Information & Ethics Committee on Feb. 26th, 2019

[The Chair, Conservative, Bob Zimmer]

Good day. We'll call to order meeting number 138 of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(h)(iv), we are here for a briefing on the security and intelligence threats to elections task force.

Today we have with us the Honourable Karina Gould, Minister of Democratic Institutions, for the first hour.

For the second hour, we have André Boucher, assistant deputy minister, operations, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security; and Dan Rogers, deputy chief, SIGINT. From the Privy Council Office, we have Allen Sutherland, assistant secretary to cabinet, machinery of government and democratic institutions; and Ayesha Malette, senior policy analyst, democratic institutions.

Minister Gould, we'll start with you. Go ahead for 10 minutes.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Minister of Democratic Institutions]

Thank you for the invitation to address the committee today. It is my pleasure to appear and to tell you more about the government's plan to safeguard the 2019 election.

I am pleased to be joined by officials today to speak to the technical aspects of Canada's plan. As the chair mentioned, this includes Allen Sutherland, assistant secretary to cabinet, machinery of government and democratic institutions; Daniel Rogers, deputy chief of SIGINT with the Communications Security Establishment; André Boucher, the assistant deputy minister of operations for the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security; and Ayesha Malette, senior adviser with the democratic institutions secretariat of PCO.

Before I start, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of the committee for their contribution over the past year to the study of disinformation. The information and views of the witnesses and members have provided valuable insight as we continue our efforts to safeguard the 2019 election.

Elections are an opportunity for Canadians to be heard, for them to express concerns and opinions through one of the most fundamental rights—the right to vote. However, this election will also experience an unprecedented amount of scrutiny.

As we have seen over the past few years, democracies around the world have entered a new era—an era of heightened threat and heightened vigilance—and 2019 will see a number of countries brace for volleys of attempted disruption: India, Australia, Ukraine, Switzerland, Belgium, the EU and, of course, Canada. Evidence has confirmed that the most recent Canadian general election, in 2015, was unencumbered by interference, although there were some relatively primitive attempts to disrupt, misinform and divide. These efforts were few in number and uncoordinated, and had no visible impact on the voter, either online or in line.

This election may be different. We've seen that the tools that were used to strengthen civic engagement are being used to undermine, disrupt and destabilize democracy.

We expect that some so-called “hacktivist” groups will use their cyber capabilities to try to influence our democratic process.

We could also face coordinated attempts at interference by foreign state actors, similar to what we have seen in other democracies over the last few years. This could include attempts to influence candidates or to manipulate social media to spread false or misleading information.

In recent years, we have witnessed foreign actors looking to undermine democratic societies and institutions, electoral processes, sovereignty and security. The malicious, multi-faceted and ever-evolving tactics constitute a serious strategic threat. We must be prepared for this. That is why in 2017 I asked Canada's Communications Security Establishment to analyze and make public an assessment of the current risk of cyber-threats and possible hacking of Canada's democratic processes. The report, “Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process”, was published as the world's first publicly shared threat assessment of its kind. It identified how key aspects of the democratic process, such as elections, political parties, politicians and media, are vulnerable to cyber-threat activity and influence operations.

This assessment, along with ongoing Canadian intelligence, and the experiences of allies and like-minded jurisdictions around the world have informed and guided our efforts over the past year, and led to the development of a plan of action based on four pillars.

We recognize that protecting Canada's democratic institutions requires a whole-of-society approach. Therefore, in addition to reinforcing and protecting government infrastructure, systems and practices, we are also focusing heavily on preparing Canadians and working with digital platforms that have an important role in fostering positive democratic debate and dialogue.

The four pillars of our plan are enhancing citizen preparedness, improving organizational readiness, combatting foreign interference and expecting social media platforms to act.

I'd like to take a few minutes to highlight some of the most significant initiatives of our plan.

Under the first pillar, enhancing citizen preparedness, we announced the digital citizen initiative. Our commitment includes an investment of $7 million towards improving the resilience of Canadians against online disinformation. We will leverage the expertise of civil society organizations that are directly working in communities on this issue.

We are increasing the reach and focus of the “get cyber safe” national public awareness campaign to educate Canadians about cybersecurity and the simple steps they can take to protect themselves online.

We have established the critical election incident public protocol. This is a simple, clear and impartial process for informing Canadians if serious incidents threaten the integrity of the 2019 general election.

The critical election incident public protocol panel is made up of five senior officials. It is expected to come to a decision jointly, based on consensus.

