Information & Ethics Committee on March 10th, 2023

[Ai-Men Lau]

I would agree with Cherie on that.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

I have one last point.

I couldn't agree more with your third recommendation in terms of engaging with diaspora communities, and for our intelligence services to have a better and deeper relationship to make sure that they have a fuller understanding of what is felt on the ground.

Very briefly, what recommendation would you have for us for making sure that our intelligence agencies do have connections? What steps can they take to have a connection with diaspora communities?

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

This will have to be very brief.

[Ai-Men Lau]

First and foremost, it's having the understanding that the diaspora is not a monolithic community. We have Chinese Canadians who have histories with Canada for a very long time and then we have newcomers from all over the world.

It's understanding that the Chinese Canadian community may not have ties to the PRC, as well as understanding that, linguistically, Chinese is not the sole language of these groups.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you.

Mr. Villemure, you have the floor for six minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I will put my first question to Ms. Lau.

In your opinion, is the Government of Canada doing enough to make the members of the diaspora feel confident?

[Ai-Men Lau]

I would say that we certainly could take more steps.

I would really like to go back and highlight the point that we're asked to comment on certain tactics, but we should also be part of the solution moving forward. I would say that when we take a whole-of-society approach, you also need to centre the Chinese diaspora in these conversations and also engage with us to help come up with solutions.

Additionally, this includes not just the diaspora, but other targeted communities and the ones that are most vulnerable. One reason that we may be feeling ignored right now is that certainly there is a dominant voice. Today, it is very heartening to see that we have a diversity of voices coming to panels like this, but we definitely need to think about how the diaspora can help support addressing foreign interference.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much, Ms. Lau.

Ms. Wong, in the brief you filed, you talk about tactics used by the Chinese Communist Party. You list seven of them.

Could you briefly go through those seven tactics, to help us understand them a little better?

[Cherie Wong]

Absolutely.

I think, particularly in relation to this conversation, we recorded various acts of political influence and elite capture. These activities are aimed at powerful people in this country, particularly at the lower levels of governance, such as school boards, municipalities and regional governance. The goal is not necessarily to advance certain candidates but to achieve a more favourable environment for Beijing. That includes the private sector in China.

Another is the information and this narrative-discursion strategy. I think Cheuk earlier spoke about the astroturfing that exists in community spaces. That type of astroturfing happens in the media and in public discourse. United Front agents aim to present themselves as the sole voice and the sole authority on Chinese communities. They try to dominate the conversation and turn it into a more favourable narrative for Beijing.

Another very key section that this committee should definitely review is the United Front Work Department. It is not just a state agency but actually a party agency of the Chinese Communist Party. It aims to influence and expand the loyalty towards Beijing. It is occurring at all levels of government. It is happening globally, as well. We can learn from our partners on the global stage where and when we can counter United Front activities.

The other ones I think are pretty obvious: the harassment and intimidation facing diaspora communities. This continues to be a very huge challenge and concern for us. We'll see whether there will be safety for diaspora communities after they speak out. It's quite concerning.

The last one I would like to go over quickly is academic influence and vulnerability on intellectual property transfer. Due to the vulnerable funding environment in Canada, a lot of the time the CCP utilizes its capital and resources so that it is able to fund specific research in Canadian institutions. In the end, it'll be able to trade the intellectual property for a very low cost.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

In your report you also mention that many people are afraid to criticize the Chinese government because it could cost them career or business opportunities.

On a macroeconomic level, do you believe that Canada is too dependent on its economic relationship with China and that this prevents it from acting in certain circumstances?

[Cherie Wong]

I think it's true to say that there is a level of dependency on the community level. Due to the underfunding of diaspora and racialized communities, we often have to look elsewhere for funding resources. That becomes a point of vulnerability where we're able to obtain funding from less reliable or suspicious sources.

That goes for every sector in Canada, really. In academic institutions, when researchers lack funding, they look for funding elsewhere. Whoever gives them the most funding for the least amount of burden.... That becomes a very vulnerable position for Canadians and Canadian institutions.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

In a few words, since I don't have much time left, could you describe the purpose of the Chinese Communist Party when it carries out such interference?

[Cherie Wong]

There is a global ambition that is being intensified under the current CCP leadership. It's not only to seek ideological alliance. It's really about advancing its economic and political power globally. We see that in various means, not only through foreign influence and interference but also through the economic investments that it's undertaking. Examples are its belt and road initiative and its Arctic silk road initiative. Really, it's just trying to expand its powers where possible, challenge international norms and ultimately aim to rewrite them.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Ms. Wong.

We have Mr. Green next for six minutes.

Go ahead, Mr. Green.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Welcome to all the witnesses, some of whom I've engaged with directly, and I'm certainly familiar with your work.

