Evidence of meeting #63 for Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was interference.
A video is available from Parliament.
9:20 a.m.
Conservative
Michael Barrett Conservative Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON
Okay. I see Mr. Stanton is nodding.
Sir, are you familiar with that case?
9:20 a.m.
Former Executive Manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
Yes, very much. I was following it quite closely, so I read all the media on it.
9:20 a.m.
Conservative
Michael Barrett Conservative Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON
Okay, so you're aware that House of Commons Speaker Hoyle issued an alert to members of Parliament to warn against interaction with Ms. Lee.
9:20 a.m.
Former Executive Manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
Yes.
9:20 a.m.
Conservative
Michael Barrett Conservative Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON
Here's a similar situation: Are you aware of an alert that was issued by the Speaker as a result of information from MI5 concerning Russian influence attempts the year prior?
9:20 a.m.
Former Executive Manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
If I'm thinking about the same one, there was a case in Britain, and I think MI5 was involved. However, I think, from what I read in the media, it's of questionable accuracy whether this.... This was, I think, a British subject who claimed that he reported to MI5 and it didn't take seriously what he was saying.
9:20 a.m.
Conservative
Michael Barrett Conservative Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON
No, the case that I'm referring to was influence activities targeting 100 members of the U.K. House of Commons by Russian state actors looking to colour their perspective of the activities of the Government of Ukraine.
However, we'll stick with the situation that you're familiar with—
9:20 a.m.
Former Executive Manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
Okay.
9:20 a.m.
Conservative
Michael Barrett Conservative Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON
—which is that of Ms. Lee. This issue was raised by MI5 and brought to the Speaker of the House, and then members were warned.
Why do you think that this is not a practice that's employed here in Canada? We've heard testimony here this morning already that there are state actors working at all levels of government in all political parties. I think that is surprising. Everyone would say, “Oh, it must be in another party. It must have been another government.” Members couldn't be blamed for that, because we have an intelligence service that has never told us otherwise.
Why don't we have that process in place here?
If you could keep your remarks pretty tight, I'll try to get to the other two speakers.
9:20 a.m.
Former Executive Manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
I'll be really brief.
I think that particular case in Britain was so egregious. They had intelligence that it was coming from the United Front Work Department and the PRC through this British citizen, going right into an MP's campaign fund. I think there was probably a lot more going on, but it wasn't hitting any legal thresholds, so the best the British could do was send out this all-points bulletin to everybody, identifying her and basically saying to stay away and stay clear because she's a foreign-influence actor.
Now, I wouldn't say for the allegations we have in Canada, based on what looks to be pretty sketchy information coming from the media—little dribs and drabs—that the Canadian government would issue something like that.
That's just my opinion, but I think that British case was so blatant that it provoked that.
9:20 a.m.
Conservative
Michael Barrett Conservative Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON
I'm out of time, but I'll circle back on this issue and give you an opportunity to respond, Mr. Wilczynski and Mr. Juneau-Katsuya.
Thanks for your response.
9:20 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative John Brassard
Thank you, Mr. Barrett.
We have roughly an hour and a half of questioning here, so you'll have another chance.
Mr. Bains, you're up next for six minutes.
9:20 a.m.
Liberal
Parm Bains Liberal Steveston—Richmond East, BC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
As technology advances, tactics evolve and foreign state relations evolve, like we've heard today, I believe the threat to democracy has a lot to do with disinformation and misinformation from foreign state actors and non-state actors—and even domestically here.
We've heard that this has been going on for a long time, so thank you all for joining us here today for this very important study.
My first question is for Mr. Wilczynski. I hope I said that correctly.
We have a strong, vibrant Chinese diaspora in the city that I live in, Richmond, where Mr. Chiu is also from. Some families have been here for well over 100 years, while others are first-generation Canadians.
You wrote in the Ottawa Citizen that Canadians of Chinese descent are the primary victims of interference from the CCP. Can you elaborate on that for the committee? I think we heard a bit about it before, as well.
9:25 a.m.
Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
The reason I wrote that is based a lot on what you've already heard from the other witnesses, who have spoken first-hand about how they have experienced some of those forms of pressure. There are many instances in the public domain, written about by members of the community who have highlighted and enumerated the various ways in which interference has negatively affected...whether it's through intimidation or whether it's through coercion.