It is important to point out that this is the reason for a panel of five senior officials. It will not be one person deciding what Canadians should know.

The protocol will only be initiated to respond to incidents that occur within the writ period that do not fall within Elections Canada's area of responsibility.

The threshold for informing the public will be very high and limited to addressing exceptional circumstances that could impair our ability to have a free and fair election. As such, the threshold must extend beyond the normal negative rhetoric that is sometimes associated with political campaigns.

I am thankful that, in consulting with political parties on the development of this protocol, partisanship has been put aside in the interest of fairness. Incorporating input from all parties has allowed for a fair process that Canadians can trust.

Under the second pillar, improving organizational readiness, our national security and intelligence agencies are supporting Elections Canada by providing advice and guidance to improve its preparedness in the face of any potential interference in the administration of elections. The CSE is also offering ongoing cybersecurity technical advice and guidance to political parties.

The security agencies will offer threat briefings to key leadership and political parties, and security clearances are being arranged for senior members in each party to give them access to the right information to help them to strengthen internal security practices and behaviours.

Under the third pillar—combatting foreign influence—the government has established the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, or SITE, to improve awareness of foreign threats and support assessment and response. The team brings together the Communications Security Establishment, or CSE, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or RCMP, as well as Global Affairs Canada, to ensure a comprehensive understanding of and response to any threats to Canada's democratic process.

Let me take a moment here to explain how the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol and the SITE Task Force are distinct yet related elements of our approach.

SITE ensures that the work of Canada's national security agencies is being done in a coordinated manner that aligns with the respective legal mandates of the agencies. Each of these agencies has their own practices for briefing up their internal organizational structures, including the heads of those agencies, as part of their regular operational practices. The Protocol will not change this.

The protocol will add a process for sharing relevant information with the panel of senior public service officials who will decide if incidents meet the threshold of interfering with Canada's ability to have a free and fair election.

When national security agency heads believe that some incident or incidents could potentially pose a threat to the integrity of Canada's upcoming federal election, they will coordinate with the national security and intelligence adviser to brief the panel accordingly, either through regular briefings or on an ad hoc basis, as is required.

We have activated the G7 rapid response mechanism, announced at the G7 leaders' summit in Charlevoix, to strengthen coordination among our G7 allies and to ensure that there is international collaboration and coordination in responding to foreign threats to democracy.

The fourth pillar is with respect to social media platforms.

I don't have to tell this committee that the face of mass media has turned from Gutenberg to Zuckerberg in a generation. It is a transformation for which the impact on society is impossible to overstate.

Social media and online platforms are the new arbiters of information and, therefore, have a responsibility to manage their communities. We know that they have also been manipulated to spread disinformation, create confusion and exploit societal tensions. The platforms have acknowledged the risk posed by misinformation and disinformation. I have been meeting with social media and digital platforms to secure action to increase transparency, improve authenticity and ensure greater transparency on their platforms.

Social media companies have reacted to the incidents of 2016 with some enhancements to their platforms. As a starting point, our government expects that those enhancements be made available to users in Canada as they have been made available to users in the U.S. and Europe.

This comprehensive plan is also bolstered by recent legislative efforts. Bill C-76, which received royal assent on December 13, 2018, takes important steps to counter foreign interference and the threats posed by emerging technologies.

Provisions in this bill include prohibiting foreign entities from spending any money to influence elections, where previously they were able to spend up to $500 unregulated; requiring organizations selling advertising space to not knowingly accept elections advertisements from foreign entities;

adding a prohibition regarding the “unauthorized use of computers” where there is intent to obstruct, interrupt or interfere with the lawful use of computer data during an election; and requiring online platforms to disclose the identity of advertisers by maintaining a publicly accessible registry of political ads published on the platform during the pre-election and the election.

It should be noted that Canada has a robust and highly respected elections administration body in Elections Canada. With the legislative, policy and programmatic efforts I have detailed for you today, Canada is in the best possible position to counter efforts to interfere in our democratic processes.

While it is impossible to fully predict what kinds of threats, if any, we will see in the run-up to Canada's general election, I want to assure this committee that Canada has put in place a solid plan. We continue to test and probe our readiness and will continue to take whatever steps we can toward ensuring a secure, free and fair election in 2019.

Thank you.

and I now welcome your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Bob Zimmer]

Thank you, Minister.

We'll start off the first seven-minute round with Ms. Vandenbeld.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

I want to thank you, Minister, for being here today and also for the incredible amount of work you've put into this, making Canada, I do believe, one of the first countries in the world to have these kinds of protocols.