Ms. Wong, in the CBC article entitled, “We know where your parents live”, Hong Kong activists say that the Canadian police are helpless against online threats. You recounted the threats you've received and the inability of police to hold those accountable.

I wanted to bring that up, because this tactic was also referenced, I think, in our previous panel as well. I can imagine how unsettling that would be for anybody, specifically people who might have family back home or even receive threats here locally that might be veiled.

Can you describe the impacts of our law enforcement's being unable to help when it comes to doxing or any other forms of harassment?

[Cherie Wong]

First and foremost, we live in a country where there's a long history of systemic and institutionalized violence towards racialized peoples. I think, particularly for the Chinese community, many of us are still fresh with the memories of head tax and other forms of exclusion.

To begin with, there is a level of distrust and a level of insecurity to approach the police on this issue. On the other hand, when our fellow activists like Cheuk—and I'm fairly new at this compared to activists like Cheuk—tell me that they've been reporting acts of harassment and intimidation, that they've been reporting since the 1990s, and no action has been taken, then it really deters me from ever going to the police in the first place.

I, however, have reported one of my incidents to the Vancouver Police Department, who didn't even bother enough to meet me in person to talk about the threat that I faced that day. I think in that moment I realized that policing is not the solution to the threats and intimidation we are facing.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

I can certainly appreciate that perspective.

Previous testimony suggested that resources be made available perhaps to help scan phones and devices and provide technological solutions for counter-intelligence, basically to help in a defensive role.

I want to try to ensure that we have some good recommendations coming forward about things that we can control as a Canadian government versus things that just might be out there on the Internet and so on and so forth.

One of your recommendations also included increasing government funding for grassroots and diasporic organizations. Has your organization considered ways within your own community that you can help keep yourselves safe in terms of providing resources to community members that might be beneficial for, as you referenced, your Internet, the potential for surveillance and that type of thing, kind of countersurveillance measures that we might be able to help support?

[Cherie Wong]

I really appreciate what you mentioned. Having someone who could help check our phones and help check our cybersecurity network, I think that's something that most dissidents—almost all dissidents—would take advantage of. We do not have any guidelines aside from what we develop. It is community knowledge that allows us to help each other right now.

For our organization, we have certain security measures that we ask all of our volunteers to follow such as having a VPN, having an alias email and having a second phone, if necessary. These are all extra steps that require resources and dedicated funding, and it is simply not possible for all dissidents and all Chinese Canadians to have all of these resources so they can protect themselves. I think there needs to be a bit more of a systemic change and attitude change in how we address these types of issues.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Mr. Chu, from your life's work, can you comment on other resources that might be made available to folks in the diaspora who are living here that might be helpful in countersurveillance types of efforts, or I should say an effort to defend against foreign surveillance and foreign intimidation?

[Bill Chu]

I think in our work we constantly run into the almost dysfunctional narrative between the RCMP and CSIS, both of which are supposed to work together, but we find that there's a big gap there. We complain to the RCMP, but nothing really happens, as the others have mentioned.

As far as CSIS is concerned, they are also painfully aware that some of their research and information did not really trickle down to all the politicians.

I think, right off the bat, that it's also the system itself that is not functioning well.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Can I ask a question specific to that? Please feel free not to answer, as I don't want to put anybody in jeopardy asking this.

Could it be helpful or has it ever been the case...does CSIS ever let folks in your community know that they're a target? Is that information ever shared? That might help them safeguard.... Is that something you might think could be helpful if they had information to share with you as a target or is that maybe a national security kind of...?

[Bill Chu]

I think for the average Chinese Canadian, they are not aware of the exact role of CSIS. Most people, if they ever got threatened, would go to the RCMP, but if they approach the RCMP and it doesn't go anywhere, as far as they are concerned, then they lose trust in the system.

That rebuilding of the trust is very important. It goes right up to the top, including what our Prime Minister has been responding with, which is very disappointing to say the least.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Green.

Thank you, Mr. Chu.

That concludes our first round of questioning. This is just a reminder that we're going to go Conservative, Liberal and then two and a half, and two and a half, for the Bloc and the NDP. That will be the end of the panel.

I know Mr. Villemure has something he'd like to say at the end.

Mr. Kurek, I have you on the list.

Mr. Barrett, go ahead.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

I'm going to split my time with Mr. Kurek.

If you'll just indulge me, first I'm going to give notice of motion:

That the Committee, in relation to its study of foreign interference, invite Katie Telford, Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister, to appear alone for three hours, provided that she be sworn or affirmed.

I'll turn the floor over to Mr. Kurek.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you.

The notice of motion is accepted.

Go ahead, Mr. Kurek.