There have been a lot of elements in the public domain. That's why I think it's really important and why I'm so pleased that Mr. Chiu, Mr. Ho and Mr. Manthorpe have all been here to share that experience and that research they have done in terms of the effects that manipulation has had on the community.
There are, unfortunately, too many pressure points that can be exercised by hostile states, and we have to be mindful of them. I think that's why it's important for us to listen to members of the community as we craft strategies to respond to that kind of threat.
9:25 a.m.
Liberal
Parm Bains Liberal Steveston—Richmond East, BC
On that note, are there other communities that you think are impacted in the same way?
9:25 a.m.
Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Yes. Again, that's been mentioned at this table. I think...and this is all in the public domain. You don't need to look at classified information, because the communities themselves have spoken about it.
I believe the Iranian community have spoken very directly about how they have been affected by foreign interference. We also have seen, in many instances, in the public domain.... You don't need to go out for classified information on how Putin's regime in Russia has tried to influence a wide range of issues that are of interest to that state. It affects not only, I think, members of ethnocultural communities, but also members of other targeted communities that might be vulnerable to the actions of those hostile states.
I'll elaborate on that if you'd like.
9:25 a.m.
Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Specifically, on the last one, also in the public domain, I have been particularly critical of the actions of the Russian government when it comes to targeting the LGBTQ2+ community and trying to highlight, amplify and specifically undermine Canadian support for and social cohesion around equality rights for a historically marginalized community.
For me that might not necessarily be interference so much as malign influence, but it is a hostile activity by a state actor that I think negatively affects specific Canadians.
9:25 a.m.
Liberal
Parm Bains Liberal Steveston—Richmond East, BC
How as MPs can we protect ourselves from bad actors when we aren't provided with the tools? One of the issues is that even if we proactively reach out to public safety agencies or anyone else and try to ask who we should stay away from, that information isn't shared, because, quite frankly, it could compromise something.
What can we as MPs do?
9:25 a.m.
Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Having these kinds of sessions is profoundly important, as is having officials, both current and previous, from the national security and intelligence community share what they can in a public environment about what the threat is.
Personally, I also believe there can be far more transparency from Canada's security and intelligence communities. We have the ability to speak to the public, to parliamentarians and to others around the issues of foreign interference in, I think, a more regular and more frank way.
Part of the challenge has been a long history of reticence and risk aversion when it comes to having those conversations, and I think one of the effects of that history of risk aversion to regular, forthright conversations is that many Canadians—and unfortunately a number of parliamentarians—lack a deep understanding of the way security and intelligence works and how we can work more effectively together to counter the threat posed by hostile state actors and other threats to Canada's national security.
9:25 a.m.
Liberal
Parm Bains Liberal Steveston—Richmond East, BC
In the article I referenced before, you discuss how disclosure of classified documents undermines efforts to address foreign interference.
Can you expand on why that is?
9:25 a.m.
Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Yes. Again, when one sees illicitly disclosed intelligence, there is a lot that intelligence services can determine by having access to that information. They can figure out what the source of the information is. They can figure out who, potentially, would have been seeking the information in the first place, thereby compromising individuals within the security and intelligence community themselves.
Once intelligence services acquire that knowledge, they can develop strategies to avoid similar tactics in the future. When they avoid those tactics and those tactics evolve, the ability for security and intelligence services to maintain access and to have transparency and visibility into what they are doing—whether through human sources, as happens for organizations such as CSIS, or through signals intelligence, if there's disclosure—is closed, because then targets of that intelligence collection can modify their behaviour in a way that closes that ability.
9:30 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative John Brassard
Thank you, Mr. Wilczynski and Mr. Bains.
Mr. Villemure, you're up next for six minutes.
9:30 a.m.
Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here this morning.
Mr. Juneau-Katsuya, you are back with us. I have a number of questions for you, so I would like you to answer simply yes or no. We will see where that takes us.
You say every federal government, from Mr. Mulroney's to Mr. Trudeau's, has been compromised by China. Is that correct?
9:30 a.m.
Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Unit, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual