Information & Ethics Committee on Oct. 18th, 2023

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Villemure.

I gave you extra time because the answer was important to the committee.

Mr. Green, you have six minutes.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Mr. Chair, I have a point of order.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Go ahead on your point of order.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

I'm deeply concerned here, Mr. Chair. You'll recall that, in the outset of the study, I debated vigorously to ensure that other companies were presented here. I have received communications from a Ms. Rachel Curran, somebody who should be well known to the work of committees and the importance of committees. I just want to get clarification from the clerk on which version of the motion was sent to Facebook—or its parent company, Meta—and Ms. Curran. There was a reference to “the use of social media platforms”, in that this study is not just a study about TikTok.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

I'm going to refer that to—

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Was it the original version that was sent, Mr. Chair, or was it the amended version that was sent?

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

According to the clerk, Mr. Green, it was the amended version that was sent.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Just to be clear, as our Standing Orders present in terms of the parliamentary privileges of committees to seek documents and call witnesses, I want to begin, Mr. Chair, in this point of order by sharing my deep disappointment that a corporation, particularly one like Facebook, which was involved in Cambridge Analytica, can simply send us a letter and say that they're not going to attend based on their personal opinion on the matter.

Just for the record, Mr. Chair, it's not up to their personal opinion. I want to ask you, on this point of order, whether or not this would warrant a follow-up letter from you as the chair to demand that they come here, or whether we ought to seek other more direct subpoena-type powers for corporations—besides TikTok—that have been involved with some serious security breaches and some serious malicious behaviour, as I referenced with Cambridge Analytica, in order to have a full discussion about the impacts of social media. I'm seeking your direction, sir.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

I appreciate that, Matt. What I'm going to suggest is that we will have time after these witnesses are done. We have a hard stop at seven o'clock if we want, so we can have time to discuss where we want to go with this.

Of course, as the chair, I'll certainly take the direction of the committee, but my suggestion is that we continue. I appreciate your point of order and your concern about this, but my preference is that we continue with the witnesses, because we have them for a short period of time—only until 6:30. Then, if you like, you can bring this up afterwards, sir.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

I most certainly will.

I'll begin my statement, sir, by welcoming the members from TikTok for having the courtesy and the integrity to show up before this committee. It's a very important discussion. I would suggest that the targeting of one particular company and its geopolitical relationships is troubling for me and is part of a continuing trend of what I would call “red-baiting”, but we'll allow you to answer in this next series of questions.

In reference to the last interventions regarding the French Senate commission of inquiry into the use of the TikTok social media network and the use of the data and strategy to influence, it released the conclusions of its report. They were just referenced. I want to make it crystal clear that while you're here—and certainly we haven't made you swear in officially on oath—I'm going to take you at your word that you understand the quasi-judicial nature of this committee and the seriousness of this study.

One of the conclusions included its finding that the Communist Party and the Chinese intelligence agencies could potentially have access to data collected on TikTok on its users around the world, despite constant efforts to conceal those facts. I want you to provide us with a concise and clear response to that allegation, because it seems to be at the crux of the matter here.

[David Lieber]

Thank you for that question. I'd emphasize that it is a theoretical concern that's been raised. We've been pretty clear categorically, sir, that we would not disclose user data to the Chinese government if we were requested to do so.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

That's a request, sir. What if they didn't ask you? Do they have the ability through their technology or through any other back doors to this through any of your partners, or any relationships to any operations on mainland or in Hong Kong or anywhere else, that might provide them without the need to request any access to user data?

[David Lieber]

I'm not aware of any such capability, but I also want to be clear that it would be irresponsible for me or any other employee of a technology company to make categorical guarantees about what governments are capable of or incapable of in terms of their ability to conduct activities, including hacking, on their own initiative—

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

I wasn't speaking about hacking. I was just talking about without requesting, about if they could just access it.

I appreciate the response on that, and obviously that is the crux of the matter. As somebody who has pushed for a wider study on the use of social media, whether it's through private actors like Elon Musk and the kind of unhinged nature in which his takeover of Twitter has resulted in the devolution of that platform, or Facebook or Instagram or others, I think it's important that we get clear about what it is that's at stake here.

One of the other findings from the four headings under the French Senate report included that, for the extensive data collection carried out by the platform, the purposes remain “opaque”. The multi-faceted opacity on the part of the company included its lack of transparency and the opacity of TikTok's recommended algorithm, and the public health issue with regard to concerns about the psychological effects of TikTok, particularly amongst young people.

Do you accept the findings of the report?

[David Lieber]

I would disagree with the characterization about extensive data collection. We collect less data in many instances than our competitors. If you sign up for a TikTok account, the only thing you need to provide is an email address or phone number, date of birth and a user name. You can create an account in that fashion. We don't ask for people's—

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Sir, let's be clear. We know that's how you sign up, and we know that, once the app is installed, you're tracking things whether the app is running or not. I s that not the case?

[David Lieber]

What I can tell you is that when people are using our app or collecting information—

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

That wasn't the question I asked you, sir.

[David Lieber]

We're not collecting—

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

When you're not using the app, does it continue to collect information on what you're searching—keystrokes, views and all of those things?

[David Lieber]

No.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Okay.

For the past several years, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has attempted to negotiate a national security contract with TikTok meant to mitigate concerns that it would be used by the Chinese government to access valuable personal information about U.S. citizens or manipulate U.S. civic discourse. Can you comment on the status of these negotiations, please?

[David Lieber]

The status is those negotiations are ongoing.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Is that all you're going to comment on?

[David Lieber]

I'm happy to talk further about the protocols we've deployed to address those concerns, if that's useful.

We do have a project, called Project Texas, that endeavours to address the concerns that the U.S. government has raised, mainly the concerns about Chinese government access to user data and how the platform may be manipulated or used as a conduit for—