In the case of the U.K., not a lot is known about the internal ministry arrangements. Much of it gets done at the ministerial level. There is some control of information by various administrative bodies, and certainly the independent reviewer in the U.K. reviews the extent of information-sharing.
In Australia and New Zealand they have information-sharing arrangements between, for example, federal and state police and ASIO in the Australian environment. Information does, then, get to be shared.
From a comparative law perspective, whether their particular tests for sharing information comply with ours or not, I couldn't tell you offhand. I can find out, as could one of your clerks, I suppose, but my view would be that the test of relevancy is too low in our statute. The test should be that it be necessary, as Daniel Therrien mentioned in his evidence.
I want to round out by responding to something that some of the service witnesses said on this question, and that I think Scott Doran from the RCMP said as well: that there's the sense that no one is going to know in some other agency what CSIS's mandate is, so how do I know whether it's “necessary” for CSIS? How am I going to divine that?
If you look at their testimony, you will also see that they talked about these agencies' having sectors or groups within the agency for whom there's going to be training on how to comply with the statute. Well, if there's going to be training on how to comply with the statute, you can train them to understand what “necessary” means for CSIS. It's not rocket science. CSIS does it; they deploy it. Somebody sitting in Health Canada, then, or one of the other agencies—CRA, let's say—can learn what the mandate is and can apply it. It's not as if it's mysterious; it's just a matter of training.