This goes to the root of my concern. The target of information that would reach the threshold is so broad that it's not even broad: it's open-ended. It's already set up to become something quite amorphous.
At the lowest level, it could just be that they'll harvest all sorts of information and they won't know what to do with it. The worst-case scenario, as I've pointed out a couple of times, is that either we miss a terrorist or a national security threat because there's so much information there, or else that we make mistakes and share collected information and mined data abroad and create a disaster for individual Canadians.
If I were rewriting this, I would just start again. It's a short bill, so you just start again. As I answered to Mr. Blaikie, you'd lay out those principles. You'd start with a very tight definition. I believe Mr. Erskine-Smith mentioned the section 2 definition in the CSIS Act; I think that's a good start, because if this is a national security information sharing bill, let's tie it to national threats to the security of Canada. That's the remit of CSIS, and that's a pretty broad definition in itself. That brings us to a nice tight definition, and then of course there's laying out the protocols and safety measures. I think that would do it. That would regularize and give us some coherence in national security information sharing.
As well, though it's not for a bill, a lot of work needs to go into making the agencies work together in a coherent way and into improving that review over time.