Recently the all-party democracy caucus heard from Chris Walker, who has written on sharp power. This is power that some authoritarian regimes use. It's distinguished from soft power because it is subversive and it's intended to change public opinion or divide public opinion in other countries. When you mention the foreign threats, we're not unique. This is happening in countries around the world.

You mentioned the G7 rapid response mechanism. I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit on that and also the other ways in which Canada is collaborating with other democratic countries around the world to be able to combat this threat.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

It's interesting, this concept of sharp power. I hadn't heard that before, so I will look into that after this. If you have any information, please don't hesitate to send it.

With regard to our work in the G7, we are leading the Rapid Response Mechanism secretariat that will be hosted at Global Affairs Canada, which is looking at open source data to establish, first of all, a baseline when it comes to how social media is being manipulated with regard to foreign interference in specific domestic activities, although it could also be with regard to, for example, elements of Canada's foreign policy that create spikes.

When we engaged with the White Helmets in Syria, for example, there was evidence of interference from foreign actors who were trying to polarize the debate or spread misinformation in that regard.

This is also in line with our work as a member of NATO. NATO has the Strategic Communications Centre, which is actively looking at these items. Canada hosted NATO StratCom in the fall and provided an opportunity for our media partners to engage with them and to learn about some of the foreign interference activities that have taken place. NATO does this in all of its member countries, and it's open to the media to participate, should they be interested.

We're also a member of the Five Eyes, and as such we share information with regard to foreign threats and interference into our democracies. This is something that we, as western democracies and like-minded countries, talk about quite a lot. I have personally had conversations with counterparts in France, the U.K., Germany, Ukraine, Latvia, Australia and the list goes on and on and on, because this is something that all of us are taking very seriously. We've seen, time and time again, different instances in which there has been evidence of foreign interference in the elections of like-minded countries and allies.

That being said, we're still assessing the impact of that interference.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Our committee has heard a lot of testimony, as you know, about the ways in which data aggregators have influenced social media platforms, specifically in Brexit, but also in the U.S. election.

I notice that you have put in place the critical election incident public protocol. What would have been the impact in those countries or some of the others you mentioned, such as Ukraine or India, if something like that had been in place? I know it's hard to say, hypothetically, but in what ways could that have mitigated some of the things we saw happen?

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

Well, actually, I think we can point to a very real situation that is not hypothetical, in that we looked at allied countries and like-minded countries around the world to see what mechanisms they had and have in place.

What stuck out for me was the French example of the Conseil d'État, which weighed in when there was a leak from the Macron campaign to basically say that it was a threat against their democracy, and they advised the media not to report on it.

That's a step further than what this is anticipating. We tried to come up with something that would fit within the Canadian context. The Conseil d'État in France has been around for a very long time. The idea was to avoid the kind of bureaucratic gridlock that we saw, for example, in the United States in the 2016 presidential election, and to avoid having one individual law enforcement agency going out and saying something, and to try to create a process, and to announce that well in advance so that Canadians could understand the process that would lead to such an announcement, should it occur. The hope, of course, is that it won't occur and we won't need to use it, but it's always better to prepare and plan for the worst.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Obviously there would be a very high threshold set for when this might be implemented.

Can you give examples of the kinds of things that would trigger this mechanism?

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

I am cautious about doing that, because I think everything is very context-dependent, and I wouldn't want to prejudge the outcome of the panel and their decision.

However, I think it's safe to assume that some of the major incidents that we've seen around the world—for example, the Macron leaks or what the U.S. was grappling with at the time—would be things of sufficient value to inform Canadians. But, again, it will be very context-dependent and it will be within the context of the Canadian election, which is different.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Good.

In that case, my other question would be about the fact that there's multi-party involvement. What kinds of safeguards are there to make sure that this is completely non-partisan and completely neutral, and that no one political party would be able to manipulate that system?

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

Since the CSE put out the report in June 2017, we have been meeting with all of the major political parties represented in the House of Commons to facilitate a connection with CSE so that they can provide technical advice should parties choose to avail themselves of that. We're not informed of whether that relationship carries on or not. We simply facilitate the connection and have been meeting with political parties on an ongoing basis to build that trust.

As I mentioned in my remarks, I have been very encouraged by the fact that all of the major political parties represented in the House of Commons have really been at the table with regard to this. We will also be extending security clearance to all of the leaders represented in the House of Commons as well as three of their top campaign aides, and they will be briefed on an ongoing basis.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Bob Zimmer]

Next up, for seven minutes, is Mr. Kent.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you, Minister. Thank you to the officials who are here for the second hour.

