. Greene a little time so that he may answer as well.

[Prof. Ian Greene]

I very much agree with Mr. Levine on this. The American systems are highly partisan. They're not seen as being objective as ours are. I think the key is ensuring that the commissioner is always seen as someone who is non-partisan and objective and competent.

With regard to that, I think in future the system for choosing the commissioner could take a lot from the provinces. In any of the provinces, an all-party committee of the legislature advertises for the new commissioner when there's a vacancy and makes the recommendation to the cabinet for the appointment. So everybody agrees on it, and everyone trusts the person who's chosen. In the Senate they informally sort of follow that model here too.

That's something to think about for the future, not currently. Maintaining impartiality is really important. This is why in our system for the really serious breaches—let's say the commissioner finds that a member or cabinet minister has been in a real conflict of interest, and it's not trivial but a serious situation—it's left up to the House of Commons to decide what the punishment should be, because, in the end, we have a system of legislative supremacy.

[The Chair, NDP, Pierre-Luc Dusseault]

Thank you.

I now give the floor to Mr. Warkentin, who has five minutes at his disposal.

[Chris Warkentin, Conservative, Peace River, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank both witnesses for being with us today. We appreciate your testimony.

The commissioner had intended to bring testimony to this committee at our last meeting, and unfortunately she wasn't able to do that, but she left her notes as to what she intended to say. Having read that testimony, I guess she believes that the system currently is functioning relatively well. She believes she has a system that's working well and that Canadians can trust, but obviously she has recommended some tweaks to assist in her work. Obviously, you gentlemen have some suggestions regarding that as well.

You've made some broad suggestions about post-employment for public office holders. Of course, when we're talking about public office holders, we're talking about staff members, MPs, former ministers, a whole host of folks, so we have to discuss the issues of what we're going to do to them when they're seeking employment after they've ended their public service. You made some suggestions with regard to post-employment, but it seems to me that the major issue is covered under the Lobbying Act. Obviously, there's a prohibition with regard to certain communications that they can undertake. In addition to limiting their ability to communicate—and the rules are provided in the Lobbying Act—what other provisions do you believe would be necessary? Or does the Lobbying Act cover the concerns you have? There have been some suggestions, and I'm not sure we've articulated what those would be.

Either of you can answer.

Mr. Levine, you can jump in.

[Gregory J. Levine]

I have just a quick thought on that. Sorry, I can't find it, but at the time of the Oliphant commission, there was concern that there was a disjuncture between the Conflict of Interest Act and the post-employment requirements under the Lobbying Act. All I can do is highlight that right now, because I can't find it, but I do recall that as an issue.

If I find it, is it all right if I send it to you?

[Chris Warkentin, Conservative, Peace River, AB]

That would be appreciated, because at this point I'm not sure that anybody has articulated specifically what changes would be undertaken in this act that aren't already covered under the Lobbying Act. If something comes to mind, we'd be interested.

I think that whatever we do, we have to ensure that it be charter-compliant in addition to.... We have some very good people who are spending some time in public service, and we need to ensure that the public interest is protected but also that we protect the interest of the charter provisions for any former public office holder. I think there's some clarification we would seek if you have specific suggestions on that.

In terms of public office holders, there has been some concern with regard to former public office holders going to work for non-partisan agents or officers of Parliament. I wonder if you have any suggestions or thoughts with regard to folks who are considered to have been public office holders and who seek employment within the non-partisan offices of officers or agents of Parliament.

Do you have any thoughts, suggestions, or concerns with regard to this movement of a public office holder, post-employment, going to seek positions in those non-partisan, or what need to be maintained as non-partisan, environments?

[Prof. Ian Greene]

My first reaction is that I'm not as concerned about that as I am about them going to work in an agency where they could make really a lot of money from knowing what they know from their previous employment—

[Chris Warkentin, Conservative, Peace River, AB]

Well, I'm not sure we can suggest that they don't make money.

[Prof. Ian Greene]

Maybe they are making a lot of money, but the key is this, I think. What the Americans have done is to have really detailed rules about everything. It's hard to understand them because they're so lengthy and so detailed. Also, because they're so detailed, there are a lot of loopholes. For us, what is really important, I think, as Mr. Levine mentioned, are statements of principle.

What we're basically trying to do is prevent undue influence. Now, once again, undue influence is a vague term. It really refers to some people having an unfair advantage, so—

[Chris Warkentin, Conservative, Peace River, AB]

Okay. I appreciate those comments. You articulated them earlier.

My concern, and what the specific question was related to, is former public office holders moving into non-partisan offices.

[Prof. Ian Greene]

Yes.

[Chris Warkentin, Conservative, Peace River, AB]

You are not certain that you have concerns with regard to that.

Mr. Levine, do you have concerns with regard to that?

[Gregory J. Levine]

Yes, I can see a concern there. It depends on the level they're moving into, I think, but even so, if they are a public office holder in a senior position or a partisan position and they move into a non-partisan office, and they do it without a significant cooling-off period, you raise an issue of the objectivity of the non-partisan office.

Yes, I think there's an issue there. I don't know how I would quantify the length of time, but I think I do see an issue there.

[The Chair, NDP, Pierre-Luc Dusseault]

Thank you.

Your time is up.