One aspect of the Estonian model that is important and valuable is the principle of collecting once. Not requiring citizens to keep inputting their data is the key idea of this unified national identity, and it prevents this problem that citizens in most countries face of constantly giving the same information to multiple different entities. Each time data is supplied, another weak point is created.
Figuring out how to make the supply-once and secure-forever model work logically makes a lot of sense, because it also helps separate identity from other data. Having mechanisms to create de-identification and anonymization built into the structure works well and so on.
The Aadhaar model in India, another national identity system. has come up. I can corroborate what Mr. Vickery said about it. I've had students doing their own research who found these systems to be alarmingly easy to penetrate, at least in India. To have a digital model that does not also have a strong data protection regime on top of it is a risky endeavour. In some ways Estonia might be well-placed, because it has both this digital government and 20 or 30-year tradition of European data protection linked to it.
We also look at China as an extreme in the other direction, where a surveillance industry.... The distinction between private enterprise and the government is completely blurred and the use of surveillance for social control and social coercion is quite alarming. We do look at the new emerging privacy and data models around the world to figure out which places are figuring it out.