I wonder if you have had time to read, first, the interim report that this committee filed last July, and then most recently, our final report in December entitled “Democracy Under Threat: Risks and Solutions in the Era of Disinformation and Data Monopoly”. It dealt very closely with the Cambridge Analytica-Facebook-AggregateIQ scandal, and associated attempts to interfere in elections in North America and Great Britain.

I wonder what your comments are on the recommendations of this committee and on previous recommendations in our review of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, the PIPEDA review that was done by this committee, which recommended greater order-making powers for the Privacy Commissioner and more substantial, more significant penalties for violations of Canadians' privacy, including with regard to the democratic electoral process.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

Yes, absolutely. I have read both of the reports. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, I thank the committee both because it's really good work and also because I think it was being done even before this became a really sexy topic. I congratulate you on that.

I would note that with regard to both of the reports, there are several items that have been addressed and incorporated, both in Bill C-76 as well as in our announcement a couple of weeks ago with regard to protecting democracy. For example, in the first report, recommendation 5 is captured in Bill C-76 as well as recommendations 7 and 8.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Bill C-76 doesn't cover foreign charitable funding through the CRA.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

Right, but to prevent foreign funding and influence in domestic elections.... Well, it's with regard to any foreign funding toward third parties or political parties or candidates.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Leadnow is funded by foreign charitable funds channelled through organizations like Tides Canada.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

I'm not sure that there's evidence of that, but that would be something—

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

We would refer you to the testimony in this committee of Ms. Vivian Krause.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

Again, we have the Commissioner of Canada Elections who would be responsible for investigating that. It is not something that has come up, and I would caution against those allegations, but I do think it is important to note that in Bill C-76, which was seen at the procedure and House affairs committee—and I see Ms. Kusie here who played a substantial role in that—we were able to have significant all-party consensus with regard to banning foreign funding with regard to third parties in our elections. That has been a very productive engagement.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

With regard to the critical election incident public protocol panel, I'm wondering why there are two significant omissions there in terms of the presence of the Chief Electoral Officer and the Privacy Commissioner, both of whom have much more relevance, I believe, with regard to the protection of privacy and the protection of the electoral process. Certainly these officials are well equipped with regard to foreign hacking and foreign electronic digital interference. In view of the recommendations that the Privacy Commissioner has been making for a couple of years, I'm surprised that he doesn't have a look-in on this panel.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

If I may, this panel is specifically put in place to deal with foreign threats to our democracy. We have Canadian legislation and mechanisms through the Commissioner of Canada Elections and the RCMP should there be a breach of Canadian law domestically. This is specifically with regard to foreign interference in the election. I would like to read the statement from the CEO of Elections Canada who, after the announcement, confirmed that he is an officer of Parliament and not a part of the Government of Canada:

In its preparations for the next federal election, Elections Canada has been working closely with the national security agencies and the Commissioner of Canada Elections. We rely on their expertise so we can focus on our primary objective: administering the election and ensuring Canadians know where, when, and ways to register and vote.

With regard to a matter of national security, that's where the Government of Canada and the whole-of-government approach, through this critical election incident public protocol, will come into play. However, with regard to the administration of the election, of course, the CEO of Elections Canada will remain the primary interlocutor that Canadians can trust and count on.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

With regard to this panel's activities in a situation during the writ period, which would involve something like the deepening SNC-Lavalin scandal—the Prime Minister's original claim regarding the media report of allegations of attempted obstruction of justice, political interference, pressure on the former Attorney General—this panel, given the clerk's testimony last week and if there was successive electronic retweeting of that story, would very possibly side with the government, as you said, and bring in to some doubt the ability of this panel.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

I should clarify, because at no point did I say that the clerk would side with the government on something that you said just now. What is important, and what I did say, was with regard to the fact that there would be a panel of five individuals who are senior public servants. They would be notified by the heads of the relevant national security agencies.

Should those heads of the national security agencies have sufficient reason to believe that there is an incident that merits their attention, that is of sufficient value, that it would impede the ability for free and fair elections, coming from a foreign threat, this panel of five would have to make a collective decision based on consensus as to whether or not they are going to inform the public

At the same time, all of the major political parties represented in the House of Commons, their leaders and up to three of their senior staff of their choosing will receive security clearances. They will all be briefed at the same time in terms of what is going on, so that we have transparency with regard to that and so that they have all of the same information coming to them. That is a very important element of this to ensure that everyone is getting information at the same time.