Information & Ethics Committee on March 10th, 2023

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Good morning, everyone.

I'm going to call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 61 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022. Members can attend in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application. Should any difficult and technical challenges arise, please advise me. Please note that we may need to suspend for a few minutes to ensure that all members are able to participate fully.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(h) and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, December 7, 2022, the committee is commencing its study of foreign interference and threats to the integrity of democratic institutions, intellectual property and the Canadian state.

The committee has a routine motion concerning connection tests for witnesses.

Pursuant to that motion, I am informing you that all of the witnesses completed the required connection tests before the meeting.

Everybody's connection is perfect.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses for the first hour. As an individual, we have Gabrielle Lim, doctoral fellow, Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, who is with us today on Zoom. We welcome, from the Toronto Association for Democracy in China, Cheuk Kwan, co-chair. From the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, we have Mehmet Tohti, the executive director.

Ms. Lim, we're going to start with you. You have up to five minutes for your opening statement.

[Gabrielle Lim, Doctoral Fellow, Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual]

Good morning. I'm Gabrielle Lim, a doctoral fellow at the Citizen Lab. I'm also a researcher at the Harvard Shorenstein Center. My research focuses primarily on information technology, civil liberties and security, with a specialization in mis- and disinformation.

While the views I present are my own, they are based on research carried out by me and my colleagues. The following comments will briefly cover some of the effects of foreign interference, the contributing factors that give rise to their effectiveness and recommendations.

Firstly, I want to stress that evidence of activity is not evidence of impact. For example, although it has been suggested that the Russian-based Internet Research Agency influenced U.S. public opinion, there is little evidence of a direct impact on the U.S. 2016 presidential election. The bulk of their activity was actually engaged in audience building. When compared with the volumes of media consumed by the average American across the mainstream, independent and social media, Russian-sponsored activities were but a small fraction. As such, we should avoid exaggeration when discussing such activities. To do otherwise risks undermining trust in our elections and sowing division amongst ourselves, including potentially alienating certain communities and increasing xenophobia.

Secondly, I would like to draw attention to a different kind of foreign interference—digital transnational repression—namely, foreign-directed digital operations that target individuals in Canada's diaspora communities. In other words, this is happening on our land. This could include online stalking, harassment, threats, often gender-based attacks, hacking attempts and other forms of intimidation. These may start off digitally, but often cross over into the real world.

Even though transnational digital repression remains understudied, there is very strong evidence of its negative impact. My colleagues at Citizen Lab have documented its effects on mental health, self-censorship and fear of political participation. I highlight transnational repression because while it is a form of foreign interference, it shouldn't be equated with, say, online information ops that seek to sway large audiences, or some of the direct influencing of political parties that's being alleged. It's a very different beast, and I just want to stress that.

Thirdly, I'd like to address some of the risk factors that make individuals susceptible to foreign-operated misinformation or foreign influence operations. Online influence operations can be thought of as an issue of supply and demand. From the supply side, we have foreign actors producing and distributing content targeted at Canadians. But we can also conceptualize influence ops as a result of the demand, where certain communities or individuals might be predisposed to receiving and believing false or misleading information. This might stem from long-standing grievances, discrimination or other forms of marginalization and inequality.

Mitigations against potentially harmful influence operations, then, require addressing these grievances and inequities among Canadians because as long as these social cleavages are left to fester, adversaries will be motivated to exploit them. As an example, the Nazis exploited racism in the U.S. as part of their propaganda during World War II, and the same divisions were exploited again by the Russians in an attempt to further divide Americans in 2016.

Lastly, I just want to say that you should exercise great caution if you're considering any legislation. Some of my colleagues and I have documented over 60 countries that have enacted laws regarding misinformation or foreign online operations, and truly there is no good evidence that they are effective. Instead they tend to face mounting criticism by activists and rights groups that they have the effect of silencing dissent and critical voices. If Canada also tightened control over the Internet this would legitimize illiberal and authoritarian-leaning governments' own censorship-enabling laws.

Introducing information controls through legislation also risks playing into Russia and China's desire that information security, the control of information available to their publics, is a legitimate practice in both democratic and non-democratic states alike. The ceding of democratic rights to speak and access information to state monitors is antithetical to the open Internet and the democratic norms Canada has staked its reputation on. Moreover, such information controls would likely do little to stop foreign interference.

I would advise exploring alternative policies, such as finding ways to build trust in our institutions and media, better connecting with diaspora communities, supporting targeted individuals and exploring ways to address the for-profit models that drive our media ecosystem. Should legislative mechanisms be considered, we should be wary of how this might affect already victimized or targeted individuals and communities.

In conclusion, while we should not dismiss the potential effects that foreign interference has on our democratic processes, we should not exaggerate their impact and should discern between the different types of interference and their effects. Our response should reflect sound analysis and evidence. To do otherwise would risk imposing ineffective information controls, lending legitimacy to illiberal states to engage in censorship and surveillance, while simultaneously failing to build resiliency and trust in our government.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Ms. Lim. I know five minutes is a short time, and you really packed it in there. Thank you for that.

Mr. Kwan, who is the co-chair of the Toronto Association for Democracy in China, sir, you have five minutes to address the committee.

[Cheuk Kwan, Co-Chair, Toronto Association for Democracy in China]

Good morning, Mr. Chair.

The Toronto Association for Democracy in China was founded on the eve of the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 4, 1989. Our organization supports democracy and advocates for human rights in China. As well, in recent years, we have been a watchdog for Chinese interference on Canadian soil.

The first foray by China to exert soft power on Canadian society occurred in the early 1990s when China was eager to polish its international image post-Tiananmen Square. Urged on and supported by Chinese consulates, organizations were set up by individuals who were sympathetic to the regime. Chief among them are the National Congress of Chinese Canadians, NCCC, and its successor, the Confederation of Toronto Chinese Canadian Organizations, CTCCO. These and many other proxy organizations practice the art of astroturfing and echoing the party line to defend China's foreign and domestic policies.

In addition to engaging friendly academics and business people to advocate on its behalf, China also spreads its tentacles to cultivate elected officials and infiltrate political institutions at all levels of Canadian society. All of this is documented in journalist Jonathan Manthrope's book, Claws of the Panda.

One of these instruments of interference is the United Front Work Department. According to official documents, United Front takes special interest in people of Chinese descent living abroad, viewing them as powerful external threats, as well as potential allies. It also employs thousands of agents to pursue the Chinese Communist Party's political strategy to use international networks to advance its global interests. It also harasses and intimidates Canadians who are critical of China—activists, dissidents and human rights defenders—rendering the Chinese Canadian community the real victims of this game.

We were therefore not surprised by the findings of the recent CSIS report. There's no doubt that the interference in Canadian electoral process is of grave concern, but I argue that this is but the tip of the iceberg. China's interference in Canada has been soft, intangible and gradual. As a result, this build-up over the years—the 90% of the iceberg, if you will—remains invisible to many Canadians.

Irrespective of whether the past elections have been fair or not, I argue that this invisible part of the iceberg should be the focus of our concern.

In 2017, the Canadian Coalition on Human Rights in China, together with Amnesty International, gathered evidence of harassment and intimidation by the Chinese government on individuals in Canada working on China-related human rights concerns and published the “Harassment and Intimidation” report. The report also urged the government to set up a national hotline to allow for the reporting of these harassment and intimidation incidents that are otherwise ignored by the local police or the RCMP.

We therefore urge Canada to address China's interference on these multiple fronts: Take a strong and principled stance on the issues highlighted in the CSIS reporting, establish a national reporting hotline on harassment and intimidation, and set up a foreign agent registry, similar to the one in Australia.

While these actions may not completely eliminate the problem, at least they can act as a deterrent and serve notice to foreign powers and their proxies that we guard our democratic institutions and our sovereignty seriously.

At this time I would like to add a few lines that are not in my prepared statement.

I just watched the live press conference carried out by Minister Mendicino, in which the establishment of a foreign agent registry is seen as an attack on the Chinese Canadian community. Let me assure you, this is not the case.

The Chinese Canadian community, together with our Uighur community, Tibetan community and other people, welcome this foreign agent registry. A registry on foreign agents is not the same as a registry on all Chinese Canadians.

I welcome your further questions on this.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Kwan.

Mr. Tohti, you have five minutes to address the committee, sir.

[Mehmet Tohti, Executive Director, Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning to everyone. Thanks for this invitation.

My name is Mehmet Tohti, and I call myself a lifelong activist. I currently work as executive director of the Ottawa-based Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project. As a leading voice of Uighur Canadians, we do research, documentation and advocacy work to promote the rights of Uighurs and other Turkic people in East Turkestan who are facing ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity by the Government of China.

I would make one quick note here. We are Uighur Canadians, not members of the Chinese diaspora. It is precisely because we refuse to become Chinese and to assimilate into Chinese culture by stubbornly preserving our ethnic, religious and linguistic identities that we are subjected to ongoing genocide in China. Similarly in that regard, Tibetans and Mongols are also not identifying themselves as Chinese Canadians or as members of the Chinese diaspora.

The topic of Chinese state interference is not a novelty for us. For decades, Uighur Canadians have been subjected to all forms of intimidation and harassment by the Chinese Communist Party. Since my exile life began more than 33 years ago, I personally have experienced all forms of China’s interference in my personal life, including total isolation from my family members and siblings in East Turkestan, constant threats, intimidation and harassment.

In December 2003, China’s Ministry of Public Security announced the first batch on the so-called terrorist organizations list. An organization that I chaired at the time, called the World Uyghur Youth Congress, registered in Germany, was included on the terrorist list. Because of that misinformation and attack against us, I personally am banned or cannot travel to many states, such as Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan or central Asian states and Middle Eastern countries. For the past 32 years since I left my homeland, I have been unable to visit my relatives. They cannot come and visit me in Canada. No one in my family has been given a visa. That’s why I call it total isolation.

Exactly 17 years ago, I engaged in the case of the Uighur Canadian Huseyin Celil, who was kidnapped in Uzbekistan and sentenced to life in prison in China. I started noticing suspicious activities around me after my campaign.

I would like to give you a comparison of what we are talking about today and what the topic was 16 years ago. This is a passage from the Maclean’s magazine coverage by Charlie Gillis, dated May 14, 2007. The headline of the article is “Beijing is always watching”:

The official, who identified himself only as a member of China's infamous Overseas Affairs Commission, had a laundry list of instructions. Tohti was to cease efforts to draw sympathy in Canada to the Uyghurs—the oppressed, largely Muslim population of Xinjiang province that has become a thorn in Beijing's side; he was to stop spreading allegations of cultural genocide against the People's Republic; most importantly, he was not to attend an upcoming conference in Germany where Uyghur groups from around the world planned to form an international congress. “We have your mother here, and your brother, too,” he added cryptically, noting that police had driven the pair some 260 km to a regional police headquarters in Kashgar to help deliver Beijing's message. “We can do whatever we want.”

Indeed. In the three years since that night, the 43-year-old Tohti has had enough brushes with China's long-armed security apparatus to conclude Beijing's agents are still doing much as they please—not just in China, but [here] in Canada....

I would refer that to you for a later read.

In July 2020, right before testifying before a parliamentary committee, I received a Twitter message that said, “YOUR F*** MOTHER IS DEAD”. It came from someone in Kunming city, nearly 4,000 kilometres from where my mother lived, just to stop me from testifying before the parliamentary committee.

I'll give you another recent example. On January 16, less than two months ago, I received a phone call again from the Chinese state police in Urumchi, who had taken my uncle, my mother’s brother, hostage.

I was told that my two sisters were dead, and so was my mother. The whereabouts of my three brothers, their spouses and children are unknown.

It was 15 days prior to the vote on Motion M-62 in the House for the resettlement of 10,000 Uighur refugees. That was the campaign I started in 2017. Beijing is watching every day. There are threats, intimidation and harassment.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Tohti.

I really appreciate your words and the opening statements of all of our witnesses today. I know our committee members are going to have lots of questions. I hate the committee process because of the timelines, but we do have six minutes in the first round. I'm going to have to stick to that because we do have another full panel after our first round is complete.

We're going to start with Mr. Barrett for six minutes.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Ms. Lim, Mr. Tohti and Mr. Kwan, for joining us today.

I note that doing so is not without personal risk and that it's never easy for one to appear in front of a parliamentary committee, particularly given the situation you've just outlined, Mr. Tohti. The gravity of this is not lost on us.

My first question is for you, Mr. Tohti.

What does the Communist regime in Beijing do to the Uighur people in Canada, and why do they do that?

[Mehmet Tohti]

The Communist regime in Beijing is not a democratically elected regime. That regime is not accountable to its people. It acts like a criminal organization.

For that regime, it is important to keep the Uighurs and the other people under their control, and for that reason, they take our family members hostage—I'm speaking on behalf of Uighur Canadians—just to control our life here in Canada. Even in the democratic and free country we live in here in Canada, Uighur Canadians are not free just because of the Chinese pressure and the Chinese threat of taking hostage their family members hostage.

Basically, they don't want the Uighur Canadians to exercise their right to protest and to exercise their right to speak about the atrocity of the crimes the Chinese Communist Party is committing. That is the biggest threat for the Chinese government, and for that reason, these kinds of peaceful activities are regarded as matters of national security, and for that reason, they apply very harsh measures to crack down.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Kwan, you have talked about some of the coercion that Beijing uses. Can you share some examples of how the Communist regime in Beijing attempts to coerce and intimidate Chinese Canadians?

[Cheuk Kwan]

I can share many incidents with you. Just to illustrate the kind of strong arm of the law, if you will, of the Chinese here in Canada and the kind of subtle way they can do this by exerting fear on the Chinese Canadian community, in a very typical example, you get a phone call, not just in the middle of the night but also in the middle of the day and they say, “So, how are your parents doing back in Sichuan, China?” and then you get the message. That means that if you don't behave, your parents' phone numbers, address, or even their physical well-being is under threat.

In that sense, the threat is very subtle, and they've used this on many Chinese Canadians. I'm sure they have done this to Mr. Tohti as well. This is something that I can vouch for.

In a very innocuous kind of way, they did to me. I was travelling to Hong Kong for a cultural event. I'm a filmmaker. I went to a film festival in Hong Kong to present my film, and I was followed in Hong Kong, back in 2005. I was questioned during the Q and A period by what seemed to be an agent of the Chinese Communist regime. These are little things that they do: “You know that I know that you know that I'm watching you”. That's the kind of way in which they exert pressure on you.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Thank you.

You have talked about observations that you have suspected, or you've spoken to media about suspected interference by the regime in Beijing in the electoral process in Canada—specifically, federal nominations. I believe that in one instance you were talking about busloads of people who had been sent to a nomination as arranged by agents of Beijing operating in Canada.

With about a minute left, could you tell us about that?

[Cheuk Kwan]

It's standard modus operandi. Chinese consulates may not do it directly. They have their proxies as a wink-wink thing. This is business people arranging for buses and paying stipends, something like $20 or $50 a day, to bus in people either to nomination meetings or to do counterprotesting. We have seen this in one of the fights at the Toronto District School Board, where they bused international students from Waterloo and from Guelph into Toronto to do this kind of thing.

This is something that I have seen first-hand and this is something that I have been told about first-hand by many other ridings as well.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

I think that's my time. We will come back to it.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Barrett.

Mr. Fergus, you're next for six minutes.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

I normally ask my questions in French.

I will speak in English for my guests here today.

First of all, thank you very much for your testimony, both Mr. Tohti and Mr. Kwan, as well as our guest from the Munk School.

I think I'm going to start with you, Mr. Kwan, if I could. You talked about how the United Front Work Department, UFWD, had come together to engage in astroturfing. Can you give us a recent example of astroturfing?

[Cheuk Kwan]

The astroturfing during the head tax redress fight, in which the Chinese Canadian community asked the government to pay restoration and apologize for the Chinese Exclusion Act and its head tax, was a campaign that was carried out over 20 years before that by people in the Chinese Canadian community. I represented one of the organizations, the main organization at that time, to lead this fight.

As I mentioned, right after Tiananmen Square, the Chinese set up an umbrella organization called the National Congress of Chinese Canadians, NCCC. They usurped the issue by themselves, which they have no connection to. These are recent Chinese immigrants. They have nothing to do with the Chinese Exclusion Act, and yet they took up the topic. They issued press releases. They formed over 300 proxy organizations, registered with Corporations Canada, some of which share directors and postal addresses and so forth.

These are examples of astroturfing. They set up these fake organizations, issue press releases and have press conferences.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

I'm glad that you keep track and that your organization keeps track of examples of foreign interference. I don't need you to get into detail about it today, but would you feel comfortable with providing the committee with examples of these organizations that you feel are acting in that way?

[Cheuk Kwan]

It would be my pleasure to do that.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

That would be great.

When you track those organizations, do you also track the members of the boards of directors of these organizations, of the leadership?

[Cheuk Kwan]

Yes.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Would you be comfortable sharing that with us as well?

[Cheuk Kwan]

It has been so long. I certainly will try my best.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Okay. That's an interesting question: Are there recent examples that your organization tracks?

[Cheuk Kwan]

Not our organization, but certainly I can get you the information if you would like.