Information & Ethics Committee on May 21st, 2024

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Okay.

Ms. Giles, you mentioned that non-state actors are using these techniques. It's possible that Canadian actors might be using these tactics. Theoretically, political parties could also use these tactics. Is that correct?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

Theoretically, anyone can use these tactics.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Okay.

I'll give you a couple of examples, but again, these are hypothetical. I would like to know whether they are disinformation, misinformation or malinformation.

If a political party uses a narrative that intentionally omits certain aspects, is that misinformation, disinformation or malinformation?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

It depends on the intent.

Mr. Basler, would you like to answer the question?

[Bo Basler]

As Ms. Giles stated, it absolutely depends on the intent. When we distinguish misinformation from disinformation, we are focused on misinformation, which is the spread of incorrect information. That may be a very organic spread of information through a media ecosystem or through a community.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Providing information to confuse people is a form of malinformation. I'm assuming you could also include omission, exaggeration and falsehoods. Those are forms of disinformation, right?

[Bo Basler]

For the service, the definition that we use, when we're looking at disinformation, is one where we're looking at information that is intentionally spread to misinform. For example, there may be actors saying that they're going to create a false narrative and they're going to spread that false narrative to achieve a certain objective.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Okay.

If I understand correctly, it can be a Canadian or foreign state actor or non-state actor. It can also be through social media or any other dissemination method.

[Bo Basler]

Absolutely, they could be any actors that you mentioned, although for the service's mandate, we're focusing only on those actors that are within our mandate. For us, we're focusing on violent extremists, or foreign governments that are spreading misinformation.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

The topic before us this morning is the impact of disinformation and misinformation on the work of parliamentarians.

Ms. Giles and Mr. Basler, what public policy recommendations would you make to parliamentarians to help them avoid the harmful effects of malinformation, disinformation and misinformation?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

That's another very good question.

Again, I will highlight the importance of ensuring that public information is properly understood and properly used.

This in order to ensure that parliamentarians understand the threats and are able to ensure their protection against them.

I would also encourage the continued engagement between the security and intelligence sector and the Government of Canada with parliamentarians to ensure those briefings continue to take place. That is certainly a focus for CSIS. There are some public policy gaps that exist, including in the CSIS Act and the legislation that the government has introduced. Bill C-70 will go some way in helping to address those gaps.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Could you send us some written examples of public policies that we could study in order to reduce the impacts? Bill C‑70 has not yet been passed. What does CSIS suggest?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

We would be very pleased to provide you with that information.

Much of what you'll see is the advice that has been manifested, both from CSIS as well as from what we heard from Canadians when we conducted consultations over several months on proposed changes to the CSIS Act. That's reflected, currently, in Bill C-70. The changes that are being proposed to the CSIS Act, especially as they relate to enhancing our ability to provide information and intelligence outside the federal government, will help further build the resilience of parliamentarians and Canadians.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Villemure.

We're going to go to Mr. Green now for six minutes.

Go ahead, Mr. Green.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

I'd like to pick up on my friend Mr. Villemure's line of questioning. Ms. Giles, you mentioned that there are some policy gaps in Bill C-70 and that Bill C-70 had addressed some of those. Can you identify what the gaps are, what gaps you feel have been addressed, and which gaps remain?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

Thank you very much for the question, and it's nice to see you again, although virtually.

The fundamental challenge is that the CSIS Act tool kit is old and predates the digital age. That's why it urgently needs to be updated. The conversation we've been having, where the milieu, for example, of misinformation is focused on social media, speaks to how big those gaps are and the challenge in having it predate the digital age. The information sharing to build resilience on threats outside the government in Canada is one of the largest gaps that we see, and that's also what we heard from Canadians. That, we believe, is very well addressed in Bill C-70.

The other challenge that we're experiencing is that there are some gaps in CSIS's ability to operate in a digital world. For example, we are missing some modern investigative techniques that most of our Five Eyes intelligence partners have in addition to law enforcement, such as production and preservation orders. Those are also being proposed as part of Bill C-70, as well as closing the foreign intelligence gap that's currently created by the borderless nature of data.

We'd be very happy to give a more in-depth briefing to parliamentarians on the elements of the CSIS Act that are included in Bill C-70. We did so a couple of weeks ago, but we'd be very pleased to have another session.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

I'm to take it that you're not necessarily identifying further gaps for fear that it may compromise the service in some way, or did I just miss that?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

No, there is, I think, a constant opportunity to improve the legislation, policy principles, policies, procedures and programs that we have in place. We need to constantly be learning and adapting.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Ms. Giles, respectfully, that is a lot of words. I'm going to ask you a question for the purpose of the committee. I don't say that disrespectfully, but I'm trying to elicit a direct answer from you. It is this: What recommendations would you provide to this committee that we could provide to that process to help strengthen it against the threat of foreign interference, given the context of this study?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

With regard to helping counter the threat of foreign interference, I'll go back to my opening remarks. The biggest defence we have is to ensure that there is awareness and sufficient information, so that parliamentarians and Canadians can identify the threat and know how to defend themselves against it. It's that awareness piece, that constant engagement piece.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

In relation to that awareness, there were, I think, some identified gaps in responding to individual parliamentarians being notified that they were targeted. Has that since been corrected? Is that something that has been addressed, or have you updated your policies in terms of when parliamentarians might be identified as being the targets of foreign interference?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

I think the reference is to the ministerial directive that was issued last year, which encouraged CSIS to continue to engage and brief parliamentarians. We have been taking a different approach as the attention on this issue has increased, and we've diverted some increased resources to that. However, I would stress that we were, and always have been, briefing parliamentarians on threats.

I think how threats are perceived is sometimes a bit misunderstood in terms of when things reach a threat to the security of Canada as defined by the CSIS Act, and that's when it becomes our responsibility.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

That's fair. I appreciate that.

We've spent a lot of time talking about the threat actors targeting Canadian parliamentarians. Can you speak about any work you may have encountered or thoughts you may have on corporate interference? What I mean by that is this: While it is true that state actors and non-state actors, violent extremists and others that you have identified might use these tools on certain political agendas, ideologically extreme agendas, has there been any thought on where multinational corporations also use misinformation, disinformation and malinformation for the purposes of their pecuniary interests, their financial gains? I reference the kind of money that's put in through a lot of back channels, astroturf campaigns, online campaigns, etc. I know I get targeted by them myself around the oil and gas sector as it relates to climate change denial.

Is there any thought about corporate actors in relation to foreign interference?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

That's another very thoughtful question.

One thing we try to recall is that the People's Republic of China does not really distinguish between private companies that operate from within China, state-owned enterprises, and using whatever means they can to try to further the strategic objectives of the Communist Party of China.

We see corporate actors out of the PRC using all means and various techniques at their disposal to try to further the objectives of the Communist Party of China.

One thing is, when it comes to the more criminal-related aspects of that, it falls outside the CSIS mandate.